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I. Introduction
Planning for the use and control of water
is planning for most of the basic functions of
the life of the Nation . . . Land, water, and
people go together.1
[Water] is the first [natural resource] to
have undergone public management on a
large scale, and it is the first where man has
attempted to cope in a rigorous way with inte-
grated management of linked resources in the
same area. . . . [I]t is in water that man has
made his most ambitious efforts to deal with
the whole complex network of transformation of
landscape in the human interest.2
Never before have people understood bet-
ter the social and ecological consequences of
water policies and decisions. A commitment to
make water use sensitive to the realities of nat-
ural and human communities can be rooted in
this knowledge and ethically driven by the
principles of conservation, fairness and ecolo-
gy. The long-term vitality of communities
across the American West, like the sustain-
ability of societies throughout the world,
depends on such commitments.3
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1. Report by the Mississippi Valley Committee of the Public Works
Administration 45 (Oct. 1, 1934) (emphasis added). The report was
authored by Harlan Barrows, one of three engineers appointed to
the Mississippi Valley Committee by the Natural Resources
Board to study water problems in the Mississippi River drainage
basin. Barrows believed that good planning required linking land
and water use, and he propagated that idea many times during
his distinguished career. See Martin Reuss, Coping With Uncertainty:
Social Scientists, Engineers, and Federal Water Resources Planning, 32
NAT. RESOURCES J. 101, 117-23.
2. GILBERT F. WHITE, STRATEGIES OF AMERICAN WATER
MANAGEMENT 4-5 (Univ. of Mich. Press 1969).
3. SARAH BATES ET AL., SEARCHING OUT THE HEADWATERS:
CHANGE AND REDISCOVERY IN WESTERN WATER POLICY 201-02 (Island
Press 1993).
Conceptually, water resources planning is
the simple process of balancing society’s need
for water with its available supplies. Such a
balance can be achieved either by reducing
demand to fit within existing resources, or by
increasing available supplies to meet the larg-
er demand. In reality, however, water resources
planning is much more complex. Planning,
which is an outgrowth of values and policies,
provides a foundation and framework for sub-
sequent decision-making. Values shape the
formulation of policy objectives and planning
processes.4 First, policymakers identify values
and articulate them as policy objectives.5 Once
these policy objectives have been established,
planning processes are designed to analyze the
problems and propose a set of actions to
achieve the objectives. The set of alternatives
constructed by the planning process frames
the context in which final decisions are made.
The more numerous and complex the values
and objectives, the more complicated the plan-
ning process. 
Historically, water resources policies
focused on providing adequate water supplies
to meet a community’s need, controlling the
flooding of land, maintaining navigable water-
ways or, more recently, the generation of
hydroelectric power. The policy objective for
water resources was to solve these problems at
the lowest cost to promote economic growth or
development in a particular area. Today, water
policies are far more complicated. With an
increased understanding of how water funda-
mentally impacts the sustenance and evolu-
tion of human and biologic environments, the
importance of controlling and allocating water
resources has increased, as has the number
and diversity of interests seeking a voice in the
policy-making process. Current water
resources issues encompass not only tradi-
tional balancing of supply and demand, flood
control, navigation and hydroelectric power,
but also protection of the environment, main-
tenance of water quality and distributive
impacts of resource allocation. Water
resources planning is now faced with the prob-
lem of harmonizing and blending multiple eco-
nomic, environmental and social objectives
into solutions that address the underlying
water resource problems.
During the past several decades, water
resources critics and commentators have
focused on the policy environment, with an
investigative eye toward how water policies are
framed, debated and formulated. The concerns
they have expressed include the participants
involved in the policy debate, the values artic-
ulated in policy formulation, the extent to
which alternative and dissenting views are con-
sidered, and the issues or policy impacts that
are ignored. This focus has played a critical
role in instituting procedural changes in the
formulation of water policies, and caused grad-
ual shifts in the substantive content of water
policies. The result has been the articulation
and translation of environmental and social
values6 into tangible water policy objectives. 
Often ignored, however, is an examination
of whether water resources planning has
evolved to accommodate changes in policy
objectives. Little attention has been given to
whether the dynamic sociological values7 alter-
ing water resources policies are carried into the
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4. See generally Paul Davidoff & Thomas Reiner, A Choice
Theory of Planning, 28 J. AM. INST. PLANNERS 103 (1962) (arguing that
appropriate planning alternatives cannot be prescribed from a
position of value neutrality because plans are based on achieving
objectives derived from values). See infra notes 170-73 for further
discussion of how values shape planning processes.
5. See William B. Lord, An Evolutionary Perspective on Social
Values, in SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL OBJECTIVES IN WATER RESOURCES
PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT 5 (Warren Viessman, Jr. & Kyle E.
Schilling eds., Am. Soc’y of Civil Engineers 1986). “Objectives, of
course, are derived from our values. They are disaggregated, for-
malized, and operationalized derivatives of the more ambiguous
and general concepts which help to define a culture.” Id.
6. The phrase “environmental and social values” is used
interchangeably throughout the article with the phrase “sociolog-
ical values.” The critical understanding for this article is that soci-
ological values, as described in the Appendix, are distinguishable
from economic values such as efficiency and effectiveness.
Sociological values represent a communal desire for achieving a
social benefit or avoiding a social cost. They are normative val-
ues, arrived at through a process of debate and deliberation. In
contrast, economic values can be expressed as “communal” but
are really the aggregate result of individual preferences estab-
lished through numerous private market transactions. Economic
values are established in the marketplace through the assign-
ment of monetary weights. See infra notes 151-78 and accompa-
nying text for further discussion of the important distinction
between sociological and economic values, and its implications
for water resources planning.
7. See supra note 6 and Appendix for an explanation of the
term sociological values and how it is used in this article.
planning processes. Planning is the process
that translates values and policy objectives into
a set of proposed actions for subsequent deci-
sion making. The purpose of this article is to
examine whether current water resources plan-
ning processes construct a framework for final
decisions that adequately reflects water policy
objectives. Over the past several decades, dra-
matic changes in the issues and values that
make up water policies calls into question
whether new water resource objectives are
achievable through the prevailing planning
processes.
This article argues that the newly articulat-
ed environmental and social policy objectives
of the past three decades are not sufficiently
addressed in our current water resources plan-
ning processes. The planning framework and
analytic methods used lack the capacity to
articulate and incorporate sociological values
in the planning process, severely limiting the
achievement of environmental and social
objectives. As a result, water resources plan-
ning must be fundamentally restructured. If
restructuring is not undertaken, the gap
between patterns of water resource use and
changing environmental and social values will
continue to grow.
Sociological values provide a critical nor-
mative criterion for water resources planning. A
community’s environmental and social values
represent its desire to achieve a social benefit,
or avoid a social cost. They represent a com-
munity’s aspirations and identity, and are
established through a process of public debate
and deliberation. Sociological values can be
contrasted to objective economic values, which
are aggregated monetary weights of individual
preferences expressed through marketplace
transactions. Sociological values, on the other
hand, are context-specific and represent the
collective moral considerations as to how a
community thinks it should act, independent of
how each individual would act in a private
transaction. In this respect, environmental and
social values create a set of guiding ethical
principles for water resources planning that
must be recognized and incorporated in a nor-
matively defensible planning process.8
The focus of this article is water resources
planning in California; water resources plan-
ning at the national level is given attention
where appropriate or helpful to the analysis.
The article begins with a review of historic and
current water resources planning. Sections II
and III provide important background on how
planning processes have developed over time
to accommodate the changing water policy
environment. As new concerns, values and
issues in society have manifested themselves in
water resources policies, the planning process
has subsequently changed. Because informa-
tion on historic water resources planning spe-
cific to California is scant, it is helpful first to
examine the evolution of water resources plan-
ning at the national level. An analysis of the
national planning process provides an outline
of the various stages in the development of
water resources planning, and a general under-
standing of what has induced the changes. The
national perspective is then used as a frame-
work to explore the California experience. As
might be anticipated, water planning processes
have evolved similarly in California and across
the nation. Nonetheless, it is important to
understand both histories before analyzing the
water resources planning practices of today.
Section IV of the article provides a critique
of current water resources planning. The central
question explored is whether current planning
processes have the ability to adequately con-
sider and give effect to environmental and
social objectives articulated in the policy arena.
The examination concludes that the existing
multi-objective planning framework, with its
heavy reliance upon quantitative analytic tools
and process of constrained optimization, pro-
hibits water resources planning from effectively
incorporating environmental and social values.
Section V proposes that merging water
resources and land use planning would remove
some of the barriers to achieving environmen-
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8. See infra Section IV which pursues in further detail the
importance of recognizing, articulating and finding appropriate
procedures for the incorporation of sociological values in water
resources planning. 
tal and social objectives. Concurrent planning
of these interrelated natural resources would
also provide an opportunity to create a set of
ethical principles to guide the process by
which society uses and preserves two of its
most important resources. The discussion puts
forth several arguments why water resources
and land uses should be planned together, and
provides suggestions for beginning a subse-
quent study of how the two planning process-
es can be merged.
II. Historical Development of Water
Resources Planning
A. Pre-1960s—Optimizing Economic 
Efficiency
Planning for water resources had a limited
role in American history prior to the twentieth
century. During most of the 1800s, develop-
ment of water resources was undertaken by
individuals or localized public agencies to sup-
ply water for consumptive use, keep flood
water off the land or utilize navigable water-
courses for transportation. Except to address
water quality problems in the urbanized East,9
local supplies largely fulfilled water demands.
In the arid West, where water was not abun-
dant, early settlement patterns closely paral-
leled adjoining watercourses that were divert-
ed for domestic and irrigation purposes.10
Single-purpose planning was the norm.
Under this planning paradigm, water resource
issues were disaggregated, requiring each
problem to be analyzed separately. Proposed
projects were intended to serve only one pur-
pose such as flood control, navigation or water
supply (including water quality). Planning
merely involved a comparison of reasonable
project alternatives to determine the best
design for satisfying the purpose.11 Simple effi-
cacy testing was employed to ensure the proj-
ect achieved the desired goal with minimum
inputs of materials. The common criteria for
water resource projects were safety, workabili-
ty, durability and economy.12
With the ushering in of the Industrial Age
and Progressivism in the early 1900s, water
resources were developed and controlled on
an unprecedented basis, allowing for the provi-
sion of water to vast new areas.13 Three engi-
neering accomplishments provided a powerful
stimulus for damming the rivers of America:
pumping technologies for the transportation of
water across great distances, improvements in
the production and use of concrete for dam
construction, and the development of hydro-
electric power.14 Furthermore, west of the hun-
dredth meridian, where the spatial imbalance
between water supply and water demand is
often extreme, an ongoing population explo-
sion dictated rapid deployment of new water
resource technologies. With a growing percep-
tion of water as a “developable natural
resource,” the need for more comprehensive
planning became apparent. Technology made
possible the use of water for multiple purpos-
es, and diversifying demands necessitated a
planning process.
Beginning with the administration of
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9. See ROBERT GOTTLIEB, A LIFE OF ITS OWN: THE POLITICS AND
POWER OF WATER 158-61 (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 1988); see gen-
erally NELSON BLAKE, WATER FOR THE CITIES: A HISTORY OF URBAN
SUPPLY PROBLEMS IN THE UNITED STATES (Syracuse Univ. Press 1956).
10. See Vincent A. Ostrom, The Role of Public and Private
Agencies in Planning the Use of Water Resources, in LAND AND WATER:
PLANNING FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH 29, 34-35 (Harold L. Amoss &
Roma K. McNickle eds., Univ. of Colo. Press 1961); see also PETER
ROGERS, AMERICA’S WATER: FEDERAL ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES 47-49
(Twentieth Century Fund 1993).
11. See WHITE, supra note 2, at 15-33. Single purpose plan-
ning is designed to serve a single aim by a single means, relying
on construction as that means. This was the practice in water
resources development prior to the twentieth century efforts to
develop water resources for multiple uses such as hydroelectric
power, irrigation, municipal water supply and waste disposal. See
id. at 11; see also JIM MULDER ET AL., INTEGRATING WATER RESOURCES AND
LAND USE PLANNING 6 (Utah State Univ. 1979).
12. See WHITE, supra note 2, at 11, 30-33.
13. See SAMUEL P. HAYS, CONSERVATION AND THE GOSPEL OF
EFFICIENCY: THE PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATION MOVEMENT, 1890-1920
(Harvard Univ. Press 1959). Hays argues that the progressive con-
servation movement was rooted in the deep faith that science
and technology could improve human lives through continual
planned and efficient progress. The movement gave rise to the
notion of resource management, including the concepts of “river-
basin planning” and “multiple-use.” Id.
14. See Kenneth D. Frederick, Changing Water Resources
Institutions, in SUSTAINING OUR WATER RESOURCES 67-71 (Water
Science & Tech. Bd. ed., Nat’l Academy Press 1993). “The combi-
nation of these technological, economic, and political forces con-
tributed to the rapid growth of water use and dam construction
that characterized the first seven decades of this century. Total
off-stream water use rose from about 40 billion gallons per day
(bgd) in 1900 to 370 bgd in 1970. The number of completed dams
rose from less than 3,000 at the start of the century to more than
50,000 by 1970.” Id. at 71.
President Theodore Roosevelt, federal agen-
cies charged with the development and control
of water resources began to alter their planning
methods. “River basin planning” and “compre-
hensive water resources planning” became
widely utilized.15 These multi-purpose planning
processes were implemented to optimize the
use of water resources for needs such as water
supply, water quality, navigation, flood control,
hydropower, land utilization and transporta-
tion.16 The goal of multi-purpose planning was
to design and manage water projects to satisfy
numerous purposes, a revolution from the his-
toric single-purpose planning. For example, a
major dam would be planned to simultaneous-
ly control flooding, generate hydroelectric
power, store water supplies, develop farmland,
regulate streamflow for navigation and create
recreational opportunities.17
Planning for a “purpose,” however, differs
from planning for an “objective.” Purposes are
defined as tangible problems such as water
supply, irrigation or flood control, while objec-
tives are defined as policy goals such as eco-
nomic efficiency, environmental quality, equity
and fairness. Purposes define the ends to be
achieved or problems to be solved. Objectives
delineate and shape the means to achieve the
ends.18 For the first two-thirds of the twentieth
century, water resources planning sought to
ensure that projects served multiple purposes,
but the objective of the planning process was
singular—economic efficiency.19 Once the pur-
poses or problems were identified, the plan-
ning process would analyze whether a pro-
posed project could achieve the purpose or
solve the problems in an economically efficient
manner. Benefit-cost analysis was the back-
bone of water resources planning because it
optimized the objective of economic efficien-
cy.20 If a proposed water project that achieved
the stated purposes could be designed and
managed to produce more benefits than costs,
the project was approved. Planning water
resources projects to accomplish multiple pur-
poses merely facilitated the economic efficien-
cy objective, because benefits were more likely
to outweigh costs. One author summarized the
water resources planning process as follows:
By the late 1950s, water resources
planning was a design-oriented pro-
cess carried out basically by one
agency responsible for the specific
problem to be solved. A need, flood
control, water supply, hydroelectric
power, or navigation, was recognized,
and an engineering design was pre-
pared to satisfy this need. The design
strived towards maximizing monetary
net benefits through multiple purpose
use of structures. Evaluation was gen-
erally based on monetary benefit-cost
analyses.21
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15. See Theodore M. Schad, Water Resources Planning—
Historical Development, 105 J. WATER RESOURCES PLAN. & MGMT. DIV. 9,
12-15 (March 1979).
16. See NATIONAL RESOURCES COMMITTEE, REGIONAL FACTORS IN
NATIONAL PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT, 111 (1935); see also ROGERS,
supra note 10, at 50-54.
17. See WHITE, supra note 2, at 10-11. “[There is] a tradition-
al distinction between the single-purpose dam for flood control,
irrigation, or power, and the multiple-purpose dam, serving two
or more purposes, which played an influential role in the devel-
opment of river basin programs in the 1930’s and 1940’s.” Id. at 11.
18. For example, assume the purpose or end is to create
an adequate water supply to meet demand. Assume also the
objective is to balance supply and demand in the most econom-
ically efficient manner. A balanced supply and demand could be
achieved either by building a dam, conserving current supplies,
importing water from another region, or controlling demand for
water. The action, or combination of actions, which attain the
purpose (balanced supply and demand) would be evaluated on
the objective to be achieved (economic efficiency). Adding addi-
tional purposes might make it easier to achieve the objective. For
example, it may be more economically efficient to build a dam if
the purpose is not only to create a water supply, but to also con-
trol flooding and generate power. But if there are other objectives
that must be achieved (e.g., environmental preservation, equity,
ecology), the mix of actions to fulfill the purposes may change
dramatically: balancing supply and demand through conserva-
tion, controlling flooding by land use decisions, or generating
power from an alternate source.
19. See Frederick, supra note 14, at 124-29; see also Reuss,
supra note 1, at 110-13; MULDER ET AL., supra note 11, at 8.
20. See Allen V. Kneese, Economics and Water Resources, in
WATER RESOURCES ADMINISTRATION IN THE UNITED STATES: POLICY,
PRACTICE, AND EMERGING ISSUES 23, 25-28 (Martin Reuss ed., Mich.
State Univ. Press 1993); MULDER ET AL., supra note 11, at 14. In
1936, with the passage of the Federal Flood Control Act, benefit-
cost analysis was officially adopted as a tool for assessing and
comparing the economic feasibility of alternative proposed proj-
ects. The practice was soon incorporated into all water resources
planning practices.  See infra notes 137 and 142 for a definition
and description of how benefit-cost analysis is conducted.
21. Harry E. Schwarz, Water Resources Planning – Its Recent
Evolution, 105 J. WATER RESOURCES PLAN. & MGMT. DIV. 27, 28 (1979).
The result of this multi-purpose, single-
objective approach to water resources planning
was policy debates limited to the discussion of
which projects should be built, and whether
small design changes would add benefits or
avoid costs. Discussion about whether a water
project was desirable or should be built based
on other criteria was not included in the plan-
ning process or policy debate.22 Optimizing the
objective of economic efficiency meant that
water resources projects were always deemed
desirable and justifiable when project benefits
exceeded costs.
B. 1960 to 1980—Emerging Environmental
and Social Concerns
The 1960s and 1970s presented new chal-
lenges to water resources policies, requiring
planning methodologies to evolve from serving
a single objective to grappling with the complex
task of satisfying multiple objectives.23 The fun-
damental shift resulted from fiscal, environ-
mental and social forces set in motion during
this period which have continued to influence
and change water resources policies and plan-
ning. While current water resources planning is
more technically complex, the fundamental
challenge of multi-objective planning, to opti-
mize competing and often conflicting objec-
tives, remains a central struggle.
The fiscal problems associated with single-
objective planning received heightened scruti-
ny in the early 1960s.24 The cost of proposed
water projects skyrocketed and public support
faltered for three reasons. First, projects
became increasingly expensive and complex as
benefit-cost analysis determined the simplest
and most beneficial projects were built first
leaving only marginally justifiable projects.25
Second, various groups mounted legal and
political challenges to proposed projects,
greatly extending the time period for comple-
tion.26 Third, the public’s willingness to finance
expensive water projects waned in the post-
New Deal era as public debt rapidly increased
and a growing number of social programs accel-
erated the drain on public funds.27 The cost of
supplying water also increased sharply due to
rising energy costs for water delivery, new water
quality standards requiring expensive treat-
ment and increased maintenance costs of an
aging water resources infrastructure.28
The emerging environmental move-
ment in the late 1960s and early 1970s also
helped raise the public’s awareness of the envi-
ronmental consequences of water resources
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22. See Leonard Shabman, Nonmarket Valuation and Public
Policy: Historical Lessons and New Directions, in MULTIOBJECTIVE ANALYSIS
IN WATER RESOURCES 16, 21-22 (Yacov Y. Haimes & David J. Allee
eds., Am. Soc’y of Civil Engineers 1982).
23. See Frederick, supra note 14, at 130-31. “Multi-objective
planning is based upon the concept of constrained optimization.
One merely optimizes one objective, for example national eco-
nomic growth, while setting other objectives, such as environ-
mental quality, as constraints upon the system, or alternatively
weighs different objectives into one objective function to opti-
mize.” Peter Rogers, Integrated Urban Water Resources Management,
NATURAL RESOURCES F. 37 (1993). See generally ARTHUR MAASS ET AL.,
DESIGN OF WATER RESOURCE SYSTEMS: NEW TECHNIQUES FOR RELATING
ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES, ENGINEERING ANALYSIS, & GOVERNMENT
PLANNING (Harvard Univ. Press 1966). Section IV, infra, provides
further discussion of multi-objective planning and how it is prac-
ticed.
24. See THE PRESIDENT’S WATER RESOURCES COUNCIL, POLICIES,
STANDARDS, AND PROCEDURES IN THE FORMULATION, EVALUATION, AND
REVIEW OF THE PLANS FOR USE AND DEVELOPMENT OF WATER RELATED
RESOURCES, S. DOC. NO. 87-97 (1962) (highlighting the need to
move from single-objective water projects subject to benefit-cost
analysis, towards a multi-objective evaluation processes which
could include analyses reflective of three basic objectives:
national economic development, resources conservation, and the
well-being of people).
25. “Fifteen years and 20 billion dollars later [after the
President’s Water Resources Policy Commission report issued in
1950] a number of the major basins in the United States have
reached the point where the most promising dam sites have been
built . . . [i]ndeed there is reason to think that the storage sur-
faces provided with the completion of additional dams will gen-
erate a total amount of evaporation in a year exceeding the
incremental gain in storage resulting from recent construction.”
WHITE, supra note 2, at 4-5.
26. See, e.g., Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hiram Hill, 437
U.S. 153 (1978) (upholding the right of citizen groups to prohibit
the construction of the Tellico Dam where its construction would
be harmful to the endangered Snail Darter fish in violation of the
Endangered Species Act); Udall v. Federal Power Comm., 387 U.S.
428 (1967) (blocking federal approval of a hydroelectric project
because of its failure to adequately consider the public’s interest
in preserving wildlife under the Fish & Wildlife Coordination Act
and the Anadromous Fish Act.); Natural Resources Defense
Council v. Grant, 341 F. Supp. 356 (1972) (prohibiting implemen-
tation of the Chicod Creek Watershed Management Plan until the
Soil Conservation Service had prepared an environmental impact
statement in compliance with the National Environmental Policy
Act).
27. See Robert Kelley, The Context and the Process: How They
Have Changed Over Time, in WATER RESOURCES ADMINISTRATION IN THE
UNITED STATES: POLICY, PRACTICE, AND EMERGING ISSUES, 10, 18 (Martin
Reuss ed., Mich. State Univ. Press 1993); see also Frederick, supra
note 14, at 72.
28. See DAVID W. PRASIFKA, WATER SUPPLY PLANNING, xi (Krieger
Publishing Co. 1994).
projects.29 The public concerns that drove the
movement focused primarily on preventing envi-
ronmental destruction and pollution.30 The move-
ment resulted in the establishment of numerous
statutes, agencies and regulations that substan-
tially affect water resources planning and poli-
cies. The National Environmental Policy Act
(“NEPA”)31 represents the cornerstone of public
action. NEPA requires federal agencies to assess
the environmental impacts of their actions and
gives the public a legal tool for contesting water
resource projects by forcing consideration of less
environmentally harmful design and program
alternatives. Predating the enactment of NEPA by
several years, the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act,32
prevents projects that excessively damage natu-
ral amenities on 112 rivers designated under the
Act and provides interim protection for 105 rivers
being studied for potential listing.33 Several other
significant federal actions during the early 1970s
embodied the changing environmental values in
American culture. The Clean Water Act of 197234
and the Safe Drinking Water Act of 197435 brought
to the forefront concerns about pollution of water
resources and the quality of water used for
human consumption. The Endangered Species
Act of 197336 highlighted the plight of designated
species whose survival or critical habitat is
threatened by human activity.
Finally, water resources planning was affect-
ed by an emerging movement concerned with the
inclusion and consideration of social values,
such as public participation in the planning
process and the distributive impacts of water
resource allocation. During the 1960s there was
growing dissatisfaction with the government’s
administrative procedure process, assailed as
having been captured by special interests.37 The
political dynamic formed between legislative
committees, administrative agencies and special
interest groups was referred to as the “iron trian-
gle.”38 In water resources administration, the con-
cern was that iron triangles created a planning
process heavily biased in favor of water “develop-
ment,” to the exclusion of public concerns and
values.39
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29. See Leonard Ortolano, Water Planning and the
Environment, 105 J. WATER RESOURCES PLAN. & MGMT. DIV. 65 (1979). 
The 1960s also represented a period in which scholars
from universities and elsewhere began a serious
attack on the economic efficiency concept as the basis
for ranking water resources plans. Like some of the cit-
izen critics, academics argued that economic efficien-
cy provided an inappropriately narrow basis for rank-
ing alternatives, since many significant environmental
and social effects of Federal water resources invest-
ments cannot be measured in terms of incremental
change in national income. . . . Partly as a conse-
quence of the aforementioned criticisms, the early
1970s witnessed the emergence of some fundamental
changes in laws, policies, and regulations governing
Federal water resources planning.
Id. at 72.
30. See Appendix (describing utilitarian value in conserva-
tion).
31. National Environmental Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 91-190,
83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-
4370d). The statute required for the first time that federal agen-
cies “stop and think” before taking actions which could signifi-
cantly affect the environment. NEPA imposed procedural require-
ments on federal agencies by mandating formal documentation
of the decision making process, consideration of negative
impacts and benefits, and project alternatives. The NEPA regula-
tory model has been replicated by many states for governing
state agency actions. See California Environmental Quality Act
(“CEQA”), CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21000-21177 (West 1991). See
infra notes 116-22, 204-07 for additional details about CEQA and
NEPA.
32. Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, Pub. L. No. 90-542, 82 Stat.
906 (1968) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271-1287).
33. See DAVID H. GETCHES, WATER LAW IN A NUTSHELL 153
(West 1990).
34. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments,
Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified as amended in
scattered sections at 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1387).
35. Safe Drinking Water Act, Pub. L. No. 93-523, 88 Stat.
1661 (1974) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 300f to 300j-
26).
36. Endangered Species Act, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat.
884 (1973) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544). The
Endangered Species Act has been interpreted to require that
once a species is designated as “endangered,” federal agencies,
and to a lesser degree private citizens, are prohibited from taking
actions which would “take, harm, or harass” the species. The Act
has not only been used to block water projects, but also to force
changes in the management of existing water resources projects.
See, e.g., Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hiram Hill, 437 U.S. 153
(1978).
37. See generally THEODORE LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM:
IDEOLOGY, POLICY AND THE CRISIS OF PUBLIC AUTHORITY (Norton 1969).
38. See generally JOHN LIEPER FREEMAN, THE POLITICAL PROCESS:
EXECUTIVE BUREAU-LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE RELATIONS (Random
House 1965). The concept of iron triangles is still widely utilized
as a political theory for explaining how particular interests are
served through the legislative and administrative process. See
DANIEL MCCOOL, COMMAND OF THE WATERS: IRON TRIANGLES, FEDERAL
WATER DEVELOPMENT, AND INDIAN WATER 6-13 (Univ. of Cal. Press
1987).
39. See DAVID LEWIS FELDMAN, WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT:
IN SEARCH OF AN ENVIRONMENTAL ETHIC 6-7 (The Johns Hopkins Univ.
Press 1991); see also Harvey R. Doerksen & John C. Pierce, Citizen
Influence in Water Policy Decisions: Context, Constraints, and Alternatives,
11 WATER RESOURCES BULL. 5 (1975).
The judicial system responded to these
criticisms through a number of important
developments.40 First, the right of participation
in agency decision-making, and the ability to
seek judicial review of those decisions, was
extended to “public interest” representatives.41
Secondly, courts expanded the coverage and
content of procedural formalities to require full
agency documentation of planning processes,
and provided interested parties the legal
means to ascertain and rebut the factual and
analytical bases for agency decisions.42 This
revolution in administrative law resulted in
public participation, oversight and challenge
to water resources planning processes.43 The
diverse interests clamoring for a stake in water
resources were slowly empowered to inject
new concerns and objectives into the planning
process.44
By the mid-1970s water resources planners
had a vast number of new issues, laws, regula-
tions, procedural requirements and public
interests to consider and incorporate into their
planning practices. For the first time, limits
were placed on water resources development.
This was most prominent in the arid West,
where the reality of water scarcity finally
emerged as a central planning concern.45 Fiscal
constraints, environmental impacts and social
concerns all led to limitations upon the con-
tinual augmentation of water supplies. The
limits of Industrial Age and Progressive era
policies were being realized. Solutions to water
resources problems could no longer be sought
by merely constructing another dam, building
a more extensive supply system or using new
technology to extract additional water. Fiscal,
environmental and social limits demanded
attention.46 One author and engineer writing in
1969, issued this warning:
The prevalence of this view that
major channel and streamflow regula-
tion constitutes the primary means
and foundation of water management
makes it all the more important to
reassess the methods that have gov-
erned in the past and to examine the
possibilities offered by new ones . . .
the prevailing methods are ill-suited to
the changing conditions of both the
[water] supply and its use.47
The “changing conditions” of this era
forced a paradigm shift in water resources
planning. Rejected were the two old planning
methodologies: the traditional engineering
approach in which water resources problems
were solved through the design of physical
projects, and the modified engineering
approach where multiple design alternatives
were subject to benefit-cost analysis to select
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40. See generally Richard Stewart, The Reformation of American
Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669 (1975).
41. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). In Sierra
Club, the Court greatly expanded the definition of constitutional-
ly cognizable injuries that could be the basis of citizen lawsuits to
include injured interests that “reflect aesthetic, conservational,
and recreational, as well as economic values.” Id. at 734, 738.
42. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401
U.S. 402 (1971) (invalidating the Department of Transportation’s
decision to place a highway through a public park because it was
arbitrary and capricious, and an abuse of agency discretion);
Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966) (holding that the Federal
Power Commission failed to adequately consider several impor-
tant factors in its decision to grant a license for the development
of a hydroelectric project on the west side of the Hudson River;
the case was remanded to the agency for further proceedings
which took five years, but resulted in a substantially modified
project).
43. See generally JOHN C. PIERCE & HARVEY DOERKSEN, WATER
POLITICS AND PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT (Ann Arbor Science 1976).
44. See GOTTLIEB, supra note 9, at 199-240 (documenting the
emergence of environmentalists, Native Americans and local
grass-roots community groups as interests demanding a role in
the water planning process).
45. The literature on water resources planning during the
late 1960s and 1970s reflects a growing recognition of the limits
on the continual expansion of water supplies due to fiscal, envi-
ronmental and social constraints. See generally WHITE, supra note 2;
see also RICHARD C. MURRAY & E. BODETTE REEVES, ESTIMATED USE OF
WATER IN THE UNITED STATES IN 1970 (U.S. Geological Survey 1970).
“There is chronic and anxious talk of national water shortage. . . .
The most menacing aspect of the prophecy . . . is that it may
become self-fulfilling.” WHITE, supra note 2, at 1-2. 
46. See Shabman, supra note 22, at 22. “With the late 1960s
the social consensus on water development began to collapse. . .
. As the nation moved into the 1970’s, the concept of a capital
stock in water resources was expanded beyond physical works to
include the remaining free-flowing rivers and environmental
amenities associated with them. Accompanying this change was
the view that water resource decisions must focus on using what
we have rather than on seeking to expand the supply of physical
works. Such a view challenged the basic, unquestioned, con-
struction premise of the traditional water programs.” Id.
47. WHITE, supra note 2, at 5.
the most economically efficient type and scale
of works. The new direction in water resources
planning was synthesized by the 1973 Report of
the National Water Commission.48 The focus of
the study was water resources planning that
emphasized economic, environmental, social
and legal analysis, rather than technological
solutions. The Commission’s executive direc-
tor, Theodore M. Schad, noted that the report
reflected a belief that “a change in emphasis
from water development to preservation is
underway and will continue in the future.”49
New fiscal, environmental and social con-
cerns forced water resources planning to trans-
form from single objective to multi-objective
planning.50 The planning process was expanded
to include, as potential strategies, both the
management of existing water resources and
the creation of new supplies.  These strategies
balanced supply and demand while achieving
economic, environmental and social objec-
tives.51 Institutional changes were also made in
the control of water resources to facilitate the
transformation.
Planning to implement the economic effi-
ciency objective was redefined to include both
supply augmentation and demand manage-
ment strategies. Constraints on the develop-
ment of new facilities from strained budgets,
rising construction costs and increased water
delivery costs dictated that benefit-cost analy-
sis should consider how improved manage-
ment of existing resources affected economic
efficiency.52 Planners were required to examine
how much more efficient operation of existing
facilities and careful stewardship of existing
supplies could satisfy new and changing water
demands.53
While the economic efficiency objective
was being redefined, new environmental and
social concerns were forcing their way into
water resources planning. The plethora of envi-
ronmental laws enacted during this period
required water resources agencies to reshape
their planning processes and include a legal
review of proposed plans to ensure statutory
compliance.54 These new environmental laws
presented planners with new concerns that
had to be addressed in any proposed water
resource project or action. These concerns
included: protection of endangered species,
protection of particular waterways, impacts on
fish and wildlife, water pollution, water quality
and other potentially negative adverse envi-
ronmental effects of a proposed development.
Environmental considerations reinforced the
advantage of water resources management
alternatives, as compliance with environmen-
tal statutes was often more efficiently and
effectively achieved through better manage-
ment of existing supplies.55
Changes in administrative law helped to
ensure that new environmental and social con-
cerns were considered in the planning process.
Citizen groups now had legal avenues through
which to assert their claims and arguments for
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48. NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, WATER POLICIES FOR THE
FUTURE (Final Report to the President and the Congress of the
United States, GPO 1973).
49. Theodore M. Schad, The National Water Commission
Revisited, 14 WATER RESOURCES BULL. 302, 306 (1978).
50. See Kneese, supra note 20, at 28-29. See supra notes 15-
22 and accompanying text for an explanation of the difference
between single-objective and multi-objective planning.
51. See generally Lord, supra note 5. “Resource development
is giving way to resource management. . . . Management planning
will be quite different from development planning. Distributive
politics will take a back seat to redistributive and, especially, reg-
ulatory politics in public decision making. . . . Greater emphasis
will be placed upon the establishment of societal goals and
objectives.” Id. at 9.
52. See NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, supra note 48, at 227-
315 (making eight recommendations for how to improve the prac-
tices and procedures for managing existing water resources to
secure greater productivity without augmentation of supplies).
The Senate Select Committee on National Water Resources pre-
sented its findings in 1961, and among its principle recommen-
dations was the need to avert future water shortages produced by
anticipated growth, through achieving greater efficiency in water
use and development. See ROGERS, supra note 10, at 56-57.
53. See L. Douglas James, Needed Directions in Analysis of Water
Management Alternatives, in MULTI-OBJECTIVE ANALYSIS IN WATER
RESOURCES 46 (Yacov Y. Haimes & David J. Allee eds., Am. Soc’y of
Civil Engineers 1982) (arguing that water resources planning
must change its emphasis from constructing new facilities, to
more efficient management that takes into account possibilities
for reallocation, conservation and quality protection).
54. See Ortolano, supra note 29, at 72-74 (providing an
overview of how environmental objectives were integrated into
the water resources planning process); see also Benjamin F. Hobbs
& Walter M. Grayman, Dealing with Social and Environmental Evaluative
Criteria, in SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL OBJECTIVES IN WATER RESOURCES
PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT, supra note 5, at 308, 309-10.
55. This was especially true in the area of water quality. See
GOTTLIEB, supra note 9, at 155-98 (providing an excellent account
of emergence of water quality as a central concern for water
resources agencies during the 1960s and 1970s).
alternative designs or the prohibition of a pro-
posed project.56 To avoid legal challenges, the
planning process was adapted to be more
inclusive and responsive to environmental and
social concerns by increasing, and often even-
tually mandating, public participation.57 Water
planning was forced to focus less on efficiency
and more on the distributive effects of water
projects and programs.58 The central struggle
for water resources planners was to incorpo-
rate broader noneconomic environmental and
social values into a planning process that was
built on traditional benefit-cost analysis
designed to optimize economic efficiency.59
Structural changes in the control of water
resources planning also facilitated implemen-
tation of multi-objective planning. In 1965, the
Water Resources Planning Act was adopted.60
The Act created the federal Water Resources
Council (“WRC”) which brought together seven
federal agencies to develop principles, stan-
dards and procedures for planning and evalu-
ating water resources development propos-
als.61 After extensive study, the WRC issued the
final principles and standards in 1973, which
were binding on all federal agencies and feder-
ally funded water resources projects.62 The
principles and standards established two
objectives to guide water resources planning,
national economic development and environ-
mental quality. They also established a
detailed planning process for achieving these
objectives, requiring for the first time analyses
such as formulation of alternative plans, trade-
offs among various alternatives and documen-
tation of the range of uncertainties and impli-
cations for project alternatives.63 With the cre-
ation of the WRC and the enactment of NEPA,64
formal inter-agency cooperation became the
norm and agencies began to give serious con-
sideration to the suggestions of other agencies
and the public regarding changes in project
plans.65
C. 1980 to Present—Multi-Objective Planning
By the 1980s, multi-objective planning had
become well-entrenched as a process for
implementing water resources policies. Three
fundamental objectives emerged for inclusion
in multi-objective water resource planning
process: economic efficiency, environmental
protection and social equity. The evolution in
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56. See supra notes 31-44 and accompanying text.
57. See generally Gene E. Willeke, Social Aspects of Water
Resources Planning, 105 J. WATER RESOURCES PLAN. & MGMT. DIV. 79
(1979); Gene E. Willeke, Theory and Practice of Public Participation in
Planning, 100 J. IRRIGATION & DRAINAGE DIV. 75 (1974); but see
GOTTLIEB, supra note 9, at 246-53 (arguing that “[d]espite the inter-
est in improving its public image, the water industry, however,
has been slow to substantively alter either its methods or goals,”
and concluding that, “[p]ublic participation . . . meant establish-
ing water utility legitimacy, not new policies”). “Citizen participa-
tion (or public involvement) was brought about by feelings on the
part of citizens, planners, and elected officials alike that the con-
cerns of citizens were not being adequately incorporated into
plans for public projects. Eventually, citizen participation was
required in all water resources planning conducted by a Federal
agency or with Federal funds. This brought about a considerable
revision of planning procedures.” Willeke, supra, at 79.
58. See Willeke, supra note 57, at 87-88; see also GOTTLIEB,
supra note 9, at 253-57 (discussing the issue of water pricing
inequities).
59. See Adam B. Jaffe, Benefit-Cost Analysis and Multi-Objective
Evaluation of Federal Water Projects, 4 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 58 (1980).
“Benefit-cost analysis has serious limitations, even when used
solely as a measure of the economic return of a project. Some of
its weaknesses, such as particular improper procedures and the
bias resulting from evaluation by construction agencies, could be
remedied in principle. . . . The more fundamental problems, such
as the difficulties measuring the value of non-priced commodi-
ties . . . demonstrate the need for maximum exploration of alter-
native assumptions.” Id. at 68. See infra notes 137, 142 for a
detailed definition of benefit-cost analysis, and infra Section IV.A.
for further discussion of the inherent problem of “valuation” in
benefit-cost analysis.
60. Water Resources Planning Act, Pub. L. No. 89-80, 79
Stat. 244 (1965) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1962-1962d-3).
61. The WRC was composed of the Secretaries of
Agriculture, Army, Commerce, Energy, Interior, Housing and
Urban Development, and the Administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1962a (West 1999). 
62. See Principles and Standards for Planning Water and
Related Land Resources, 38 Fed. Reg. 24,778 (1973).
63. See id. The actual impact of the Water Resources
Council’s Principle and Standards (“P&S”) guidelines has been
minimal. The P&S guidelines were the subject of great debate
throughout the 1970s and were never truly instituted in federal
water resources planning processes. It is important, however, to
realize that the substantive and procedural issues raised by the
WRC and the P&S guidelines have continued to resonate and
influence the direction of water resources planning. See generally
Eugene Z. Stakhiv, Achieving Social and Environmental Objectives in
Water Resources Planning: Theory and Practice, in SOCIAL AND
ENVIRONMENTAL OBJECTIVES IN WATER RESOURCES PLANNING AND
MANAGEMENT, supra note 5, at 107; see also ROGERS, supra note 10, at
125, 127; Jaffe, supra note 59, at 82-85. See infra note 167 and
accompanying text for further discussion of the relative failure of
the P&S and its progeny.
64. See supra note 31 and accompanying text for explana-
tion of NEPA.
65. See Ortolano, supra note 29, at 75.
water resources planning, however, was mir-
rored by a transformation in water resources
philosophy. The forces of change in the late
1960s and ‘70s brought an end to the era of big
water development projects. Supply augmen-
tation was no longer considered the major pol-
icy program for agencies responsible for water
resources.66 The 1980s ushered in not only
multi-objective planning, but a new era of
water resources stewardship with a shifting
policy emphasis from water supply considera-
tions to those of water quality, environmental
quality and distributive equity.67
The result is a planning process that pro-
duces a very different mix of water resources
programs and projects.68 Demand and supply
management projects are incorporated into
the planning process to help achieve an effi-
cient balance of water supply and demand
while preserving environmental quality.69
Environmental quality and water quality objec-
tives are furthered through the implementa-
tion of projects and programs that prevent pol-
lution of water supplies and sources, retain
sufficient in-stream flows, and treat water sup-
plies and wastewater discharges. Equitable
and environmental objectives are promoted
through the implementation of new legal and
regulatory procedures for water resources
planning70 which enhance the spectrum of
community interests asserting a stake in the
planning process.71 No longer are business and
environmental groups the only ones concerned
with how water resources planning is conduct-
ed; Native Americans, homeowners, low-
income advocates, recreationists, health advo-
cates and other grass-roots community groups
are demanding a voice in the process.72
The change in direction of water policies
and programs has re-emphasized the critical
role of multi-objective planning for water
resources, but has also made the planning
process extremely complex. The expanding
number of interests represented in the plan-
ning process, the increasingly varied demands
for water, and the growing array of programs,
technologies and facilities available to help
meet the objectives have dramatically
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66. See Philip C. Metzger, The Need for Institutional
Modernization, in SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL OBJECTIVES IN WATER
RESOURCES PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT, supra note 5, at 27. See also
Christine Olsenius, Implications and Current Trends, in SOCIAL AND
ENVIRONMENTAL OBJECTIVES IN WATER RESOURCES PLANNING AND
MANAGEMENT, supra note 5, at 19, 20. “The federal government is
getting out of the water construction business. With the excep-
tion of waste water treatment, water project development has
been at a standstill.” Id. at 20. “For perhaps the last decade, most
experts would concur that few if any unbuilt projects or undevel-
oped sites for major dams remain that are both environmentally
acceptable and economically efficient. . . . Accordingly, for 10
years now there has been no federal funding provided to begin
building new water projects, and no new federal projects author-
ized.” Metzger, supra, at 27.
67. See GOTTLIEB, supra note 9, at 155-240. See generally
Warren Viessman, Jr., Water Management: Challenge and Opportunity,
116 J. WATER RESOURCES PLAN. & MGMT. 155 (1990). “[T]here are
basically no more unallocated supplies of water in the arid West.
This means attention is shifting away from development projects
and associated economic evaluation problems to the efficient
and equitable allocation and reallocation of existing supplies.”
Kneese, supra note 20, at 30.
68. See Frederick, supra note 14, at 75-76; see also Rutherford
H. Platt, Geographers and Water Resource Policy, in WATER RESOURCES
ADMINISTRATION IN THE UNITED STATES: POLICY, PRACTICE, AND EMERGING
ISSUES, supra note 20, at 36, 44-46.
69. Demand management programs and projects such as
the reallocation of water among alternative uses, water pricing,
water conservation, and public education have helped to meet
changing demands or control increasing demands without aug-
menting existing water supplies. Concurrently, water recycling
(through reclamation and reuse), leak detection and repair pro-
grams, and drought management measures (conjunctive use of
groundwater and surface storage, water banking, land fallowing,
etc.) have been instituted to augment available supplies without
developing new water sources. See ROGERS, supra note 10, at 101-
115 (providing good overview of current water resources manage-
ment practices); see generally PRASIFKA, supra note 28; JAMES
WINPENNY, MANAGING WATER AS AN ECONOMIC RESOURCE 25-28
(Routledge 1994).
70. See supra notes 31-44 and accompanying text.
71. See PETER E. BLACK, CONSERVATION OF WATER AND RELATED
LAND RESOURCES, 26-28 (Rowman & Littlefield 1987) (discussing
how the 1960s and ‘70s fundamentally changed the perspective of
both citizens and water agencies about the role of the public in
decision making). “[T]he historic record abundantly demon-
strates, water management is becoming more, not less political;
the public and their elected representatives, through a growing
complex of private and public agencies, locally, regionally,
statewide, and nationally, are getting more and more involved. . .
. Even the mighty Metropolitan Water District of Southern
California is increasingly needing to take account of public
desires and to let down the bars guarding its insulated system of
elite control.” Kelley, supra note 27, at 14, 19.
72. For good examples of how an increasingly diverse mix
of interests are seeking participation in the water resources plan-
ning process, see GOTTLIEB, supra note 9, at 177-92 (health advo-
cates and grass-roots community groups), 219-28 (Native
Americans), 234-40 (various local grass-roots organizations). See
also Ellen L. Fraites & Frances H. Flanigan, Perspectives on the Role of
the Citizen in the Chesapeake Bay Restoration, in WATER RESOURCES
ADMINISTRATION IN THE UNITED STATES: POLICY, PRACTICE, AND EMERGING
ISSUES, supra note 20, at 105 (documenting the numerous local
organizations which rallied around water resources issues in the
Chesapeake Bay area).
increased the factors and variables in the plan-
ning process. Moreover, the advent of comput-
ers has introduced sophisticated modeling,
data collection and data analysis techniques,
thereby increasing the intricacy of the planning
process.73 But, as one prominent engineer
recently noted, multi-objective planning has
been, “made unnecessarily complicated with
its own nomenclature and dedicated computer
software . . . but no fetish is required: whether
specialized software or more general purpose
models . . . are used, the different versions of
this tool yield essentially equivalent results.”74
In other words, despite its complexity,
multi-objective planning is still an understand-
able planning concept.75 As such, the multi-
objective planning process can be scrutinized
at a conceptual level for how well it serves as a
present-day tool for reconciling water resourc-
es policy objectives and creating a foundation
for subsequent decision-making. This analysis
is undertaken in Section IV.
III. Water Resources Planning in California
A. Historical Overview
Although there is no direct documentation
of the history of water resources planning
processes used in California, the development
and implementation of water policies demon-
strate that planning methods in California
essentially followed a path of development
similar to water resources planning at the
national level. In the nineteenth century, water
resources development in California was strict-
ly a local undertaking. Single-purpose planning
was the predominant model. Water projects
were undertaken to serve one of three purpos-
es: harness large quantities of water for
hydraulic mining, control flooding to open up
prime farmland, or transport water for irrigat-
ing dry farmland.76 The concept of single-pur-
pose water resources planning was under-
scored by the fact that entrepreneurs executed
most water projects to serve personal econom-
ic interests; a de facto planning process rein-
forced by state legislation.77 Water irrigation
projects were constructed by either small,
localized irrigation districts created under the
Wright Act of 1887,78 or by large corporate inter-
ests which held sixty-two percent of the farm-
land in California.79 Development of flood con-
trol projects was epitomized by the Green Act
of 186880 which allowed any person who
acquired as little as half a tract of land to cre-
ate a swampland district for the removal of
water from the land. Water supplies for mining
were dominated by corporate interests which
quickly monopolized water resources control
in mining areas after the California Supreme
Court upheld the right of landowners to retail
their water rights.81
By the time growing urban communities
forced their way into the water resources arena
in the early 1900s, localized single-purpose
planning was already being abandoned. The
emerging Progressive movement in both
California and across the nation sought to
transform water resources planning from a
decentralized, nontechnical and loosely organ-
ized process into a highly organized, technical
and centrally planned operation to achieve
economy and efficiency.82 The Los Angeles
Aqueduct and San Francisco’s Hetch-Hetchy
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73. See generally Daniel L. Loucks, Water Resource Systems
Models: Their Role in Planning, 118 J. WATER RESOURCES PLAN. & MGMT.
214 (1992); Viessman, supra note 67.
74. Rogers, supra note 23, at 37.
75. See infra note 128 for detailed explanation of the con-
cept of multi-objective planning.
76. See NORRIS HUNDLEY, JR., THE GREAT THIRST: CALIFORNIANS
AND WATER, 1770S-1990S 73-91 (Univ. of Cal. Press 1992).
77. See id.
78. The Wright Act of 1887 (current version at CAL. WATER
CODE § 20500) authorized the residents of an area to form local
irrigation districts, elect a board of directors, issue bonds, and
raise revenue for the purpose of purchasing land and water rights,
and distributing water.
79. HUNDLEY, supra note 76, at 101. The water battle
between two giant Central Valley farmers James Haggin and
Henry Miller, resulting in the California Supreme Court decision
of Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255 (1886), epitomized the corporate
dominance and individualization of irrigation water policies.
Many large farming interests extended their holdings under the
federal Desert Land Act of 1877 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C.
§§ 321-339), which offered 640 acres of dry land for a modest
price to anyone who would agree to irrigate a portion of the prop-
erty. Intended to help small farmers, the Act was primarily used
by monopolistic interests.
80. The Green Act of 1868, 1867-68 Cal. Stat. 507.
81. See Yuba County v. Cloke, 79 Cal. 239, 243; see also
HUNDLEY, supra note 76, at 73-77.
82. See generally HAYS, supra note 13.
Aqueduct represent this transition in water
resources planning. Although the projects were
primarily designed to transport municipal
water supplies from distant sources, each was
also trumpeted as having the additional bene-
fit of bringing cheap power to burgeoning
metropolises.83 Because of the enormity of
these projects and their multiple benefits, they
were held up as models of society’s new found
capacity to harness and manage water resourc-
es to serve a growing diversity of demands.
As the progressive ideology of economy
and efficiency were ingrained into California’s
water resources policies, multi-purpose plan-
ning was institutionalized as the means to
effectuate the new policy objective. The Central
Valley Project (“CVP”) was the first product of
this new planning process. The idea for a proj-
ect in the Sacramento and San Joaquin valleys
was first proposed in the 1931 State Water
Plan,84 but the enormity of the project and the
collapse of public financing during the
Depression eventually required federal inter-
vention, control and financing.85 The project
was designed to control flooding on Sacramen-
to Valley farmland, improve navigability along
the Sacramento River, prevent salt-water intru-
sion into the Delta, as well as capture, store
and transport water supplies to dry farmland in
the San Joaquin Valley.86 By the time the CVP
neared completion in the 1950s, it included
three dams in the Sacramento Valley, two dams
in the San Joaquin Valley, four principal canal
systems transporting more than three million
acre-feet of water annually, and hydroelectric
facilities generating enough power to move the
water and sell surplus to pay for the project.87
The CVP has been heralded as the ultimate
achievement in multi-purpose planning
because “it showed that maximum use could
be made of California’s water for all beneficial
purposes.”88
While the CVP was being completed, plans
were developed for an even more ambitious
multi-purpose water project, which became
known as the State Water Project (“SWP”). In
1957, the California Water Plan89 was pub-
lished, calling for the construction of a project
that would “meet present and future needs for
all beneficial uses and purposes in all areas of
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83. See HUNDLEY, supra note 76, at 149-200. The Hetch-
Hetchy project was much less a forerunner of the Progressive Era
than the Los Angeles Aqueduct. The Los Angeles Aqueduct was
approved in 1905 and the first waters flowed into Los Angeles by
1913. The rapid development of this water project was due in
large part to Los Angeles’ creation of a powerful commission,
insulated from popular control, and led by the single-minded and
technically driven William Mulholland. In contrast, the Hetch-
Hetchy Aqueduct suffered innumerable delays and cost overruns
(about $23 million) during the twenty-five years between the pro-
ject’s proposal and the first deliveries of water to San Francisco in
1934. See id.
84. See CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS, DIVISION OF
WATER RESOURCES, BULL. NO. 25, REPORT TO LEGISLATURE OF 1931 ON
STATE WATER PLAN (1930).
85. See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR, BUREAU OF
RECLAMATION, CENTRAL VALLEY PROJECT, CALIFORNIA (Government
Printing Office 1963).
86. The State Water Plan (later renamed the Central Valley
Project) was first published in 1931 with the following three pur-
poses: (1) creation of a major reservoir on the Sacramento River
(present-day Shasta Lake) to control flooding in the Sacramento
Valley and store flood waters that were previously “wasted” by
flowing into the San Francisco Bay; (2) use of the reservoir dam
to regulate flows in the Sacramento River for improved down-
stream navigability and prevention of salt-water intrusion into
the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta; and (3) construction of an
interconnected canal and reservoir system that would transport
water released into the Sacramento River, out of the Delta, and
into the San Joaquin Valley for farming irrigation. See generally
CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS, BULL. NO. 25, supra note
84. When the Plan was adopted by the state legislature in 1933,
creation of hydroelectric power was added as an additional pur-
pose to ensure federal government support for the project. The
enormity and expense of the project eventually required the fed-
eral government to assume control and financial responsibility
for the undertaking. See HUNDLEY, supra note 76, at 252-54.
87. See HUNDLEY, supra note 76, at 252-54.
88. ERWIN COOPER, AQUEDUCT EMPIRE: A GUIDE TO WATER IN
CALIFORNIA, ITS TURBULENT HISTORY AND ITS MANAGEMENT TODAY 166
(The Arthur H. Clark Co. 1968). The author’s effusion over the
Central Valley Project as the ultimate expression of Progressive
ideology is captured in the following quotation:
The Central Valley Project is more than a physical
accomplishment. It has been a demonstration that
water resources could be stored and transported
almost at will, on an almost unlimited scale. It
brought nearer to perfection the techniques of water
management and control on behalf of people hun-
dreds of miles removed from the source of supply. It
gave assurance that technology could design and
build engineering works to meet any needs, provided
they were backed by the necessary organizational and
financial structure. It showed that maximum use could
be made of California’s water for all beneficial purpos-
es: irrigation, power development, domestic and
industrial consumption, navigation, waste disposal,
control of salinity, enhancement of fish and wild life
[sic], beautifying the out-of-doors.
Id.
89. See CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES, BULL.
NO. 3, THE CALIFORNIA WATER PLAN (1957).
the State to the maximum feasible extent.”90
Although the SWP has never been completed
as initially proposed,91 the project was
designed to, and has been operated to, simul-
taneously regulate river flows for flood control,
to deliver water for municipal and agricultural
uses, to provide drainage for irrigation water,
to generate electricity to move water supplies
and to control salinity levels in the Delta.92
Structural and institutional changes in the
control of California’s water resources from
1920 to 1960 also reflect the adoption of multi-
purpose planning. First, there was a consolida-
tion of hundreds of local water suppliers into
regional groups in an effort to achieve efficien-
cy and economy in the capture and manage-
ment of water resources. In 1911, the state
enacted the Municipal Water District Act, fol-
lowed in 1913 by the County Water District Act
and the California Water District Act.93 These
statutes were intended to coordinate multiple
water resources functions for the growing
urban areas of the state. The legislation
allowed the newly formed districts to capture
and manage water resources by purchasing,
transporting, purifying and distributing water
supplies for domestic and irrigation uses. In
1921 two more state laws, the Municipal Utility
District Act and the Public Utility District Act,
continued the trend toward multi-purpose
local water resource agencies.94 These Acts
combined water resources capture and man-
agement with the furnishing of other general
utility services such as electricity, sewer and
wastewater treatment to the districts’ resi-
dents.95
Institutional restructuring to achieve mul-
tiple purposes at the local level reached its
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90. Id. at 37.
91. To secure voter approval of bond financing for the
State Water Project (“SWP”), then Governor Brown decided to
scale-down the water project from $4 billion to $1.75 billion,
while retaining broad language in the authorizing legislation that
would allow the Department of Water Resources to construct
additional facilities as may be necessary to meet future water
needs. See HUNDLEY, supra note 76, at 280-81. The environmental
and social concerns which emerged in the late 1960s, however,
ensured that this “second phase” (often referred to as the
Peripheral Canal) of the SWP would be bitterly contested. Two
attempts to authorize completion of the SWP have been rejected,
in 1982 by the voters and in 1984 by the state legislature. See id.
at 312-30. In December 1994, the Bay-Delta Accord was enacted
to manage water resources in the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta,
requiring that the SWP and CVP reduce water exports by about
400,000 acre-feet in years of average precipitation. See Delta
Update, WESTERN WATER 3 (May/June 1995). The tenacious legal and
regulatory battles which led to the Bay-Delta Accord, and its
requirement for reductions in water exports from the Delta, led
many to believe that the “second phase” of the SWP would
remain only on paper. Institution of the CALFED Bay-Delta
Program in 1995, however, and its continuing progress toward
reaching a long-term solution to problems in the Bay-Delta, has
resurrected hopes that additional water supplies may be avail-
able through augmentation of the SWP. One of the three alterna-
tive Bay-Delta plans calls for construction of an “isolated facility,”
which is the modern day equivalent of the Peripheral Canal. See
CALFED Releases Draft of Preferred Alternative, California Envtl.
Insider, Vol. 12, Nos. 13 and 14, at 3-4 (Dec. 23, 1998). See infra
notes 130-33 and accompanying text for further explanation of
the CALFED Bay-Delta Program and discussion of the proposed
alternatives.
92. See CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES, BULL.
NO. 132-63, THE CALIFORNIA STATE WATER PROJECT IN 1963 (1963).
93. Municipal Water District Act, 1911 Cal. Stat. 1290 (cod-
ified as amended at CAL. WATER CODE § 71000); County Water
District Act, 1913 Cal. Stat. 1049 (current version at CAL. WATER
CODE § 30000); California Water District Act, 1913 Cal. Stat. 815
(current version at CAL. WATER CODE § 34000).
94. Municipal Utility District Act, 1921 Cal. Stat. 245 (cur-
rent version at CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 11501-14403.5); Public
Utility District Act, 1921 Cal. Stat. 906 (current version at CAL. PUB.
UTIL. CODE §§ 15501-18055). The East Bay Municipal Utility
District (“EBMUD”) is a good example of a multipurpose agency
formed pursuant to the Municipal Utility District Act. In 1923,
EBMUD was formed to finance construction of the Mokelumne
Aqueduct, which carried water from the Sierra foothills to the
East San Francisco Bay. Since then, EBMUD has expanded its
operations beyond the capture and transport of water supplies to
include purifying and distributing water to 1.2 million users, gen-
erating 160 million kilowatts of hydroelectricity, wastewater treat-
ment for 600,000 customers, watershed land management of
54,605 acres, and operating five public recreation areas. See East
Bay Municipal Utility District (visited Feb. 23, 2000)
<http://www.edmud.com.eball.html>.
95. A good example of the consolidation in water
resources functions is the Imperial Irrigation District (“IID”).
Formed in 1911 under the Wright Act of 1887, supra note 78, this
agency began as a small irrigation district intended to serve the
growing agricultural interests in the Imperial Valley. The IID, how-
ever, started to assert monopolistic control over water resources
for the valley after water flows into the area substantially
increased from improvements to the Imperial Dam in the 1930s
and completion of the All-American Canal in 1941. See COOPER,
supra note 88, at 72-74. Since then, the IID has created a 1625 mile
distribution system supplying 2.5 million acre-feet of water for
both agricultural uses (five thousand farms) and municipal uses
(nine cities), a massive drainage system for the farmlands in the
valley, and power generation and distribution facilitates to deliv-
er more than 300 kilowatts of electricity to industry and residents.
See ROBERT GOTTLIEB & MARGARET FITZSIMMONS, THIRST FOR GROWTH:
WATER AGENCIES AS THE HIDDEN GOVERNMENT IN CALIFORNIA 71-74
(Univ. of Ariz. Press 1991).
zenith in 1927 when the state legislature creat-
ed the Metropolitan Water District of Southern
California (“MWD”).96 MWD was charged with
the mission to fully meet all regional domestic,
municipal and industrial water needs beyond
those met through local supplies by acquiring
new imported water supplies and constructing
transmission, storage and treatment facilities.
Additionally, MWD was authorized to generate
hydroelectric power to transport and retail the
water.97 Through expansion and annexation
over the next sixty years, this super-regional
agency has gained direct control over sixty per-
cent of all water supplies for nearly ninety per-
cent of the population in Southern California.98
Restructuring the institutional control of
water resources to facilitate multi-purpose
planning also occurred at the state level. In
1945, the State Water Resources Control Board
(“SWRCB”) was created to assert state control
over the functions of studying and coordinat-
ing all water development.99 In evaluating the
feasibility of water resources projects, the
Board considered all possible beneficial uses
that could be fulfilled by the project and uti-
lized benefit-cost analysis to determine which
projects to fund.100 To fulfill its multi-purpose
mandate, the SWRCB published a comprehen-
sive inventory of California’s water resources101
and a detailed accounting of the State’s pro-
jected water demands.102 Creation of the
Department of Water Resources (“DWR”) in
1956103 culminated the state’s institutional
restructuring for multi-purpose planning. DWR
assumed the functions of fifty-two formerly
independent state agencies (including the
SWRCB) responsible for some aspect of water
planning and development.104 This was an
unprecedented consolidation of water resourc-
es planning, development and management
under a single agency. It was under the wide-
ranging power of the new DWR that California
was able to construct and manage the massive
State Water Project, as it had been unable to
do several decades earlier with the Central
Valley Project.105
By the early 1960s water agencies at both
the local and state level were structured to
implement water resources policies focused on
promoting economic efficiency through the
development and utilization of water re-
sources. Zealous application of traditional
benefit-cost analysis facilitated the achieve-
ment of this singular policy objective. The out-
come was massive water projects such as the
CVP and SWP, pursued because their multiple
“beneficial uses” made it easier to claim the
projects optimized economic efficiency.
Consolidation of water planning and manage-
ment in agencies such as the MWD and DWR
helped insure that the state’s water resources
would be developed and managed for multiple
purposes in an economically efficient manner.
B. The Modern Era
It was not until the mid-1970s that multi-
objective planning began to emerge in
California. The late emergence of this planning
process in California was likely due to several
factors. First, the SWP had just begun deliver-
ing water to Southern California in 1973, and
the unfinished “second phase” of the SWP kept
open the possibility that a new round of water
development projects would begin in the near
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96. See Metropolitan Water District Act, 1927 Cal. Stat. 694
(codified as amended at CAL. WATER CODE APP. §§ 109-1 to -551).
97. See CAL. WATER CODE APP. § 109-25 (West 1990).
98. See METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT OF SOUTHERN
CALIFORNIA, SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA’S INTEGRATED WATER RESOURCES
PLAN, Draft Report No. 1107, Vol. 1, E1-E4 (Dec. 1995) [hereinafter
“MWD IRP PLAN, VOL. I”]. Even more reliant on MWD’s imported
supplies is the San Diego region where roughly ninety percent of
the regions water supply is imported. See Anne T. Thomas, Water,
Politics & Land Use: A Changing Landscape, LAND USE F. 313 (Fall
1992). The water supply figures cited can vary depending upon
hydrologic conditions, available water supplies, storage capaci-
ties and climate conditions. See id.
99. See State Water Resources Act of 1945, 1945 Cal. Stat.
2827, 2828 § 3.
100. “It is further declared that the State should engage in
the study and coordination of all water development projects . . .
in order that . . . appropriations are made . . . upon those projects
which are most beneficial to the State, and which will bring max-
imum benefits to the people . . . when the benefits are in excess
of estimated costs.” Id. § 2.
101. See CALIFORNIA WATER RESOURCES BOARD, BULL. NO. 1,
WATER RESOURCES OF CALIFORNIA (1951). 
102. See CALIFORNIA WATER RESOURCES BOARD, BULL. NO. 2,
WATER UTILIZATION AND REQUIREMENTS IN CALIFORNIA (1955).
103. See 1957 Cal. Stat. 421  (codified as amended at CAL.
WATER CODE § 120).
104. See CAL. WATER CODE § 123 (West 1990).
105. See generally supra note 86, and accompanying text.
future. It was not until 1982, in a decisive refer-
endum vote by the citizenry, that the idea of a
permanently uncompleted SWP became a real-
ity.106 Secondly, in the early 1970s there were
still authorized, but unbuilt, water projects to
which agencies looked for additional supplies
in meeting projected growth.107 The undevel-
oped water persuaded some to believe that
additional supplies would be available to meet
demands well into the future, and the potential
for more multi-purpose water projects still
looked bright in 1970.108
Nonetheless, the forces of change that
swept in multi-objective planning and altered
water resources policies at the federal level,109
had similar ramifications in California. Upward
spiraling water resources development costs
placed new emphasis on cost-effectiveness
strategies. Multi-purpose water projects were
increasingly expensive. The highly complex and
multi-faceted developments faced increasing
resistance from environmental and community
groups, extending the time period between
approval and completion, and subjecting proj-
ect costs to massive inflation.110 Water manage-
ment programs and projects began to receive
attention as viable alternatives to supply aug-
mentation for achieving an economically effi-
cient balance between projected supply and
demand. Conservation, reallocation, conjunc-
tive use, reclamation and water pricing strate-
gies were slowly incorporated into water
resources planning in an era of fiscally con-
strained water development.111
The reinvigorated environmental move-
ment in California also had a substantial
impact upon water resources planning. In the
late 1960s, environmentalism returned to the
policy arena of California and some of its first
targets were the state’s massive water projects.
There were several important legislative mani-
festations of the movement. In 1970, the legis-
lature enacted the sweeping California Environ-
mental Quality Act (“CEQA”).112 Like its federal
counterpart NEPA,113 CEQA was the primary
means for citizens to force state and local pub-
lic decision-makers to document and consider
the environmental impacts of their actions.114 A
year later, California again followed the federal
government and enacted its own version of the
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106. See supra note 91 for details regarding the full history
behind the uncompleted “second phase” of the SWP.
107. For example, the CVP contained authorizations for
projects that were either underway or just beginning in 1970,
including the New Melones Dam on the Stanislaus River, the
Auburn Dam on the American River, and the Tuscan Buttes
Project. See Gurmukh S. Gill et al., The California Water Plan and Its
Critics: A Brief Review, in CALIFORNIA WATER: A STUDY IN RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT 3, 8 (David Seckler ed., Univ. of Cal. Press 1971);
HUNDLEY, supra note 76, at 351-52. Additionally, the SWP had been
contracted to deliver (if fully completed) 4.23 million acre-feet of
water. Studies in the early 1970s showed that only about half of
that amount was being delivered. See id. at 287, 313. Some still
pointed to plans for future development of rivers in the north-
western part of the state such as the Upper Eel and the Trinity. See
COOPER, supra note 88, at 260-61. 
108. See generally COOPER, supra note 88. “The Eel River has
already been designated as the first to be tackled. . . . An initial
Upper Eel Basin project, expected to yield close to one million
additional acre-feet of water for the state, is expected to be start-
ed just as the finishing touches are put on the Feather River
Project—around 1970. The Upper Eel development should carry
the state into the 1990s. Assuming an ever-mounting thirst, there
lies beyond the first Eel impoundment a possible additional
diversion of 1.8 million acre-feet from the Trinity River . . . .”  Id.
at 260-61.
109. See supra notes 23-44 and accompanying text.
110. See Richard E. Howitt & Henry Vaux, Competing
Demands for California’s Scarce Water, in WATER QUANTITY/QUALITY
MANAGEMENT AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION: INSTITUTIONS PROCESSES, AND
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 271, 279 (Ariel Dinar & Edna Tusak Loehman
eds., Praeger 1995). Work on the CVP began in 1937 and was not
operational until 1951, with additional facilities still being built
in the early 1970s. See Gill et al., supra note 107, at 6-8. Originally
the state authorized $170 million for the project, but costs near-
ly exceeded one-half billion by the time the CVP made its first
water deliveries. See HUNDLEY, supra note 76, at 254-255. The
uncompleted “second phase” of the SWP (the Peripheral Canal)
was initially priced at $179 million when authorized in 1966, in
1973 the costs rose to $210 million and, when the voters blocked
the project in 1982, the costs were estimated at nearly $2.5 bil-
lion. See id. at 327. Currently, the “isolated facility” alternative of
the CALFED Bay-Delta Program estimates that construction of a
peripheral canal around the Delta could cost $10.5 billion. See The
Delta Fix: A Snap Shot of the CALFED Bay-Delta Program and Status,
CALIFORNIA WATER CLEARINGHOUSE (May 1998). See infra notes 130-33
and accompanying text for further explanation and discussion of
the CALFED Bay-Delta Program.
111. See GOTTLIEB, supra note 95, at 192-210.
112. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21000-21178 (West 1990).
113. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
114. Unlike NEPA, however, CEQA has not been interpret-
ed as merely a “procedural” statute. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519
(1978). CEQA has been interpreted to contain substantive provi-
sions with which agencies must comply, including denying
approval for projects with significant adverse environmental
impacts, unless feasible alternatives or mitigation measures can
substantially lessen the impacts. See Sierra Club v. Gilroy City
Council, 22 Cal. App. 3d 30 (1990).
Wild and Scenic Rivers Act.115 The legislation
prohibited diversions on sections of five rivers,
most of which had been identified for future
water resources development.116
The environmental movement also pur-
sued its goal of natural resources protection in
the state courts and public arena. Most signifi-
cantly, the California Supreme Court reinvigo-
rated and enlarged the scope of the “public
trust doctrine,” putting all water agencies on
notice that there were environmental and
social constraints upon the beneficial use of
vested water rights.117 Also important was a
California Supreme Court decision that
required CEQA to be interpreted so as to afford
the fullest possible protection to the environ-
ment, resulting in an extension of CEQA to
cover virtually all major water resources
actions.118 When unsuccessful in achieving
environmental objectives through the courts,
environmentalists often took their case direct-
ly to the public. In 1982, voters approved a ref-
erendum to defeat the completion of the State
Water Project, and two years later the state leg-
islature rejected a measure to revive the proj-
ect.119 Additionally, the grass-roots action of
environmental organizations almost prevented
the construction of New Melones Dam on the
Stanislaus River and delayed its eventual com-
pletion for almost thirteen years.120
Finally, an emerging concern over the
social ramifications of water resources plan-
ning manifested itself in California, focusing
upon the planning process and the distributive
impacts of decisions arising from the process.
During the 1970s, there was an increased
awareness that water resources planning was
conducted without any public participation by
agencies not directly accountable to affected
communities. Concern over the insularity of
the planning process was heightened by a
sense that special interest groups, pursuing
self-serving projects and programs, were inti-
mately involved in water resources planning.
There was a newfound feeling that public par-
ticipation was critical to counter this undue
influence.121 Moreover, the public discovered
that growing out of this “captured” planning
process were large water subsidies for influen-
tial special interests. Public bond financing
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115. Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, 1972 Cal. Stat. 2510 (cod-
ified as amended at CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 5093.50-5093.70). See
supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text for the corresponding
federal act.
116. The protected rivers include all or portions of the
American, Klamath, Trinity and Eel. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §
5093.54. The Middle Fork of the Eel had been initially earmarked
for development by the SWP and water planners were continual-
ly looking toward the Trinity and Klamath as the last remaining
untapped major rivers in California. See CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF
WATER RESOURCES, The California State Water Project in 1969, BULL.
NO. 132-69 (1969); see also Gill et al., supra note 107, at 26.
117. See National Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court of
Alpine County, 33 Cal. 3d 419 (1983). In National Audubon, the
court held that as trustee for the people, the state has a duty in
making water resource allocations to balance public trust uses
(navigation, recreation, fish and wildlife and aesthetics) against
the public interest served by out-of-stream uses. More impor-
tantly, as circumstances changed, the state could rebalance the
interests and reallocate water resources as appropriate, even as
against “vested” water rights. A “vested” water right is a water
right considered to have property-like characteristics, in that pri-
vate ownership and control of the water right is defensible
against a deprivation (taking) without due process of law. The
court in National Audubon, however, held that all water rights in
California were held subject to historic public trust uses. In
essence, the property interest in a vested water right is limited to
the extent that it does not unduly compromise public trust uses
in that water.
118. See Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors, 8
Cal. 3d 247 (1972). In Friends of Mammoth, the court held that
CEQA’s environmental analysis provisions not only applied to
government projects, but also to agency actions such as the
approval or issuance of permits, leases and other entitlements
taken in response to private initiatives. See infra notes 204-07 and
accompanying text for more details regarding the applicability
and scope of CEQA.
119. See HUNDLEY, supra note 76, at 328-29.
120. See id. at 351-56. Proposition 17 was placed on the
ballot in 1974 by environmental organizations. The measure
would have blocked the New Melones Dam but was narrowly
defeated at the polls by a five percent margin. The environmental
groups then took their fight to the State Water Resources Control
Board (“SWRCB”), the courts and, eventually, Congress. See id.
121. See WATER RESOURCES CENTER, WATER DEVELOPMENT AND
THE ENVIRONMENT: ISSUES OF WATER POLICY IN CALIFORNIA, Report No.
27, 21-23 (Univ. of Cal., Davis, Feb. 1974); see also GOTTLIEB, supra
note 95, at 21, 109-46.
No aspect of the decision-making process arouses
more concern than the question of public participa-
tion: When and how should the public become
involved? How much public participation is reason-
able or effective? Can public involvement really pro-
vide a balance against pressures from special interest
groups? . . . When the agencies, the vast resources
they control, and the potential social impact of their
decisions attract public attention, as they have in the
past decade, several critical groups of outsiders
become important participants in the debate over
agency accountability. The actors raise two questions:
Who is the agency to be held accountable to? and What is the
agency accountable for?
GOTTLIEB, supra note 95, at 140.
and pricing structures heavily favored water-
intensive users such as agriculture and indus-
try. In the late 1970s, constricting supplies, sev-
eral years of drought, and the imposition of
conservation and water restrictions on users
combined to create a public outcry for refor-
mation of these inequitable policies.122 Water
resources historian Norris Hundley, Jr. summa-
rized the changing water policy climate in
California in this manner:
Court decrees eliminated major
water supplies and threatened others,
while the public, reflecting national
concern with environmental abuse and
increasing skepticism about the old,
unquestioned belief in growth for its
own sake, rejected new projects and
forced urban, state, and federal strate-
gists to emphasize better management
of available resources—the increasing-
ly central theme and thrust of water
policy in California . . . .123
Public, legislative and judicial attitudes
toward water resources were markedly different
as water agencies began to plan for water
resources in the 1980s. It was clear that envi-
ronmental and social concerns would have to
be incorporated into the water resources plan-
ning process. If the concerns were ignored,
environmentalists and community groups now
had the legal tools and a growing political
influence to compel their consideration. The
challenge for water resources planning was to
incorporate environmental and social objec-
tives, while still achieving economic efficiency.
Water agencies and decision-makers began to
realize that a well-designed multi-objective
planning process was the key to meeting this
challenge.124
By the mid-1980s, multi-objective planning
had become common for many water
resources agencies. The state aided in this
process by requiring water agencies to consid-
er both supply augmentation and demand
management strategies in adopting their long-
term resource plans. For example, in 1983 the
Urban Water Management Planning Act125 was
adopted, requiring all urban water suppliers to
prepare and maintain a plan that described
and evaluated reasonable and practical effi-
cient uses, as well as reclamation and conser-
vation activities.126 In approving the Act, the
legislature declared that the policy of the state
was to actively pursue conservation and effi-
cient use of water, and that conservation and
efficiency were to be guiding criteria in water
resource decisions.127 Three years later, the
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122. See GOTTLIEB, supra 95, at 202-07 (documenting pricing
structures and subsidies to domestic, commercial and industrial
users served by municipal water agencies); see also HUNDLEY, supra
note 76, at 380-85 (documenting pricing structures and subsidies
to agricultural interests, primarily served by federal water proj-
ects).
123. See HUNDLEY, supra note 76, at 299-300.
124. See generally WATER RESOURCES CENTER, supra note 121;
Frank H. Bollman, On the Demand for Water in Its Natural Environment,
in CALIFORNIA WATER: A STUDY IN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 84 (David
Seckler ed., Univ. of Cal. Press 1971). The following quotes evi-
dence the growing need to develop a planning process which
could synthesize multiple and conflicting objectives that were
emerging in water resources policies:
The need exists to devise methods of objectively scru-
tinizing extramarket values and of weighing the market
and extramarket values. . . . Another lesson in plan-
ning emerges from the consideration that all market
and extramarket costs and benefits be presented. This
process requires that all practicable alternatives must
be appraised. To achieve a purpose, planning should
evolve around alternatives rather than the project
itself.
Id. at 94-95.
Water planning and development go on today in a
political and social arena populated by groups of peo-
ple with widely differing viewpoints, and by public and
private agencies with differing and limited responsi-
bility. Both environmentalists and water project plan-
ners tend to focus on single aspects. . . . This proce-
dure, however, is no longer practical. Resource abun-
dance is a dream of the past, and resource scarcity is
a fact of the present and future. A better approach to
reconciliation of opposing viewpoints is needed—a
fact which already is recognized by many of those con-
cerned. 
WATER RESOURCES CENTER, supra note 121, at 23-24.
125. 1983 Cal. Stat. 3555 (codified at CAL. WATER CODE §§
10610-10656). The Act requires urban water suppliers with more
than 3000 service connections to prepare and update every five
years an urban water management plan which includes supply
and demand projections, a description of water deficiencies in
times of drought, and the ability of the water agency to meet
those deficiencies. Any plan which projects a need for additional
water supplies must contain an evaluation of alternative meth-
ods for supply augmentation including: reclamation, transfers,
retrofits, conservation, and pricing. 
126. See CAL. WATER CODE § 10615 (West 1991).
127. See CAL. WATER CODE § 10610.4 (West 1991).
Agricultural Water Management Planning Act128
was established, imposing similar duties upon
agricultural water suppliers and reaffirming the
duty of these agencies to use conservation and
efficiency as guiding criteria in planning.129
The recent CALFED Bay-Delta Program is
representative of the evolution of multi-objec-
tive water resources planning in California.
Launched in 1995, this collaborative effort of the
state and federal governments has sought to
undertake the Herculean task of developing “a
long-term solution to problems in the Bay-Delta
Estuary related to fish and wildlife, water supply
reliability, natural disasters, and water quali-
ty.”130 The four objectives adopted by CALFED to
be achieved through its long-term Bay-Delta
solution are illustrative of the scope of issues
embraced by current multi-objective planning:
1. Water Quality—Provide good water
quality for all beneficial uses.
2. Ecosystem Quality—Improve and
increase aquatic and terrestrial habitats
and improve ecological functions in the
Bay-Delta to support sustainable popu-
lations of diverse and valuable plant
and animal species.
3. Water Supply Reliability—Reduce
the mismatch between Bay-Delta water
supplies and current and projected uses
dependent on the Bay-Delta system.
4. Bay-Delta System Vulnerability—
Reduce the risk to land use and asso-
ciated economic activities, water sup-
ply, infrastructure, and the ecosystem
from catastrophic breaching of Delta
levees.131
In its most recent report, CALFED identi-
fies eight elements for implementing its pro-
posed long-term solution: levee system
integrity, water quality, ecosystem restora-
tion, water use efficiency, water transfers,
watershed management, storage and con-
veyance.132 The most controversial are the
storage and conveyance elements that will
generate additional water supplies for the
SWP and CVP.133
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128. 1986 Cal. Stat. 3323 (codified at CAL. WATER CODE §§
10800-10855).
129. See CAL. WATER CODE §§ 10814, 10802 (West 1991).
130. CALFED Bay-Delta Program Overview, CALFED BAY-
DELTA PROGRAM (Oct. 22, 1998) (visited Feb. 23, 2000)
<http://calfed.ca.gov/general/overview/html>. CALFED is an out-
growth of the 1994 Bay-Delta Accord between agricultural, envi-
ronmental and urban interests that set operating standards for
the Bay-Delta facilities in the following areas: springtime water
exports from the Delta, regulation of salinity concentrations,
maintenance of springtime flows for salmon runs, and closure of
in-Delta facilities for fish populations. The Bay-Delta Accord also
sought to comply with the Endangered Species Act by improving
the operational flexibility of Delta facilities to better monitor and
reduce impacts on listed species, and to implement some addi-
tional measures to mitigate impacts not directly related to water
exports from the Delta. 
CALFED is intended to further the Bay-Delta Accord by
developing a long-term physical solution for harmonizing the
four interrelated problem areas in the Bay-Delta: water quality,
water supply reliability, levee system integrity and ecosystem
quality. The first phase of CALFED, completed in March of 1998,
developed the following three basic structural alternatives from
which a preferred alternative would be selected: (1) rely on the
existing Delta conveyance facilities and change the timing of
diversions to minimize environmental impacts, (2) widen some
Delta conveyance channels to reduce the environmental impacts
of water diversions by the SWP and CVP, and to improve the flows
for water exports, and (3) construct an “isolated channel” which
diverts water around the Delta to the SWP and CVP export facili-
ties. See generally The Delta Fix, supra note 110. Each of the alterna-
tives also provides for increased water supply storage facilities,
with 5 million acre-feet of additional surface storage and 750,000
acre-feet of groundwater storage split between facilities north
and south of the Delta. 
The second phase of CALFED is evaluating the three basic
alternatives and developing a preferred alternative. The preferred
alternative has abandoned a one-time fixed solution and instead
seeks a “staged” implementation that relies heavily on adaptive
management. Under this concept, a final decision is delayed on
the construction of water storage and additional conveyance
facilities while other less controversial measures are implement-
ed. During the “first stage,” the need, cost, and impact of addi-
tional storage and conveyance facilities will be further evaluated
and a final determination made within approximately seven
years. See Revised CALFED Bay-Delta Program Phase II Report, CALFED
BAY-DELTA PROGRAM (Dec. 18, 1998) (visited Feb. 23, 2000)
<http://calfed.ca.gov>.
131. Primary Objectives, CALFED BAY-DELTA PROGRAM (visited
Feb. 23, 2000) <http://calfed.ca.gov/general/objectives>.
132. See Revised CALFED Bay-Delta Program Phase II Report,
supra note 130, at 48-86.
133. See CALFED Releases Draft of Preferred Alternative, supra
note 91, at 4; see also Delta Dams Proposal Gathering Momentum, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 25, 1998 (MWD and other water agencies praise the
idea to include substantial expansion of storage facilities in
CALFED solution, while environmentalists say “it doesn’t make
sense, economically or environmentally, to commit to such a
huge investment before we know whether other approaches will
work just as well”).
C. Current Water Resources Planning
Processes
Over the past decade the central struggle
for water resources planning has been to create
a multi-objective planning process that ade-
quately considers the economic, environmen-
tal and social concerns voiced in the policy
arena. Currently, there are several common
planning processes used by California water
agencies at the state, regional and local lev-
els.134 These methodologies represent the evo-
lution of water resources planning described in
the previous sections (planning to satisfy
numerous purposes and multiple objectives)
by incorporating the important concept of con-
strained optimization. “Constrained optimiza-
tion” is defined as either optimizing one objec-
tive while setting other objectives as con-
straints upon the system, or weighing different
objectives into one objective function to opti-
mize.135 What follows is a brief description of
several commonly utilized water resources
planning processes.
Least-Cost Planning (“LCP”) is a procedure
that compares the costs (construction, opera-
tion, maintenance, environmental and social)
of developing new water supply projects, with
demand management alternatives. This plan-
ning process is based upon the principle of
minimizing costs in achieving a specific pur-
pose, by seeking the combination of supply
projects and demand management programs
with the lowest overall cost.136 In essence, LCP
is a form of cost-effectiveness analysis updated
for an era with multiple water policy objec-
tives.137 Unlike traditional cost-effectiveness
analysis, LCP theoretically does not require all
costs to be reduced to a dollar amount.
Instead, LCP often attempts to use relative val-
ues (ordinal or cardinal) to rank and evaluate
various non-monetary environmental and
social project effects.138 As a result, environ-
mental and social objectives such as water
quality, social impacts and likelihood of project
success (e.g., amount of public opposition, dif-
ficulty of environmental compliance) can be
placed as constraints upon the optimization of
the least-cost objective.139
Reliability planning is a method currently
used by water agencies to balance estimated
136
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134. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES,
BULL. NO. 160-93, VOL. 1, 273-39, THE CALIFORNIA WATER PLAN UPDATE
(1994) [hereinafter “CALIFORNIA WATER PLAN (1994)”]; MWD IRP
PLAN, VOL. 1, supra note 98; METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT OF
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, PLANNING AND RESOURCES DIVISION, THE
REGIONAL URBAN WATER MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR THE METROPOLITAN
WATER DISTRICT OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA (October 1995) [hereinafter
“MWD URBAN WATER MANAGEMENT PLAN”]. The MWD IRP Plan was
relied upon to develop MWD’s Urban Water Management Plan
required pursuant to California Water Code § 10610.
135. See Rogers, supra note 23, at 37.
136. See Daniel M. Rodrigo et al., Integrated Resources
Planning and Reliability Analysis: A Case Study of the Metropolitan Water
District of Southern California, in ADVANCES IN THE ECONOMICS OF
ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES, Vol. 1, 49, 50 (1996).
137. Cost-effectiveness can be defined as the means to
achieve a given goal with the minimum waste, effort, expense or
costs.  Joseph P. Biniek, Benefit-Cost Analysis: An Evaluation, in
CONTROVERSIES IN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 136, 148 (Sheldon
Kamieniecki et al. eds., SUNY Press 1986); see also Edward S.
Quade, Introduction and Overview, in COST-EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS:
NEW APPROACHES IN DECISION-MAKING 1 (Thomas A. Goldman ed.,
Praeger 1967) (“[cost-effectiveness] consists of an attempt to
minimize dollar costs subject to some mission requirement . . .
or, conversely, to maximize some physical measure of output sub-
ject to budget constraints”). Cost-effectiveness requires that a
specific purpose be established before employing the analysis.
For example, the purpose could be to supply water for 20,000
additional residences over the next ten years. Cost-effectiveness
analysis would quantify all the costs of proposed plans that could
achieve the purpose, and select the plan that had the least total
costs.
It is critical to distinguish between cost-effectiveness analy-
sis and benefit-cost analysis. The former evaluates which proposal
achieves a specific purpose at the least cost, the later evaluates
whether implementing a proposal would result in more benefits than
costs. For cost-effectiveness, the ends or benefits to be achieved
are held constant, and the analysis is concerned solely with
achieving the least-cost (“most efficient”) means to achieve the
ends. See HENRY M. LEVIN, COST-EFFECTIVENESS: A PRIMER 17-26 (Sage
Publications 1983). In contrast, benefit-cost analysis is conduct-
ed to assess whether a specific end should be included in a proj-
ect by comparing the monetary benefits with the monetary costs
of achieving it. The end is included only if its achievement would
result in more benefits than costs. See LEE G. ANDERSON & RUSSELL
F. SETTLE, BENEFIT COST ANALYSIS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 14-17
(Lexington Books 1977). Thus, a proposed alternative could be
considered cost-effective yet be rejected under benefit-cost
analysis because the alternative would result in the total costs
exceeding benefits. Both analytical methods, however, further the
economic efficiency objective. See infra note 154 and accompany-
ing text. For further discussion of benefit-cost analysis, see infra
note 142 and accompanying text.
138. See CALIFORNIA WATER PLAN (1994), supra note 134, at
275. It is important to note, however, that use of monetary values
for environmental and social factors is always preferred because
mixing monetary and relative values compromises the integrity of
the LCP procedure. Moreover, the assignment of relative values is
virtually no less subjective than trying to assign a monetary value
to environmental and social factors.
139. For an example of the LCP planning process, see
Rodrigo et al., supra note 136, at 57-58.
future water supply and demand, given projected
water shortages due to fluctuating supply avail-
ability and changing needs. The reliability plan-
ning process first determines the most effective
and efficient way to achieve an additional incre-
ment in water service reliability using the LCP
methodology previously described.140 The second
step ascertains whether the benefits of avoiding
shortage-related costs (e.g., business costs, resi-
dential costs and environmental costs) justifies
the expense of adding the increment of reliabili-
ty.141 The second step is essentially a straightfor-
ward process of benefit-cost analysis.142 A ninety-
eight percent reliability level, for example, means
that, given projected demands, available supplies
and hydrologic conditions over the next 100 years,
a water agency has determined that it is economi-
cally efficient (benefits exceed costs) to fulfill all
anticipated demands in ninety-eight of the hun-
dred years.143 Reliability planning is essentially a
procedure by which water agencies weigh different
objectives (reliability, environmental protection
and economic development) into the optimization
of one objective function (economic efficiency).
Finally, Integrated Resource Planning (“IRP”)
has been recently incorporated into water
resources planning. The IRP process utilizes both
LCP and reliability planning methods to arrive at
the best strategy for balancing future water supply
and demand, given multiple objectives to be
achieved. The goal of IRP is to design a compre-
hensive water resources plan which achieves a
desired water reliability level at the least-cost,
given the range of potential water supply and
demand management options and the environ-
mental, institutional and political constraints to
implementing those options.144 The starting point
for the IRP process is an established reliability
goal. The agency then develops the least-cost
resource mix of supply augmentation and demand
management strategies within the established
constraints (environmental, political and institu-
tional) that achieves the desired reliability goal.145
The water resources planning processes
described above raise two significant questions
that will be addressed in Section IV. First, each
planning process involves the problem of “valuing”
costs or benefits that are difficult to reduce to dol-
lar amounts or to assign relative values. This most
often affects environmental and social factors for
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140. Water service reliability can be defined as “the degree
to which the performance of a supply system results in the deliv-
ery of water service to its customers in the amounts desired, with-
in acceptable quality standards.” Id. at 62.
141. See CALIFORNIA WATER PLAN (1994), supra note 134, at
274.
142. Benefit-cost analysis can be defined as simply a
process of quantifying and tabulating all “costs” and “benefits”
associated with the effects of a proposed project or plan, with the
analytic result being that a project or plan is not acceptable
unless cumulative benefits exceed total costs. In practice, how-
ever, the analytic process can be very complex and difficult. One
author describes the process as follows:
In formal cost-benefit analysis, the analyst, using mar-
ket and other data, estimates, on a willingness-to-pay
basis, the gains and losses associated with all the
major effects of a policy, program, or regulation. The
analyst must go through a series of steps, which
include, ‘the identification of all nontrivial effects,
categorization of these effects as benefits or costs, quan-
titative estimation of the extent of each benefit or cost
associated with an action, translation of these into
common metric such as dollars, discounting of future costs
and benefits into the terms of a given year, and a sum-
mary of the costs and benefits to see which is greater.
The resulting sums must also be compared across alterna-
tives. These tasks are Herculean. An enormous amount
of highly skilled work goes into foreseeing the possi-
ble consequences of a program (which may differ con-
siderably given other policies and decisions) and esti-
mating the benefits and costs associated with those
consequences. A good cost-benefit analysis, which
may run into several volumes, can be an impressive
document.
Sagoff, supra note 6, at 33 (citing Richard N.L. Andrews, Cost-
Benefit Analysis and Regulatory Reform, in COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS AND
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS: POLITICS, ETHICS, AND METHODS 107, 108
(Daniel Swartzman et al. eds., The Conservation Foundation
1982)). One of the central issues surrounding the usage of bene-
fit-cost analysis is a determination of project effects that should,
or are capable of being, quantified and calculated as a benefit or
cost. The proper scope of benefit-cost analysis has become high-
ly debated and criticized as environmental and social values have
been translated into policy objectives to be achieved through the
planning process. For a good synthesis of this debate, see Jaffe,
supra note 59, at 59-63. This issue is discussed further, infra,
Section IV.A.
143. This is the reliability level that the Metropolitan
Water District of Southern California has established for whole-
sale deliveries to its member agencies. See METROPOLITAN WATER
DISTRICT OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA’S INTEGRATED
WATER RESOURCES PLAN, Draft Report No. 1107, Vol. 2, 2-4 to 2-5
(Dec. 1995) [hereinafter “MWD IRP PLAN, VOL. 2”].
144. See Susan L. Robinson, Integrated Water Resource
Planning in Las Vegas, in INTEGRATED WATER RESOURCES PLANNING FOR
THE 21ST CENTURY 548, 550 (Michael F. Domenica ed., Am. Soc’y of
Civil Engineers 1995); see also MWD IRP PLAN, VOL. I, supra note 98,
at 1-7.
145. See MWD IRP PLAN, VOL. 2, supra note 143, at 2-4.
which there is no readily available market or valu-
ation process. Second, the multi-objective plan-
ning framework is designed so that environmental
and social objectives serve as “constraints” upon
the “optimization” of the economic efficiency
objective. There are no procedures for optimizing
environmental or social objectives. Both of these
issues raise fundamental questions as to the
capacity of the current water planning processes to
adequately incorporate envirnmental and social
policy objectives.
IV. Critique of Current Water Resources
Planning Processes
Environmental and social concerns are
emerging as a fundamental part of the water
resources policy landscape. As documented in
Sections II and III, new voices have demanded
and asserted a role in the water resources policy-
making processes. The result has been a shift in
philosophy from continual development of new
water supplies to balancing supply and demand
through a combination of supply augmentation
and demand management strategies. Current
water resources policy literature is replete with
statements about the need to incorporate and
be sensitive to environmental and social val-
ues.146 In fact, environmental and social objec-
tives are often announced as “guiding principles”
for water resources decision-making.147
Yet, with all the attention given to these con-
cerns, why is there a continuing sense that envi-
ronmental and social values are not adequately
138
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146. See, e.g., BATES ET AL., supra note 3, at 178-198; Kelley,
supra note 27, at 18-19; Rogers, supra note 23, at 38-39; David H.
Getches, Water Resources: A Wider World, in NATURAL RESOURCES POLICY
AND LAW: TRENDS AND DIRECTIONS, supra note 6, at 124, 139-46;
PRASIFKA, supra note 28, at 239-51; WINPENNY, supra note 69, at 1-28.
See generally Ingram et al., supra note 6; Daniel P. Loucks,
Sustainability Criteria in Project Planning, in INTEGRATED WATER RESOURCES
PLANNING FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 144.
147. See Urban Water Management Planning Act and
Agricultural Water Management Planning Act, supra notes 125-29
and accompanying text. In 1992, MWD Board of Directors adopted
eleven goals for its planning and operation, one of which was an
“[e]nvironmental goal to assure adequate consideration of envi-
ronmental effects and appropriate mitigation of its activities.”
METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA—BOARD OF
DIRECTORS, GOAL AND OBJECTIVES (Los Angeles 1992). Additionally,
the Board adopted seven guiding principles, including the follow-
ing environmental principle: “Environment: Establishes an
approach to integrating environmental values and awareness into
Metropolitan’s decision-making and makes a commitment to pro-
vide water to accommodate regional growth.” Id. The MWD IRP also
contains several statements about the centrality of public partici-
pation to the IRP process. For example, the Plan states, “[b]ecause
of the diverse needs and institutional arrangements in the region,
the success of the IRP would only be achieved through an open
and participatory process that involved the major stakeholders,”
and further, “[i]n total, over 450 participants representing environ-
mental, business, agricultural, community and water interests,
provided crucial input to the process.” MWD IRP PLAN, Vol. 1, supra
note 98, at 1-8, 3-2. 
In a similar fashion, the State Water Plan contains important
statements about the achievement of environmental and social
objectives, and the inclusion of public participation. The “Forward”
of the Plan contains the following statement: 
[The Plan] was developed with extensive public
involvement . . . An outreach advisory committee made
up of representatives of urban, agricultural, and
environmental interests was established . . . to assist
the Department of Water Resources in preparing [the
Plan] . . . . The committee met regularly to review and
comment on the content and the adequacy of work in
progress. Public hearings in each of the State’s ten
major hydrologic regions were held by the California
Water Commission to receive comments from the pub-
lic. . . . The inclusion of environmental water needs, the
commitment to implementation of extensive water
conservation measures, and public involvement in
developing this plan reflect current socioeconomic pri-
orities.
CALIFORNIA WATER PLAN (1994), supra note 134, at iii-iv. Most recent-
ly, the CALFED Bay-Delta Program established a mission state-
ment with the following environmental objective to be achieved by
the adopted solution for the Bay-Delta problem: “Improve and
increase aquatic and terrestrial habitats and improve the ecologi-
cal functions in the Bay-Delta to support sustainable populations
of diverse and valuable plant and animal species.” Mission Statement,
Objectives and Solution Principles, CALFED BAY-DELTA PROGRAM REVISED
PHASE II REPORT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (visited Feb. 23, 2000)
<http://calfed.ca.gov/current/execsum.html>. CALFED has also
published the following summation of how the program has
included public participation in its development of a solution to
the Bay-Delta problem:
The public has a central role in the development of a
long-term solution. A group of more than 30 citizen-
advisors selected from California’s agriculture, environ-
mental, urban, business, fishing, and other interests
with a stake in finding long-term solutions for the prob-
lems of the Bay-Delta Estuary have been charged under
the Federal Advisory Committee Act as the Bay-Delta
Advisory Council (“BDAC”). BDAC advises the CALFED
Program on its mission and objectives, the problems to
be addressed and proposed actions. BDAC also pro-
vides a forum for public participation, and reviews
reports and other materials prepared by CALFED staff. .
. . In the first phase, the CALFED Program . . . conduct-
ed meetings and workshops to obtain public input . . .
and held public scoping sessions to determine the
focus and content of the EIS/EIR. . . . During Phase II . .
. the release of the documents was followed by a 105-
day public comment period. Seventeen public hearings
were held around the state during the public comment
period.
CALFED Bay-Delta Program Overview, supra note 130. See supra notes
130-34 and accompanying text for further discussion and explana-
tion of the CALFED Bay-Delta Program.
reflected in the outcome of water resources
policies? This sense of non-inclusion of envi-
ronmental and social values is not new; it has
been a persistent issue since the late 1960s.148
Have decision makers just given lipservice to
these values? Are statements made just to pla-
cate the latest interest groups? This is unlikely
given the increasing extent to which those
voicing environmental and social concerns are
able to influence, or be included in, the policy-
making process. The doors of the decision-
making room have been opened to criticism,
scrutiny and public participation.149
This article suggests that environmental
and social values contained in water policies are
not adequately incorporated into water
resources planning. While critical focus has
been given to the policy-making process and
has resulted in the inclusion of environmental
and social values in policy objectives, there
has not been sufficient attention given to the
policy implementation process. Planning is the
means by which policies are operationalized
and serves as a foundation for subsequent
decision-making. Without a concomitant
change in planning processes, changes in val-
ues toward water as reflected in policy objec-
tives are likely to have little impact upon final
outcomes. The result is a widening gulf
between patterns of water use and evolving
sociological values.150
The critical question examined in this sec-
tion is whether current planning processes
have the capacity to adequately consider,
include and give effect to the environmental
and social values voiced in the policy arena.
The following critique of current multi-objec-
tive water resources planning methodologies
answers this question in the negative for two
primary reasons. First, water resources plan-
ning has continued to rely heavily upon the
use of quantitative analytical tools. This
reliance forces planners to attempt to quanti-
fy non-market environmental and social fac-
tors, resulting in a less than desirable inclu-
sion of environmental and social objectives in
the planning process. Second, multi-objective
planning in water resources has remained a
process of constrained optimization in which
only one objective is optimized, subject to the
constraints of secondary objectives. Economic
efficiency continues to be the primary objec-
tive, with environmental and social objectives
serving only as constraints and receiving a
minimum level of consideration in the plan-
ning process.
A. Valuation of Environmental and Social
Factors
Two current water resources planning
methods, LCP and reliability planning, contin-
ue to necessitate the quantification of envi-
ronmental and social factors, so they can be
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148. In 1973, shortly after environmental and social con-
cerns became a part of the water resources dialogue, the report
of the National Water Commission, highlighted the inadequacy
of the consideration given to these issues when it stated that
“[t]he nation’s record of taking ecological processes and environ-
mental values into account in water development and use has
been unsatisfactory . . . [and] plans often do not reflect the inter-
est of the general public, large segments of which have little voice
in it.” NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, supra note 48, at 205, 366. In
1979, critics similarly concluded, “[t]he environmental quality
objective is a firmly established fact in today’s planning scene,
though a formal methodology for dealing with environmental
problems is still lacking. . . . [Additionally,] [t]he extent to which
these [social] impacts are considered in a project formulation is
not well defined, but it appears that social impacts are still not
considered in depth by planners.” Ray K. Linsley, Two Centuries of
Water Planning Methodology, 105 J. WATER RESOURCES PLAN. & MGMT.
DIV. 39, 42-43 (1979). And most recently, water resource planners
noted that, “[t]here are two major areas where the current [plan-
ning] approach seems to be in trouble . . . (ii) incorporating envi-
ronmental and social values directly into planning.” Rogers, supra
note 23, at 35.
149. See BATES ET AL., supra note 3, at 152-77; GOTTLIEB, supra
note 95, at 137-46; GOTTLIEB, supra note 9, at 218, 234, 240 & 246-
253. “Policy decisions are more susceptible than ever to public
influence. First, the overlay of environmental law has already
opened the process so that there are public hearings before most
big decisions. Second, the public and groups representing it (cit-
izen associations, water-user groups, and environmental organi-
zations, for example) are increasingly informed and skilled at par-
ticipation and advocacy.” BATES, ET AL., supra note 3, at 177.
150. Political scientists have long recognized the need for
values to be included throughout the decision making process:
It is not merely in the phase of problem identification
that the choice of standards is important. Each step in
the process of decision making depends on the initial
stipulation of values to be served. We cannot just
“weigh” or “compare” policy alternatives. We must
weigh and compare them against something. At the
end of analysis, we cannot merely make decisions. We
also have to justify them.
Charles W. Anderson, The Place of Principles in Policy Analysis, 73 AM.
POL. SCIENCE REV. 711, 712 (1979).
compiled with numeric economic factors to
produce an aggregate outcome.151 Using analyt-
ical tools that require quantification of all fac-
tors is problematic when attempting to incor-
porate environmental and social objectives in
the planning process. Environmental and
social objectives cannot be easily translated
into quantifiable numbers.152 These objectives
are derived from sociological values and are
not premised upon particular costs or benefits
that might result from their implementation.
The “value” accorded to environmental and
social objectives is not established by market-
place mechanisms, but is instead weighted
through a process of public deliberation.
LCP and reliability planning both contain a
process of cost-effectiveness analysis;153 relia-
bility planning additionally involves an addi-
tional second step of benefit-cost analysis.154
Both cost-effectiveness and benefit-cost analy-
sis are designed to produce a conclusion
derived from aggregated data that allows a
decision maker to determine that Plan A is
preferable to Plan B or Plan C because it is
more cost-effective or has a higher benefit-cost
ratio.155 The outcome of each analysis is
expressed as a numerical figure, requiring
quantification of all factors.156 Moreover, the
integrity of the analytical result is dependent
upon the inclusion of every cost or benefit, no
matter how intangible or unquantifiable.157
Cost-effectiveness analysis, or fiscal effica-
cy testing, has been utilized in water resources
planning since its inception. Planning has
always sought to find the least costly means for
achieving a purpose. When single-purpose
planning was the norm, the only concern of
planners was to design water resources proj-
ects that required the least amount of fiscal
outlays or resource inputs to accomplish the
purpose.158 Cost-effectiveness has continued to
be a foundation in water resources planning,
even as the purposes and objectives of water
policies have changed.
When multi-purpose planning emerged in
the early 1900s, it was found that cost-effec-
tiveness analysis was appropriate for analyzing
the fiscal impacts of the project, but was not
capable of evaluating all the potential costs
and benefits of a multi-purpose project.
Benefit-cost analysis was developed to fill this
void, and was officially incorporated into water
resources planning in the 1930s by the federal
government and in 1945 by the California leg-
islature.159 This analytic tool allowed planners
to tabulate costs and benefits that were out-
side the traditional resource costs of time,
labor and material inputs. Moreover, it allowed
planners to grapple with the increasingly
diverse set of public benefits and future costs
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151. For LCP, see supra notes 136-39 and accompanying
text. For reliability planning, see supra notes 140-42 and accom-
panying text.
152. See Loucks, Sustainability Criteria in Project Planning,
supra note 142, at 154. “Such benefit-cost analyses are only suit-
able when dealing with easily quantifiable expenditures and
returns over time. They cannot be applied when dealing with
environmental issues and resources that are not priced in the
market place . . . .” Id. at 143.
153. See supra notes 137, 140 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text.
155. See RICHARD LAYARD & STEPHEN GLAISTER, COST BENEFIT
ANALYSIS 1-2 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2d ed., 1994). “The general
question that a cost-benefit analysis sets out to answer, is
whether a number of investment projects, A, B, C, etc., should be
undertaken and, if funds are limited, which one, two, or more
among these specific projects that otherwise qualify for admis-
sion, should be selected.” EDWARD J. MISHAN, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
58 (Praeger 1976). Cost-effectiveness is broadly defined as an
“analytic study designed to assist a decision maker in identifying
a preferred choice among alternatives.” Quade, supra note 137, at
1.
156. See Steven Kelman, Cost-Benefit Analysis in
Environmental, Safety, and Health Regulation: Ethical and Philosophical
Considerations, in COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS AND ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATIONS: POLITICS, ETHICS, AND METHODS, 137, 143 (Daniel
Swartzman et al. eds., The Conservation Foundation 1982). “In
order for cost-benefit calculation to be performed, all costs and
benefits must be expressed in a common metric, typically dol-
lars.” Id.
157. See Michael F. Sheehan, Economism, Democracy and
Hazardous Wastes: Some Policy Considerations, in CONTROVERSIES IN
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, supra note 137, at 108, 114. Writing about
the process of quantifying nonmarket factors, the author cited
two economists who concluded:
In some cases, it may be best to avoid quantifying
some intangibles as long as possible, carrying them
along instead in the form of a written paragraph of
description. . . . [but] We will find no escape from the
numbers. . . . Ultimately the final decision will implic-
itly quantify a host of intangibles; there are no incom-
mensurables when decisions are made in the real
world.
Id. at 114 (citing EDITH STOKEY & RICHARD ZECKHAUSER, A PRIMER FOR
POLICY ANALYSIS 153 (W.W. Norton 1978)).
158. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
159. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
that accrued from massive, long-term water
plans.160 Benefit-cost analysis was extended
to include the following factors: (1)
intertemporal distribution of resource pro-
duction and consumption; (2) discounted
future costs and benefits of facilities
planned but scheduled for later develop-
ment; (3) project benefits and costs that
arise from physically interdependent eco-
nomic activities; and (4) costs or benefits
associated with not adding a particular fea-
ture to the proposed project.161 Benefit-cost
analysis became a tool for determining
whether a particular facility or component
should be included in the multi-purpose
plan because it increased total benefits
more than the costs. Cost-effectiveness
analysis was limited to determining the
least-cost means of implementing the plan,
once its scope had been defined.162
Both these analytic methods were devel-
oped to achieve the dominant water policy
objective of the pre-1960 era, economic effi-
ciency, which seeks to ensure that society
receives an overall net economic benefit
from water resources plans.163 Cost-effective-
ness and benefit-cost analysis are ideally
suited to serve this objective because they
translate every factor in an analysis into a
numerical value, produce an aggregate out-
come and enable planners to definitively
conclude whether a proposed water
resources plan is economically efficient.164
When multi-objective water policies first
emerged in the late 1960s, however, plan-
ners immediately noted the difficulty
encountered in trying to address newly artic-
ulated environmental and social objectives
within the existing planning paradigm.165 The
problem was how to incorporate environ-
mental and social factors into the cost-effec-
tiveness and benefit-cost analyses, when
such factors are neither priced in the market
place nor readily translatable into numerical
values.166
There were limited attempts to develop a
formal planning method for addressing non-
market factors outside cost-effectiveness or
141
W
ES
T 

N
O
R
TH
W
ES
T
Winter / Spring 2000 Who Controls the Waters?
160. See OTTO ECKSTEIN, WATER RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT: THE
ECONOMICS OF PROJECT EVALUATION 19-46 (Harvard Univ. Press 1958);
see also WHITE, supra note 2, at 41-42.
161. See ECKSTEIN, supra note 160, at 19-46.
162. See id. at 2-8.
163. The term “economic efficiency” as used here refers to
the “Kaldor-Hicks” notion of an efficiency criterion, whereby a
proposed plan is deemed efficient and therefore desirable “if the
gains exceed the losses, so that the gainers could compensate
the losers and retain a residual gain.” JOHN KRUTILLA & ANTHONY
FISHER, THE ECONOMICS OF NATURAL ENVIRONMENTS: STUDIES IN THE
VALUATION OF COMMODITY AND AMENITY RESOURCES 28-29 (Resources
for the Future 1975). The Kaldor-Hicks notion of economic effi-
ciency is the criterion upon which benefit-cost analysis is based.
See ANDERSON, supra note 137, at 13. Economists also refer to
another efficiency criterion, known as “Pareto-optimality,” where-
by a proposed plan is efficient only if gains to one group can be
made without burdening or being opposed by anyone. Use of this
stringent Pareto-efficiency criterion, however, has been criticized
as leading to policy or planning paralysis. See id.; Appendix (equity
or fairness) (arguing that “literal adherence to the Pareto-superi-
ority criterion could be paralyzing”).
164. NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, supra note 48, at 380-81.
It is important to note that numerical outcomes produced by
cost-effectiveness and benefit-cost analysis have often been
attacked as erroneous or misleading. The basis of this criticism is
that it is relatively easy to manipulate “values” used in these
analyses to produce a desired result. Even where an analysis is
done perfectly, the results may be misleading because of the pos-
sibility of willful or negligent misuse of the process. See Daniel
Swartzman, Cost-Benefit Analysis in Environmental Regulation: Sources of
Controversy, in COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS AND ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATIONS: POLITICS, ETHICS, AND METHODS, supra note 156, at 53,
67-68. Not only are there severe difficulties in valuing nonmarket
environmental and social factors as discussed in this section, but
even the method of assigning values to economic factors has
been subject to criticism. See id. at 59-61; Jaffe, supra note 59, at
60, 62.
165. “The benefit-cost ratio limits itself to questions of
economic efficiency. It does not take into account those non-eco-
nomic activities such as environmental quality. It presents an
incomplete picture of the planning scenario. Economic impacts
are considered; noneconomic impacts are not.” MULDER ET AL.,
supra note 11, at 14-15. “Planning tends to bury in the arithmetic
of benefit-cost analysis important issues that must be decided on
a non-quantitative and judgmental basis.” NATIONAL WATER
COMMISSION, supra note 48, at 366.
166. See Shabman, supra note 22, at 30-34; Daniel P.
Loucks, Analytical Methods for Multiobjective Planning, in SOCIAL AND
ENVIRONMENTAL OBJECTIVES IN WATER RESOURCES PLANNING AND
MANAGEMENT, supra note 4, at 169; WATER RESOURCES CENTER, supra
note 121, at 11-12. At a California policy conference on water,
development and the environment, a water resource planner with
EBMUD framed the issue this way:
Are the present evaluation procedures for determining
cost-benefit ratios antiquated? I do not believe it is
the procedures, but some of the items that we are try-
ing to crank into the procedures . . . It will be of great
value, however, for economic evaluation procedures
used by the state, federal and other agencies over the
past 20 years or more to be modified to better quanti-
fy some of the environmental impacts. This will not be
easy .
Id. at 12. 
benefit-cost analyses, but implementation of
these procedures was never widespread.167
Instead, planners have retained the centrality
of cost-effectiveness and benefit-cost analyses
in water resources planning168 and focused
their efforts on three strategies: (1) developing
tools that more accurately quantify and meas-
ure non-economic environmental and social
factors; (2) incorporating environmental
objectives through compliance with regulatory
requirements; and (3) incorporating social
objectives through public participation com-
ponents. The shortcomings of the first strate-
gy will be addressed in the remaining part of
this section. Discussion of the second and
third strategies is deferred until the next sec-
tion.169
To incorporate environmental and social
objectives in the planning process, planners
have attempted to develop new methods for
“valuing” these essentially nonmarket factors.
The following example demonstrates how this
is often accomplished. For a proposal to divert
and store 500,000 acre-feet of water from a
river, the evaluation process would first
attempt to quantify the environmental and
social impacts of this diversion by placing an
economic value on tangible factors such as
fish and wildlife losses, new or destroyed
recreational opportunities, as well as jobs cre-
ated, retained or lost. Additionally, to capture
“values” that are less tangible, a contingent
valuation method such as a preference survey
might be used. Preference or contingent valu-
ation surveys are a means by which planners
can determine people’s willingness-to-pay
(economic preference) to gain certain benefits
or avoid particular costs for which there is no
readily available market.170 In the present
hypothetical, a preference survey could seek to
quantify what people would be willing to pay
to leave the 500,000 acre-feet of water
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167. There were two principle efforts made at the national
level. In the 1960s, Senate Document 97 was developed and initi-
ated by President Kennedy. See supra note 24 and accompanying
text. The document recognized that economic considerations
were only one factor in project evaluation and that benefit-cost
analysis should be limited to its proper context. Yet, there were
few actual changes that resulted from Senate Document 97 and
benefit-cost analysis remained the sole analytic tool for several
more decades. See Jaffe, supra note 59, at 68.
The Principle and Standards for Planning Water and Related Land
Resources [hereinafter “P&S”] was approved by President Nixon and
published in 1973. See supra note 62. The P&S attempted to estab-
lish two separate evaluation processes for water resources plan-
ning known as “accounts.” One of the accounts was to include
effects on the environment, which were to be quantified to the
extent possible and described qualitatively where necessary. The
P&S also called for the separate evaluation of “social well-being.”
See Jaffe, supra note 59, at 70-71. But the promises of the P&S
remained largely unrealized until the Principles and Guidelines
replaced them in 1980 and reinstated economic efficiency as the
sole evaluation criteria for water resource planning. See id. at 71;
Knesse, supra note 20, at 29. For a good discussion of how the
“accounts system” of planning was designed to operate, see
MULDER ET AL., supra note 11, at 15-6. For an example of a water
resources plan that attempted to implement and follow the P&S,
see DAVID C. MAJOR & HARRY E. SCHWARZ, LARGE-SCALE REGIONAL
WATER RESOURCES PLANNING 33-48 (Kluwer Academic Publishers
1990).
168. As noted above, both the LCP and reliability planning
processes currently used in California rely upon these analytic
tools. See supra notes 136-43 and accompanying text. Articles and
books on resources planning continually note that benefit-cost
analysis remains the primary evaluation tool. See, e.g., Partha
Dasgupta & Karl-Göran Mäler, The Environment and Emerging
Development, in COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS, supra note 155, at 319 (arguing
that unless environmental resources are viewed as “economic
goods” they will continue to be neglected in policy design and
implementation); BLACK, supra note 71, at 177-214 (presenting ben-
efit-cost analysis as the fundamental process for water resources
project evaluation); see also FELDMAN, supra note 39, at 157-67
(“despite criticisms by many political scientists and economists of
the misuse, misapplication, or overreliance upon this methodolo-
gy by government agencies, benefit-cost analysis remains secure
because it is a relatively simple and lucid way to depict advantages
and disadvantages of natural resources development”); Jaffe, supra
note 59, at 71 (“[t]raditional [benefit-cost] analysis has remained
the primary evaluation tool. . . . The formulation of . . . plans . . .
has been limited to identifying variations of the . . . plan which are
“least bad” with respect to environmental values. . . . The objec-
tives of . . . social well-being . . . have been ignored”).
One water resources planner recently attempted to docu-
ment some of the general criteria used for evaluating proposed
water plans, the majority of which the author defines as relying
upon some form of cost-effectiveness or benefit-cost analysis: (1)
the economic efficiency criterion involves the straightforward
process of ensuring that economic benefits exceed costs, where
both are discounted at the proper rate, (2) social equity analysis is
seen as evaluating whether there is capacity to reallocate water
use to “higher value uses [that] produce net social benefits,” and
(3) consideration of environmental factors is regarded as a process
of quantifying “environmental costs as elements in economic
costs, to be taken into account in cost-benefit analysis and price-
fixing.” WINPENNY, supra note 69, at 75-90. 
169. See infra notes 181-229 and accompanying text for this
analysis.
170. “The contingent valuation method explicitly elicits
information concerning the minimum level of compensation
required by an individual to forgo receiving a particular level of a
public good or the maximum amount the individual would be will-
ing to pay to obtain the nonmarket good or service.” G. CORNELIUS
VAN KOOTEN, LAND RESOURCE ECONOMICS AND SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT: ECONOMIC POLICIES AND THE COMMON GOOD 150 (U.B.C.
Press 1993). See also generally RONALD G. CUMMINGS ET AL., VALUING
ENVIRONMENTAL GOODS: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE CONTINGENT VALUATION
METHOD (Rowman & Allanheld 1986).
instream for environmental benefits or, con-
versely, what people would be willing to pay to
increase the reliability of their water service
or avoid a certain level of water rationing.
Despite similar vigorous attempts to
quantify environmental and social factors
for inclusion in the established planning
methods, there remains a continuing sense
that environmental and social objectives
have not been adequately addressed.171 This
shortcoming can be traced to water
resources planning processes that operate
under the premise that all policy objectives
are derived from economic values.
Environmental and social objectives, howev-
er, are derived from sociological values.172
The distinction is critical because the
process by which economic and sociological
values are formulated points to the necessi-
ty for a different planning process to achieve
these objectives. 
Economic values (the desire for obtain-
ing a good or service, or avoiding an eco-
nomic cost) can be assigned a weight in
monetary terms which measures society
preferences for the good or service in a dol-
lar amount. Economic values have been his-
torically accorded monetary weights, and
continual market transactions ensure that
the assigned weight is a relatively accurate
reflection of society’s preference. In con-
trast, sociological values (the desire for
achieving a social benefit or avoiding a
social cost) have not historically been
weighted in monetary terms; rather, prefer-
ences for those values have turned upon the
merits of arguments that support the value.
The “market” in which these merits are trad-
ed and accorded weight is a forum for dis-
cussion and debate, not monetary transac-
tions.173
This distinction between types of values
makes clear that not only must environmen-
tal and social values be evaluated in a delib-
erative forum, the planning process must
also have some deliberative methodology to
properly translate and incorporate these val-
ues in planning outcomes. Former Yale eco-
nomics professor Charles Lindblom argued,
in his famous article The Science of “Muddling
Through,”174 that for complex social problems
it is impossible to clarify values in advance
of the planning process. The values people
articulate vary with circumstances, so that
differences among relative values cannot be
reconciled outside a specific context.175
Instead, weighing, ranking and selecting val-
ues to be promoted is done through a choice
among planning alternatives. For complex
social problems, choosing the means to
solve the problem is an inherently value-
laden process that simultaneously defines
the objectives to be achieved.176
If environmental and social values are to
be reflected in policy outcomes, they must
be incorporated in the planning process.
This would require the development and
implementation of procedures which allow
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MWD used preference surveys in the IRP process, to “deter-
mine willingness to pay for services that are typically difficult to
measure, such as recreation, environmental protection, and
resource reliability.” Rodrigo et al., supra note 136, at 71. MWD also
used preference surveys in its reliability planning to quantify as
many of the impacts from water rationing as possible. For exam-
ple, it used a contingent valuation survey to determine that house-
holds would pay on average $10 to $20 per month every other year
to avoid severe water shortages. MWD also relied on another sur-
vey that estimated that a fifteen percent shortage of water supply
to Southern California’s industrial sector would result in a loss of
16,000 jobs and over $3 billion in production. See CALIFORNIA WATER
PLAN (1994), supra note 134, at 309. For another example of prefer-
ence surveys used in water resources, see Wesley N. Musser et al.,
Contingent Valuation in Resolving Local Public Water Problems, in WATER
QUANTITY/QUALITY MANAGEMENT AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION: INSTITUTIONS,
PROCESSES, AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 110, at 467. 
171. See supra note 146 for a list of critics who have high-
lighted this continuing failure in water resources planning. For
a general critique on the failure of contingent valuation meth-
ods to adequately reflect environmental and social concerns in
analytic and decision making processes, see Kelman, supra note
156, at 143-48.
172. “Sociological values” refer to those beliefs and con-
victions that we hold about what our society should do; our col-
lective identity and aspirations as a community. Sociological
values are public values arrived at through a collective agree-
ment about what actions the community should take to pro-
mote these values. Distinguishable are economic values which
can be expressed “collectively,” but are arrived at through the
aggregation of individually expressed preferences.
173. See Sheehan, supra note 157, at 115; Mark Sagoff,
Economic Theory and Environmental Law, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1393, 1417
(1981).
174. Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of “Muddling
Through,” in CLASSIC READINGS IN URBAN PLANNING 35 (Jay M. Stein
ed., McGraw-Hill, Inc. 1995).
175. See id. at 38-39.
176. See id. at 40.
for participation, debate and deliberation
among affected interests. The application of
economic analysis tools, such as cost-effec-
tiveness, benefit-cost and preference sur-
veys must be limited to circumstances in
which the marketplace, through countless
expressions of individual preferences,
ensures the monetary values assigned are an
accurate reflection of our collective econom-
ic predisposition.177
To argue that environmental and social
objectives can be satisfied through the
existing analytic framework by identifying
economic factors labeled as “social” or “envi-
ronmental” ignores the fact that these objec-
tives are defined without reference or consider-
ation of their economic effects. Environmental
and social objectives were not established by
referencing the possible economic benefits
that might be gained or costs that might be
incurred if the objectives were achieved.
Instead, they were derived from sociological
values that express our collective will as a soci-
ety. They are normative values that embody an
ideal for what we would like our society to
achieve, independent of costs or benefits.
Thus, economic valuation of environmental
and social objectives does not accurately
reflect the weight that society accords them.178
This is not to say that economic impacts
labeled as “environmental” or “social” should
be ignored. To the contrary, the continual
expansion of economic analysis to include the
valuation of economic impacts that are diffi-
cult to measure for lack of ready market is a
positive trend. Internalizing externalities is
critical to understanding the full economic
import of our actions.179 But this process
should not be considered an adequate
achievement of environmental and social
objectives through the planning process.
Methods that create a deliberative process,
rather than a technical process, must be uti-
lized. 
Current water resources planning has
attempted to provide a deliberative forum
through the inclusion of “public participation”
processes. This is a step in the right direction.
However, as explained in the next section, the
planning framework within which public partic-
ipation occurs has limited the capacity of this
process to fully manifest environmental and
social objectives in planning outcomes.180
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177. Professor Stephen Kelman, in critiquing the benefit-
cost analysis process, noted that the process of trying to quanti-
fy nonmarket factors erroneously assumes “there is no difference
between how people value things in private, individual transac-
tions and how they would wish a social valuation of those same
things to be made in public, collective decisions.” Kelman, supra
note 156, at 145. Kelman notes that this assumption grows natu-
rally out of the “highly individualistic microeconomic tradition.”
Id. He suggests a better alternative, that receives greater support,
is when “public, social decisions provide an opportunity to give
certain things a higher valuation than we choose, for one reason
or another, to give these things in our private, individual activi-
ties.” Id. More recently, water policy analyst David Feldman sup-
ported Kelman’s conclusion when he wrote that economic analy-
sis:
[I]nadequately accounts for environmental impact and
fails to elucidate the objectives of public policy. It also
ignores the range of concerns that people have about
the uses of natural resources. For this reason, it can-
not be normatively defended by reference to some
compelling social good that is reached through care-
ful deliberation.
FELDMAN, supra note 39, at 6.
178. Harvard Law professor Laurence Tribe has pointed
out that to incorporate social values in analytic techniques in the
form of preferences requires relying on the flawed premise that
“characterizing all values as expressions of human preferences
does not affect their content or distort their perspective.”
Laurence H. Tribe, Ways Not to Think About Plastic Trees: New
Foundations for Environmental Law, 83 YALE L.J. 1315, 1329 (1974).
Over a decade earlier, water resources economist Otto Eckstein
supported Tribe’s conclusion when he wrote that benefit-cost
analysis cannot be the only criterion in water resources decisions
because there are social ideals to be considered that “are based
on ethical value judgments which are clearly outside the realm of
economics.” ECKSTEIN, supra note 160, at 39.
More recently, University of Chicago philosophy professor
Alan Gerwith similarly argued that to evaluate social objectives
such as “life health, safety, education, and many others,” solely
on a monetary criterion, ignores the moral considerations which
underlie these objectives. Alan Gerwith, Two Types of Cost-Benefit
Analysis, in UPSTREAM/DOWNSTREAM: ISSUES IN ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS
205, 208 (Donald Scherer ed., Temple Univ. Press 1990). He points
out that “there are other, normatively prior ways of assessing
basic human values—ways that view these values as objects of
rights and hence as setting normatively necessary duties to pro-
tect the values, quite apart from monetary considerations.” Id. at
209. For these reasons, Gerwith concludes that there must be a
separate process of analyzing economic considerations (mone-
tary opportunity costs) and moral considerations (authoritative,
substantive, and distributive questions). See id.
179. See HAL R. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 259-63
(W.W. Norton 1984) (discussing the concept of externalities as
representing economic costs that are excluded from a decision
maker’s consideration and how cost internalization techniques
make possible more efficient decisions where economic factors
have no functioning markets).
180. See infra notes 219-29 and accompanying text.
B. Environmental and Social Objectives as
“Constraints”
1. The Planning Framework
Beginning in the late 1960s, water
resources policies began to include environ-
mental and social objectives in addition to his-
torical economic goals, necessitating the
development of a planning process that could
effectively address multiple objectives. The
multi-objective planning framework that
evolved over the next several decades has been
succinctly described as a process of “con-
strained optimization,” whereby a single objec-
tive is optimized subject to the constraints of
other objectives.181 This process has been more
cynically described as selecting one objective
to be optimized, with a final outcome that is
“least bad” with respect to the other objec-
tives.182
MWD’s recent Integrated Resource
Planning (“IRP”) process provides a good
example of constrained optimization of multi-
ple objectives. The IRP states that “[t]he major
objective for the IRP was developing a compre-
hensive water resources plan that ensures: (1)
reliability, (2) affordability, (3) water quality, (4)
diversity of supply, and (5) adaptability for the
region, while recognizing the environmental,
institutional and political constraints to
resource development.”183 Although water qual-
ity, affordability and reliability have sometimes
been referred to as environmental or social
purposes, their usage in the IRP demonstrates
that these terms are primarily economic goals
in this context.184 Grouped together, the five
numbered purposes embody the economic
efficiency objective that the IRP process opti-
mizes, subject to environmental, institutional
and political constraints.185
The following statement demonstrates
how the process of constrained optimization
operated in the IRP:
The institutional, political, and
environmental constraints in the devel-
opment of a resources strategy are all
important factors that need to be
addressed. For example, although
imported supplies may appear to be
lower in costs than some local
resources, the success of imported
resources development may be difficult
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181. See supra notes 18, 23 and accompanying text. The fol-
lowing is a more complete description of the constrained opti-
mization planning process:
1) Define the objectives to be obtained to sat-
isfy public demands and needs;
2) Define both resource and institutional con-
straints that will affect obtaining of any of the
objectives;
3) Determine possible relationships and
impacts of the constraining factors on achieving
the desired objectives; and
4) Optimize the goal, which means satisfying
the individual objectives with respect to the
parameters set by the constraining factors.
See generally DAVID C. MAJOR, MULTIOBJECTIVE WATER RESOURCES
PLANNING (American Geophysical Union 1977). For an explanation
and example of how multiple objective optimization has been
effectuated, see MAJOR & SCHWARZ, supra note 167, at 33-48
(describing a water resources planning process in which three
objectives are to be achieved: economic efficiency, regional well-
being, and environmental quality).
182. See Jaffe, supra note 59, at 71.
183. MWD IRP PLAN, VOL. 1, supra note 98, at 1-7.
184. “Affordability” is defined as the “goal of achieving
reliability in the least-cost manner for the entire region.” MWD
IRP PLAN, VOL. 1, supra note 98, at 3-26. Assessing the affordabili-
ty of water was accomplished by a comparison of local water
costs to other regions throughout the nation, a contingent valu-
ation survey of willingness-to-pay to avoid water shortages, and
a comparison with other utility costs. See id. at 3-35 to 3-39. The
emphasis was clearly on making the region’s water supply cost-
competitive. 
“Water quality” is defined as the achievement of a level of
water quality which allows implementation of “cost-effective
local groundwater conjunctive use storage and water recycling
projects” to avoid the need for more expensive treatment of high
salinity water. Id. at 3-24, 3-26. The social benefits of water quali-
ty result from compliance with State and Federal water quality
requirements. See MWD IRP PLAN, VOL. 2, supra note 143, at 2-5 to
2-6. While the need to consider social objectives was noted
(“Metropolitan’s treated water facilities must also consider the
public’s level of satisfaction”), it is unclear how, or even if, this
objective was considered in the IRP process. See id. 
Social objectives such as “equity” are mentioned in the con-
text of MWD’s rate structure, but “equity” is never defined in this
context and it is unclear how equitable concerns factored into the
IRP process. See id. at 2, 2-9. Moreover, “equity” and “fairness” are
listed elsewhere as “business principles” with the emphasis on
reliability and maintaining a balance between cost and benefits.
See id. at 2-3; MWD IRP PLAN, VOL. 1, supra note 98, at 5-7. As noted
before, the “reliability” goal is derived through its own con-
strained optimization process in which the cost-effectiveness
objective is optimized. See supra notes 140-42 and accompanying
text.
185. The MWD IRP uses “political constraints” to identify
what could be more appropriately termed social or community
constraints. The term connotes a concern for the political accept-
ability of the IRP (i.e., the degree to which the plan is acceptable
to the communities that it will impact).
to achieve without a strong commit-
ment to utilize feasible local resources
(conservation, water recycling, and
groundwater) first.186
Embodied in the above statement is a
notion that economic efficiency would be opti-
mized by relying heavily on imported water
resources. However, optimization of this objec-
tive is constrained by environmental and polit-
ical (social) objectives. Thus, the IRP must
include some amount of local water resources
sufficient to satisfy the constraining objec-
tives. Another example of constrained opti-
mization is seen in the IRP’s consideration of
conservation strategies. Conservation is val-
ued only in its capacity to contribute to the
economic efficiency of the IRP.187 Environmen-
tal benefits that flow from conservation are rel-
egated to a minor consideration in the analy-
sis, whereas economic measures are the pri-
mary means for valuing conservation propos-
als.188 Thus, conservation is undertaken prima-
rily to optimize the economic efficiency objec-
tive, with recognition that it will also satisfy
constraining environmental and social objec-
tives. The result of the IRP’s constrained opti-
mization planning process is a final water
resources plan that is marginally less harmful
to the environment and marginally more
acceptable to the community. Excluded are
strategies that actually optimize environmen-
tal or social objectives.189
The constrained optimization framework
for achieving multiple planning objectives
presents a serious challenge to the incorpora-
tion of sociological values. For economic
objectives to be “constrained” by either envi-
ronmental or social objectives, or vice versa, a
common basis for evaluation must be estab-
lished. As was discussed in Section IV.A.,
where possible, the common practice has been
to monetize environmental and social objec-
tives. The results of this practice, however,
have been unsatisfactory.190 Alternatively, sev-
eral efforts have been made to evaluate quali-
tative aspects of environmental and social
objectives separately from economic objec-
tives, and then attempt to reconcile quantita-
tive and qualitative measures.191 This planning
procedure, however, was vigorously resisted
and eventually failed for want of acceptance.192
With a need to address multiple planning
objectives, and a failure to develop adequate
analytic tools for environmental and social
objectives, water resources planners looked for
other processes that could provide a means for
giving environmental and social objectives
sufficient consideration. Planners sought to
identify procedures that, if completed, would
be accepted as having accorded sufficient
weight to these objectives.193 By focusing upon
the adequacy of process, planners were relieved
from struggling with developing standards for
evaluating whether sufficient substantive con-
sideration was given to environmental and
social objectives. Planners seized upon the
environmental review process as codified in
CEQA and NEPA194 as the primary procedure
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186. MWD IRP PLAN, VOL. 1, supra note 98, at 3-27.
187. “Metropolitans’ average level of investment for con-
servation projects should not exceed the regional benefits meas-
ured over the life of the project(s).” Id. at 5-9.
188. “Regional benefits of conservation projects should be
measured by: (1) a reduction in capital investments due to a
deferral and/or down-sizing of regional infrastructure; (2) a reduc-
tion in O&M expenditures needed for treatment and distribution
of imported water; (3) a reduction in expenditures associated
with developing alternative regional supplies; and (4) environ-
mental benefits from reduced demands on the ecosystem.” Id. at
5-8.
189. Part of the limitation in optimizing environmental
and social objectives through the IRP process is not only its use
of the constrained optimization model used but also that the IRP
presumes that water demand is a fixed rather than variable factor.
See infra notes 219-29 and accompanying text (discussing the con-
sequences that follow from a fixed demand premise).
190. See supra notes 151-80 and accompanying text.
191. See supra note 167.
192. See Stakhiv, supra note 63, at 107. The author discuss-
es the failure of planners to develop and implement planning
processes which would evaluate environmental and social objec-
tives separate from economic objectives. Instead, the con-
strained optimization model has been the only planning method-
ology employed since the 1970s with economic efficiency as the
primary objective to be optimized. The author cites problems and
issues such as the inadequacy of analytic tools, the need to retain
the analytic rigidity offered by quantitative mathematical models,
the fact that it is easier both theoretically and computationally to
maximize economic objectives, and the difficulty of effectively
integrating quantitative and qualitative measurements. See id. at
107-18.
193. See id.
194. See supra notes 112-14, 118 and accompanying text
(explaining CEQA), and supra note 31 (explaining NEPA).
for consideration of environmental objec-
tives,195 and developed various public partici-
pation processes as the procedure for consid-
eration of social objectives.196
The functional result of this water
resources planning structure is that economic
efficiency remains the primary objective to be
optimized through water resources planning.
Environmental and social objectives serve only
as procedural “constraints.” The method for
incorporating environmental and social objec-
tives into the planning process focuses on pro-
cedural compliance rather than substantive
evaluation. Through regulatory environmental
review and inclusion of public participation
mechanisms, water agencies are considered to
have provided sufficient incorporation of envi-
ronmental and social objectives. The planning
process is devoid of methods that evaluate the
substance and sufficiency of the consideration
given to environmental and social concerns
through these procedures. As a result, environ-
mental and social objectives are ensured only
a minimal level of consideration through pro-
cedural compliance; “optimization” of these
objectives is not contemplated. Environmental
and social objectives are relegated to function-
ing only as constraints on the optimization of
economic efficiency. 
Elevation of economic efficiency and mini-
mization of environmental and social objec-
tives has not been an explicit policy choice, but
rather it is an implicit result of the planning
framework. Water agencies make clear in their
statements the need to incorporate environ-
mental and social values in water resources
policies. Policy objectives which embody these
values are adopted with no indication that they
are ranked as less desirable to achieve than
other objectives.197 But the planning framework
used by water agencies works as an implicit
choice to limit consideration given to environ-
mental and social objectives. The implicit rela-
tionship between the structural framework of
planning, and the ideas, perspectives and val-
ues which are articulated through the planning
process, is cogently summarized in the follow-
ing passage:
The structure of organizational
arrangements implicitly determines
the basis for distinguishing the sets of
events to be controlled, the order of
preferences for ranking the values to be
achieved by organized activities, and
the standards for determining the rele-
vancy of information to be communi-
cated in the decision-making process.
Since patterns of organization have a
fundamental influence upon the devel-
opment of perspectives, values, and
ideas regarding resource policies and
patterns of resource development, any
question of comprehensive planning
must involve comparable questions
about the design of organizational
arrangements.198
2. A Case Study—Minimizing 
Environmental and Social 
Objectives
The MWD IRP process provides a good
case study of how the constrained optimiza-
tion framework identifies standards that
accord environmental and social objectives
minimum consideration and relegates them to
serving as constraints upon optimization of
economic efficiency. It also provides some
insight into how the use of the constrained
optimization planning operates as an implicit
policy choice to emphasize economic efficien-
cy and minimize environmental and social
objectives.
147
W
ES
T 

N
O
R
TH
W
ES
T
Winter / Spring 2000 Who Controls the Waters?
195. Water planners have noted that the regulatory regime
is now the primary means by which environmental values are
incorporated in the planning process. See, e.g., Stakhiv, supra note
63, at 109 (“[T]he [NEPA] EIS is once again viewed by the envi-
ronmental protection agencies as the mechanism to ensure that
environmental and social objectives play a role in project plan-
ning.”); Kneese, supra note 20, at 29 (NEPA, through its EIS
requirement, is the “primary way in which environmental consid-
erations enter into the planning of . . . water resources projects.”).
196. See infra notes 215-29 and accompanying text.
197. See supra note 147 (providing several examples of how
environmental and social concerns have been explicitly promot-
ed as a part of the water resources planning process). There is no
indication in these planning processes that environmental and
social concerns are viewed as less desirable than other policy
objectives.
198. Ostrom, supra note 10, at 49.
a. Environmental Objective
In 1992, the MWD adopted seven guiding
principles to serve as a framework for the
agency’s decision-making process and provide
broad statements about MWD’s aspirations.199
The guiding principle for the environment
seeks to establish “an approach to integrating
environmental values and awareness into
Metropolitan’s decision-making.”200 While the
MWD’s guiding principle aspires to integrate
environmental values, when the principle was
translated into an objective for the IRP
process, the aspirations disappeared. The
environmental objective adopted for the IRP
is to “minimize the environmental impacts” of
the water resources plan which are produced
by the IRP process.201 The guiding principle is
interpreted as requiring only “careful consid-
eration of all . . . project-specific environmen-
tal impacts and regulations.”202 A more broad-
based consideration of environmental values
is specifically rejected by the IRP, which states
that its role is limited to being “consistent
with regional management plans that address
the cumulative environmental and social
impacts for the region.”203
The focus of the IRP environmental objec-
tive on the minimization of impacts and regu-
latory compliance indicates that the objective
is designed to satisfy the existing environ-
mental regulatory requirements as embodied
in CEQA and NEPA. The objective intends to
integrate environmental concerns as they are
codified, not to integrate environmental val-
ues as articulated by the affected communi-
ties. CEQA and NEPA force government agen-
cies to consider, before acting, potential envi-
ronmental impacts of the action. Statutory
compliance with these acts, however, is less
than optimal from the standpoint of compre-
hensively incorporating environmental values
into the planning process. First, NEPA and
CEQA apply only to specific actions; mere
planning or contemplation of action is out-
side the statutes’ purview.204 Moreover, under
CEQA only “discretionary” government
actions, as opposed to “ministerial,” are sub-
ject to the Act.205 Second, the statutes only
require an analysis of physical environmental
impacts—social impacts alone do not need to
be considered.206 Third, the laws allow identi-
fied impacts to be mitigated and, where not
mitigable, a project can nonetheless be
approved for overriding reasons.207 In essence,
the current environmental regulatory regime
is not designed to force the incorporation of
environmental values into project planning,
but rather to ensure there are not substantial
environmental impacts that result from the
planning process. The difference is significant.
Values are normative criteria for planning,
representing the beliefs of the community.
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199. See METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT OF SOUTHERN
CALIFORNIA—BOARD OF DIRECTORS, supra note 147.
200. Id.
201. MWD IRP PLAN, VOL. 1, supra note 98, at E-9, 3-22
(emphasis added).
202. MWD IRP PLAN, VOL. 2, supra note 143, at 2-14.
203. Id. at 2-14. See also infra notes 219-29 and accompa-
nying text (discussing additional ramifications of this planning
limitation as it relates to control of water demand).
204. See Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976) (holding
that NEPA only applies to proposals for specific action and that
the agency determines whether a “proposal for action” has been
made, subject to arbitrary and capricious review by the courts);
see also Guidelines for Implementation of the California
Environmental Quality Act, CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15352
(1998)[hereinafter CEQA Guidelines](CEQA applies only when a
public agency commits itself “to a definite course of action”).
205. A ministerial act is one “involving little or no person-
al judgment by the public official as to the wisdom or manner of
carrying out the project. The public official merely applies the law
to the facts as presented but uses no special discretion or judg-
ment in reaching a decision.” CEQA Guidelines, supra note 204, §
15369; see also Leach v. City of San Diego, 220 Cal. App. 3d 389
(1990) (holding the city’s decision to draw water from a reservoir
ministerial in nature and thus exempt from CEQA, despite the
potential harmful impacts to the ecosystem around the reser-
voir).
206. See Council on Environmental Quality (“CEQ”)
Regulations, 40 C.F.R. § 1508.14 (1999)(“[under NEPA] economic
or social effects are not intended by themselves to require prepa-
ration of an environmental impact statement.”); see also
Metropolitan Edison v. PANE, 460 U.S. 166 (1983); San
Franciscans for Reasonable Growth v. City and County of San
Francisco, 209 Cal. App. 3d 1502, 1521-2 n. 13 (1989) (holding
project’s creation of demand for new housing implicated “social
and economic, not environmental concerns” that are “outside the
CEQA purview”).
207. See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490
U.S. 332 (1989) (holding that NEPA requires an agency to consid-
er all reasonable alternative and appropriate mitigation meas-
ures, but that there is no mandatory duty to implement them,
even if they are feasible); see also CEQA Guidelines, supra note 204,
§ 15093 (stating that agencies may approve a project without mit-
igating significant adverse environmental impacts by adopting a
statement of “overriding considerations”); Citizens of Goleta
Valley v. Bd. of Supervisors (“Goleta II”), 52 Cal. 3d 553 (1990).
Impacts are positive criteria for planning, rep-
resenting the quantifiable harms to the com-
munity, what citizens want to avoid, and the
collective preferences of the community.
Incorporating values into project planning
allows a community to strive to achieve an
ideal, even if that ideal requires internalizing
quantifiable harms or costs imposed by a proj-
ect, harms that in the abstract the community
would seek to avoid. In contrast, planning to
minimize impacts ensures only that a commu-
nity’s preferences are maximized in a specific
project because quantifiable costs are
reduced.
If values are incorporated into planning, a
proposed alternative that optimizes economic
efficiency with minimal environmental and
social impacts may be rejected. A community’s
desire to promote or achieve certain environ-
mental and social values may require the pro-
posal to internalize extra economic costs or
harms. For example, a proposed project to
build an additional reservoir and fill it with
imported water supplies may be rejected
despite findings that the project balances
future water supplies and demand with the
greatest economic efficiency, causes minimal
or no environmental and social harms,208 and
promotes some environmental and social
goals.209 The proposed project may also be
rejected because it does not adequately
address more broad-based, as opposed to
project-specific, environmental and social val-
ues. These values could include concerns such
as conservation,210 fairness and intergenera-
tional equity,211 and sustainability or carrying
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208. The plan could have minimal impacts because the
reservoir is located in an area where there would be minimal
environmental damage, no dislocation or endangerment of any
households, and increased imported water supplies would be
achieved by installing water savings devices in another region,
and transferring the conserved water, with no resultant job loss-
es. MWD has argued somewhat persuasively that its soon-to-be
completed Eastside Reservoir Project will have similar results.
Specifically, the project calls for the construction of an 800,000
acre-foot reservoir in an uninhabited valley in rural southeastern
Riverside County, to be completed in 2002. See MWD IRP PLAN,
VOL. 2, supra note 143, at 5-3 to 5-5; 1 CALIFORNIA WATER PLAN, supra
note 134, at 306-312. The MWD claims that water to fill the reser-
voir will come primarily from water transfers from the Coachella
Valley. In 1990, the MWD began a water conservation program
with the Imperial Irrigation District (“IID”), which will conserve
75,570 acre-feet annually for use by MWD. The MWD also secured
an agreement to place a concrete lining in the All-American
Canal, which was to be completed in 1999 and conserve 25,700
acre-feet annually for use by MWD. See MWD URBAN WATER
MANAGEMENT PLAN, supra note 134, at 74-75.
209. The plan could promote environmental and social
goals because imported water prices would keep retail water
prices lower compared to other plans, thereby increasing eco-
nomic and job growth in the area (a social benefit). Additionally,
if the imported supplies were transferred from existing uses in
another region, the need to extract new supplies from in-stream
flows could be avoided (an environmental benefit).
210. Conservation measures as an alternative to imported
supplies would have been considered in the planning process,
but were likely not adopted due to the fact that imported supplies
could be obtained at a lesser cost with minimal environmental
and social impacts. If, however, conservation measures were not
evaluated merely for their “economic value,” but instead were
considered for their potential to achieve broader environmental
and social values, the final water plan may have been different.
211. See supra notes 208-09 (stating that the proposed plan
did achieve some equitable outcomes). The transfer of water
saved through conservation measures ensured that no job losses
resulted from the plan, and securing the lowest cost water
resource helped to ensure future economic and job growth for
the area. What is unclear, however, is whether the full-range of
equitable concerns were considered in the planning process.
Equity values have been broadened over the past several decades
to include fairness among the present generations as well as fair-
ness to future generations. For example, transferring water from
one region to another involves reallocation of the potential for
future growth. One region has acquired the capacity to expand
water uses, while another region has limited its ability to accom-
modate future growth in water consumption. Moreover, assuming
that water uses differ between the regions, the water transfer
results in the reallocation of water from one type of use to anoth-
er. Thus, a transfer of water involves fundamental decisions about
where and how water should be used, invoking concerns with the
equitable impact of those decisions. Assuming the transferred
water is planned for use in the immediate future, the water trans-
fer also invokes issues of intergenerational equity. See NATIONAL
RESEARCH COUNCIL, WATER TRANSFERS IN THE WEST: EFFICIENCY, EQUITY,
AND THE ENVIRONMENT 14-15, 38-69 (National Academy Press 1992);
see also generally PHILIP C. METZGER, OPTIONS FOR PROTECTING SOCIAL
VALUES IN WESTERN WATER TRANSFERS OUT OF AGRICULTURE (The
Conservation Foundation 1987) (arguing that efficiency concerns
alone cannot be the basis for determining water transfers and
that mechanisms must be put in place that ensure equitable and
environmental values are considered in the decision making).
Robert Paehlke recently noted that a fundamental difficulty in
attempting to integrate equitable concerns within the current
economic analysis framework is that
Any risk to employment is taken to be tragic, regard-
less of the tragedy attendant on continued employ-
ment (as in cutting of the last of the old-growth
forests). In effect the problem lies in the equitability of
the distribution of both work and income. It may be
the single largest political problem involved with the
integration of equity values and environmental values,
and thus deserves a great deal of attention in the
future.
Robert C. Paehlke, Environmental Values and Public Policy, in
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE 1990S 351, 364-65 (Norman J. Vig &
Michael E. Kraft eds., Congressional Quarterly Inc. 1994).
212. It is unclear whether sustainability values would have
capacity.212 A planning process which allows
full consideration of these values would likely
result in a very different proposed water
resources project.
If planning is done only to minimize
impacts, any plan or project that minimizes envi-
ronmental and social impacts will never be
rejected despite its failure to promote or achieve
the community’s values. For example, the hypo-
thetical water project described above would be
deemed optimal because impacts were mini-
mized to the greatest extent possible. The fact
that the project failed to consider more compre-
hensive environmental and social values of the
community is irrelevant because those concerns
are outside the scope of the planning process.
Even if the community forced water resources
policies to address these larger concerns
through the adoption of explicit policy objec-
tives or statutory language, the constrained opti-
mization planning process automatically
reduces consideration of these concerns to the
minimum amount possible. The result is that
water resources planning provides the commu-
nity no opportunity to assess whether it would
rather incur some impacts in exchange for
achieving or promoting its values. Without incor-
poration of values in planning, a community is
able only to satisfy its preferences, not to
express its will.
b. Social Objective
There is no explicitly adopted “social objec-
tive” for the IRP process, but it is clear that social
values are intended to be incorporated through
the public participation process. The public par-
ticipation component of the IRP process is
repeatedly emphasized as critical to addressing
the concerns of affected communities.213
Although public participation in the IRP is not
statutorily required, public participation ele-
ments are becoming increasingly commonplace
in legislative acts, even those that deal with
water resources.214 Agencies are aware that pub-
lic participation in the planning process is now
expected so, when not required by regulation,
agencies often elect to make this a part of their
planning process.215
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been considered. The transfer of water from one region to anoth-
er would obviously help achieve sustainable growth. But sustain-
able growth is very different from the concepts of sustainable
development and carrying capacity. Sustainable growth incorpo-
rates only the economic values of a community and does not seek
to balance those with the social and cultural values as sustain-
able development seeks to do. See R.E. Munn, Towards Sustainable
Growth, 26A ATMOSPHERIC ENVIRONMENT 2275, 2727 (1992).
213. See MWD IRP PLAN, VOL. 1, supra note 98, at 1-1, 1-8, 3-
2, 3-3. The following statements are examples of the emphasis
purportedly given to public participation in the IRP:  “[b]ecause
of the diverse needs and institutional arrangements in the region,
the success of the IRP would only be achieved through an open
and participatory process that involved the major stakeholders,”
and “[n]ew approaches that take a broader perspective and
involve the public in the decision-making process are being used
by water agencies to solve the problems of supply shortages and
water quality.” Id. at 1-8, 1-1.
214. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE § 10004(b)(2) (West 1991)
(requiring department to release a preliminary draft of the
California Water Plan, as updated, upon request, to interested
persons and entities throughout the state for their review and
comment); CAL WATER CODE § 10005.1 (West 1991) (requiring
department to conduct a series of hearings with interested per-
sons, organizations, local, state, and federal agencies, and repre-
sentatives of the diverse geographical areas and interests of the
state before preparing the California Water Plan); CAL. WATER
CODE § 10642 (West Supp. 1995) (requiring that in preparing an
Urban Water Management Plan, each water supplier must
encourage the active involvement of diverse social, cultural and
economic elements of the population within the service area
prior to and during the preparation of the plan, and hold a pub-
lic hearing on the plan); CAL. WATER CODE § 10842 (West 1991)
(requiring public hearing prior to the adoption of an Agricultural
Water Management Plan); CAL. WATER CODE §§ 10753.2, 10753.5
(requiring public hearing both before a Groundwater
Management Plan is prepared and before it is formally adopted);
see also infra note 222 (describing public participation required by
CEQA and the federal Administrative Procedure Act).
215. See supra note 147 (describing public participation in
the CALFED process which was under no obligation to receive
any public input other than as required under CEQA).
As a result, public participation elements
are used by water planning agencies as a legit-
imization tool for the articulation and integra-
tion of social values. Planning processes are
legitimized in regard to social values by the
extent to which public participation is solicit-
ed.216 For example, the MWD is careful to high-
light at the beginning of its IRP document that
three regional assemblies were held, and over
450 individuals participated in an effort to
"gain consensus on resource policy issues, pro-
vide direction for future work, and to endorse
regional objectives, principles, and strate-
gies."217 Similar to regulatory compliance for
environmental objectives, solicitation of public
participation is now generally recognized as
the minimum requirement for consideration of
social objectives.
Unlike regulatory compliance, however,
public participation can be an effective tool for
incorporating sociological values such as ecol-
ogy, equity, conservation and sustainability.218
As was previously discussed, sociological val-
ues are weighted and accorded merit through
discussion and debate; without a deliberative
process, sociological values cannot be trans-
lated into policies and planning outcomes.219
Public participation elements can help foster a
forum of discussion and debate by providing
the community an opportunity to shape,
review and critique the planning process. But
the effectiveness of public participation as a
vehicle for sociological values depends upon
several factors: the diversity of public partici-
pation solicited, the extent to which articulat-
ed sociological values are actually incorporat-
ed and reflected in the planning process, and
the planning framework which shapes the dis-
cussion and debate.220
It is easy to get mired down in attempting
to evaluate the first two factors by reference to
a water agency's explicit actions. For example,
did the agency do a good job of soliciting
diverse public participation? Was sufficient
general notice of the hearings provided to the
public, or specific notice sent to interested par-
ties? Were public hearings held at times when
participation would be meaningful? Did the
agency give sufficient consideration and incor-
porate, where possible, the articulated socio-
logical values? Were changes made in the plan-
ning processes or outcomes in response to
public participation? There has been signifi-
cant debate and criticism surrounding what
constitutes sufficient and quality public partic-
ipation,221 and the State of California has
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216. In its preface, the IRP takes note of this trend toward
including public participation processes. “Across the country, it is
clear that traditional approaches to water supply planning are
not well-suited to the complex issues that face the water indus-
try today. New approaches that take a broader perspective and
involve the public in the decision-making process are being used
by water agencies to solve the problems . . . .” MWD IRP PLAN VOL.
1, supra note 98, at E-1. Other planning documents have made
similar statements.  See, e.g., 2 CALIFORNIA WATER PLAN (1994), supra
note 134, at 2 (“[The 1994 California Water Plan] was developed
with extensive public involvement including an outreach adviso-
ry committee made up of urban, agricultural, and environmental
interests . . . the California Water Commission held hearings in
each of the State’s ten hydrologic regions . . . to receive public
comments. . . . [and] after considering comments received from
over 100 individuals, the commission developed several recom-
mendations which added policy guidance for the final water plan
update”); MWD URBAN WATER MANAGEMENT PLAN, supra note 134, at
10-11 (documenting that public review and comments were
solicited in preparation of the plan, a public hearing was held,
and that “all comments were taken into consideration in the
preparation of the final report”); WEST BASIN MUNICIPAL WATER
DISTRICT—1994 ANNUAL REPORT (Carson 1994) (stating that “during
the 1994 construction of the water recycling projects, the District
held more than 25 evening community forums, open houses and
inspection trips . . . [and that] public access to information
included annual hearings to approve wholesale water rates and a
per parcel standby charge”).
217. MWD IRP PLAN, VOL. 1, supra note 98, at E-8 to E-9, 3-
2 to 3-3. 
218. See supra note 6 and Appendix (describing, in detail,
what issues these values encompass).
219. See supra notes 181-98 and accompanying text.
220. See Norman Wengert, Participation and the Administrative
Process, in WATER POLITICS AND PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT, supra note 43, at
29; see also Gene E. Willeke, Identification of Publics in Water Resources
Planning, in WATER POLITICS AND PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT, supra note 43, at
43. UCLA Professor of Urban Planning, John Friedmann argues
that planning “is an inherently moral practice . . . in the sense
that it affects the way we live—relations among people and their
institutions.” John Friedmann, Planning in the Public Domain:
Discourse and Praxis, in CLASSIC READINGS IN URBAN PLANNING, supra
note 174, at 74, 75. If the centrality of moral discourse to planning
is recognized, says Friedmann, it follows that all “effective plan-
ning is therefore a negotiated process among affected parties
who have different values, concerns, and interests at stake.” Id. at
76. Thus, planners cannot create planning processes that impose
technical or utopian solutions, but rather planners’ expertise and
vision should only be components of a process which formulates
solutions through negotiated planning. See id. at 76-77.
221. See PIERCE, supra note 43, at 3-19.
responded by adopting regulations that force
agencies to be explicit about the consideration
given to public input.222
While this debate is important, a more cen-
tral factor has been overlooked. The planning
framework, within which public participation
occurs, fundamentally affects the diversity and
quality of public participation and the extent to
which articulated sociological values are capa-
ble of being included in planning processes
and outcomes. In essence, the water resources
planning framework dictates the scope of
issues relevant to the planning process and the
capacity of the planning process to address
those issues.223
The current water resources planning
framework is too narrow and limits the consid-
eration of sociological values. The MWD IRP
provides a good example. The planning frame-
work for the MWD IRP is built on the constrain-
ing assumption that demand is a derived func-
tion that cannot be altered. Projected water
demand is calculated using an econometric
model that takes into account statistical data
regarding demographic and economic trends,
hydrologic conditions and water conservation
measures.224 The quantity of future water sup-
plies forecasted by the demand model pro-
vides the baseline from which the IRP planning
processes begins.225 The water resources plan-
ning framework can be summarized as follows:
given an established future water demand, what water
resource strategies can generate sufficient supplies to
meet that demand?
Completely outside the MWD IRP planning
framework are options that would actually con-
trol water demand. In fact, the IRP makes clear
that any measures to control growth in water
demand are beyond the purview of the plan-
ning process.226 The planning process is essen-
tially a discussion about trade-offs between
various supply strategies. Arguably, factoring
water conservation effectiveness in the
demand model helps “control” future demand,
but this is really an accounting function that
only calculates expected reduction in demand
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222. See supra note 215.  While most statutorily required
public participation elements only require a public hearing or
receipt of written public comment several regulatory regimes
have gone further to mandate written agency response to sub-
stantive issues raised through public participation. See, e.g.,CEQA
Guidelines, supra note 204, § 15088 (stating that a written “evalu-
ation and response to public comments is an essential part of the
CEQA process . . . [and] failure to comply with the requirements
can lead to disapproval of a project”); 5 U.S.C. § 553 (requiring
federal agencies that conduct informal rulemaking to provide
written response to significant and material public comments);
see also Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F. 2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
Moreover, agency responses must be specific, fact-based, and
provide a reasoned analysis of why the suggestions were reject-
ed. See, e.g., CEQA Guidelines, supra note 204, § 15088(b) (requir-
ing a “good faith, reasoned analysis in the response,” and noting
that “[c]onclusory statements unsupported by factual informa-
tion will not suffice”); 5 U.S.C. § 553 (requiring agencies’ informal
rulemaking action to be supported by a sufficiently rational and
cogent explanation considering all the evidence and alternatives
presented to the agency); see also Sierra Club v. Gilroy City Council,
222 Cal. App. 3d 30, 46 (1990); Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Assn.
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
223. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
224. The MWD uses an econometric model known as
MWD-MAIN, which is based upon the national state-of-the-art
demand forecasting model IWR-MAIN used by numerous water
resources agencies throughout the country. The model forecasts
water demand based on projected demographic and economic
trends. This result is adjusted given projected climate data and
anticipated effectiveness of water conservation programs. See
Rodrigo et al., supra note 136, at 53-56; see also MWD IRP PLAN VOL.
1, supra note 98, at E-5 to E-6, 2-1 to 2-12. For the IRP, water con-
servation estimates were based upon the full implementation of
best management practices (“BMP”) which include: (1) increased
plumbing efficiency through plumbing codes for new structures
and retrofits for existing structures, (2) interior/exterior water
audits and incentive programs for residential, industrial, and
commercial/institutional customers, (3) distribution system leak
detection and repair, (4) metering, (5) conservation pricing, (6)
large landscape water conservation requirements for new devel-
opments, and (7) public education and information. See id. at 3-4.
225. See MWD IRP PLAN VOL. 1, supra note 98, at 3-4.
226. The MWD takes a firm position that control of water
demand is not a part of the IRP planning process. The position
adopted by the MWD is that besides implementation of water
conservation measures, growth in demand is dictated by policies
outside the arena of water resources. As a result, water resources
planning is essentially limited to planning for adequate water
supplies, not comprehensively addressing all factors attendant to
the natural resource:
In accordance with Metropolitan’s policies on water
supply, Metropolitan is responsible for ensuring ade-
quate and reliable supply of water to meet increasing
demands within the service area. . . . Metropolitan
does not initiate or implement “no growth” policies.
By adopting plans or policies intended to limit water
supplies to levels that would not meet the projected
demands . . . Metropolitan would be engaging in de
facto regional growth control that is beyond its legal
capacity. Consequently, Metropolitan’s policy regarding the
regional growth [i.e., growth in water demand] is not to dictate
levels of supply, but rather to plan its facilities in accordance with
the adopted regional growth plans.
MWD IRP Plan Vol. 2, supra note 143, at 2-15 (emphasis added).
resulting from water conservation programs.
Not part of the debate are options to control the
underlying forces that drive increasing water
demands.227
By removing demand from the planning
framework, the range of concerns that can be
considered relevant and redressable through
the IRP process is severely limited. Any concern
must be accommodated within a water strategy
that provides sufficient supplies to satisfy pro-
jected demand. Many sociological values rele-
vant to water resources policy, however, require
a broader framework for adequate considera-
tion. Consequently, no matter how procedurally
comprehensive a public participation element is
included in the planning process, a constrained
framework that ex-cludes consideration of water
demand prevents sociological values from hav-
ing a substantive impact on planning outcomes.
For example, addressing sustainability con-
cerns requires that supply and demand are bal-
anced at a level that does not diminish natural
resources over time. The concern is not only
diminishment of water resources, but how the
use of water resources can diminish other natu-
ral resources and ultimately impact the carrying
capacity of the regional environment.228 An
appropriate level of water resources consump-
tion for sustainability purposes cannot be
achieved if water demand is not planned con-
currently with water supplies. Similarly, consid-
eration of equity and fairness values necessi-
tates that demand be included in the water
resources planning framework. Water resources
planning involves fundamental decisions about
where and how water will be utilized. A planning
process limited to designing the best supply
strategy to fulfill an expected demand does not
allow for equitable considerations of whether
the distribution of that demand (i.e., the capac-
ity for future growth), both geographically and
among types of uses, is equitable or socially
desirable.229
The critique of water resources planning
provided in this section contains several impor-
tant lessons for the new voices that have sought
to infuse sociological values into water
resources decisions. While these groups and
individuals have been instrumental in articulat-
ing environmental and social values that are
increasingly accepted as legitimate policy
objectives, the analysis indicates that their voic-
es still lack the power to completely translate
those objectives into policy outcomes. Environ-
mental and social objectives are relegated to
receiving minimal and insufficient considera-
tion by the existing water resources planning
framework which relies heavily on quantitative
analysis, retains the centrality of constrained
optimization of multiple objectives, and
excludes water demand from the planning
process.
Even though policy outcomes have failed to
adequately incorporate environmental and
social objectives, it has been easy for propo-
nents to use the existing planning process to
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227. Water resources agencies often argue that actions to
control water demand are beyond their legal capacity. See supra
note 226. The claim is based on a conclusion that such actions
would constitute de facto land use planning, which is an exercise
of police powers that water resources agencies do not possess as
limited powers agencies. The validity of this legal position, how-
ever, is not firmly established. While it is clear that water agencies
cannot engage in land use planning, water agencies do have dis-
cretion to decide whether or not to augment water supplies. See
Building Indus. Ass’n of N. Cal. v. Marin Mun. Water Dist., 235 Cal.
App. 3d 1641 (1991); Wilson v. Hidden Valley Mun. Water Dist.,
256 Cal. App. 2d 271 (1957). What remains ambiguous is whether
a water agency’s decision not to seek new water sources must be
grounded in specific utility-related reasons (e.g., actual or threat-
ened water shortages, or impacts upon existing users), or
whether the decision can simply be made in the best interests of
the community based on reasonably expressed opinions of resi-
dents and elected water officials. Cf. Building Indus. Ass’n, 256 Cal.
App. 3d at 1645-47; Wilson, 256 Cal. App. 2d at 285; Swanson v.
Marin Mun. Water Dist., 56 Cal. App. 3d 512 (1976); Lukrawka v.
Spring Valley Water Co. 169 Cal. 318, 332 (1915); see Thomas, supra
note 98, at 318.
Whether or not water agencies currently have the legal
capacity to control demand is ultimately irrelevant. The legal
capacity can be given to water agencies if needed. More pertinent
is whether water agencies’ failure to consider controlling demand
is a normatively defensible position. Under the analysis provided
in this section, the answer is no. Exclusion of demand from water
resources planning is normatively indefensible because it pro-
hibits adequate consideration of sociological values in the plan-
ning process. As a result, current planning outcomes cannot be
defended with reference to a set of ethical principles that eluci-
date the desired consequences of the proposed actions. Instead,
planning outcomes are defended only upon the grounds that
they are economically efficient, a justification based upon eco-
nomic preferences and not ethical principles. See generally
FELDMAN, supra note 39, at 2-3.
228. See Appendix (discussing further sustainable develop-
ment and carrying capacity).
229. See Appendix (discussing further values relating to
equity and fairness).
legitimize the results. Public participation
components and full compliance with environ-
mental regulations strengthen the existing
planning process as a legitimization tool.
Proponents can emphasize that a project was
given full environmental review under the
existing complex regulatory structure, and that
concerned citizens had ample opportunity to
ensure that environmental and social concerns
were raised and incorporated into the planning
process through public participation proce-
dures. 
The central problem is that the current
planning framework, which marginalizes envi-
ronmental and social objectives, is not the
result of an explicit policy choice that can be
openly challenged as to whether or not it
serves the public interest. The planning frame-
work evolved over several decades and oper-
ates implicitly to minimize the consideration
given to sociological values. This implicit
nature of the policy choice makes it difficult to
change. No matter how strongly environmental
and social values are voiced in the policy
arena, or solidified in policy objectives, the
planning process works to minimize their
impact. Moreover, proponents of the status
quo can use the planning process to legitimize
outcomes. If the voices of environmental and
social values are to be heard, it will be in find-
ing the capacity to change fundamentally the
structure of water resources planning. The next
section provides a suggestion for how this
might be accomplished.
V. Restructuring the Planning Process—
Merging Water Resources and Land Use
Planning
The basic structure for water resources
planning has not undergone significant revi-
sion since environmental and social values
first emerged in water policies during the late
1960s. The process has remained primarily
technical and quantitative, relying upon ana-
lytical tools that necessitate numerical valua-
tion of factors to produce aggregate outcomes.
Multiple water resources objectives have been
addressed through a process of constrained
optimization, whereby economic efficiency is
optimized subject to the constraints of envi-
ronmental and social concerns. There have
been some important modifications in the
planning process, including mandated envi-
ronmental impact analyses and public partici-
pation processes, but the framework for water
resources planning has nonetheless been
unable to embrace fully the environmental and
social values articulated in society.
Water resources planning must undergo a
fundamental restructuring to accommodate
the continuing emergence of environmental
and social values in water resources policies.
The deficiencies in current water resources
planning processes are in danger of creating
patterns of water use that are not in accord
with changing sociological values. A bit of wis-
dom offered on this point over three decades
ago is still pertinent today:
Because of the rich interrelation-
ship among the various values or
goods which can be derived from water,
administration [planning] of water
resources will require a complex sys-
tem of organization in order to realize
the diverse values . . . As patterns of
demand change, patterns of organiza-
tion will also change. . . . If we are organ-
ized so that we can inform and articulate our
interests both as consumers and citizens, we
should be able to arrive at those settlements in
water resources that represent the requirements
for comprehensive development at any given
time.230
The quote highlights the need to ensure
that structures for water resources planning
are organized so that communities can express
their interests both as consumers and citizens.
In other words, the planning framework must
allow full consideration of both economic and
sociological values so that we arrive at “those
settlements in water resources” which reflect
our communal will.
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230. Ostrom, supra note 10, at 50 (emphasis added).
Two pivotal principles that must be
embodied in a new planning structure were
highlighted in Section IV. First, there must be a
deliberative process by which environmental
and social objectives can be incorporated into
water resources planning. Quantitative analy-
ses must be limited to the achievement of eco-
nomic objectives. Numerical valuation meth-
ods may include social or environmental
impacts that have quantifiable economic
effects, but these processes cannot be the only
way in which environmental and social objec-
tives are addressed. Sociological values must
be weighted and translated into planning out-
comes through a process of discussion and
debate.
Second, the planning framework must
allow for comprehensive consideration and
evaluation of how environmental and social
objectives can be achieved through the plan-
ning process. The procedure of constrained
optimization cannot be maintained. This
framework not only sustains reliance on quan-
titative analytic methods and implicitly pro-
motes economic efficiency as the overriding
planning objective, it results in environmental
and social objectives receiving only minimal
consideration. The recent trend toward public
participation in water resources planning is a
step in the right direction, but this process
must also undergo restructuring. The frame-
work for public participation is limited to
addressing only issues that are relevant and
redressable through water supply strategies.
Discussion and debate over controlling the
forces that drive demand are separated from
water resources planning, severely limiting the
capacity to articulate and incorporate socio-
logical values in water resources planning out-
comes.
Merging water resources and land use
planning holds promise for achieving the
restructuring described above. Concurrent
planning of land use and water resources can
remove some of the barriers to achieving envi-
ronmental and social objectives. Moreover,
merging the two disciplines provides an oppor-
tunity to create a set of comprehensive ethical
principles to guide the process by which socie-
ty uses and preserves two of its fundamental
and inherently linked natural resources. The
following discussion explains why land and
water should be planned together, and the
benefits that would flow from this integrated
planning process. At the end, some brief sug-
gestions are offered for further research about
implementation of a merged land use and
water resources planning process.
A. Why a Merger Is Needed
The quote at the beginning of this paper is
a reminder that it has long been recognized
that “land, water, and people go together.”231
Without an adequate water supply, human activ-
ity and existence are not sustainable.232 This real-
ity is especially obvious in California, where
average annual precipitation in the southern
half of the state is about 13.4 inches,233 com-
pared to average annual rainfalls of forty to sixty
inches for states east of the Mississippi River.234
The vital link between land, water and people is
made ironclad in California by the tenuous geo-
graphic connection between water resources
and human activity. To a degree unprecedented
in history, life in California depends on the con-
tinuous maintenance of giant systems that con-
nect distant water sources to people and their
activities. Roughly seventy-five percent of the
natural water runoff occurs in the northern one-
third of the state, while seventy-five percent of
the water demand is created in the southern
two-thirds.235
Water use is directly related to the character
of land use, and conversely land use has a major
effect upon water resources. The quantity and
quality of the available water supply determines
the types of supportable land uses, while per-
mitted land uses determine a region’s existing
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231. Report by the Mississippi Valley Committee, supra note 1.
232. See Water, Water Everywhere, EARTH EXPLORER (Feb. 1992).
“Water is abundant, yet it can be more precious than gold. That’s
because water isn’t always in the right place in the right form at
the right time. . . . Without water, life would vanish.” Id.
233. See CALIFORNIA WATER PLAN, supra note 134, at 50
(Figure 3-2).
234. See MARC RIESNER & SARAH BATES, OVERTAPPED OASIS:
REFORM OR REVOLUTION FOR WESTERN WATER 4 (Island Press 1990).
235. See CALIFORNIA WATER PLAN, supra note 134, at 9 (Table
1-4), (Figure 3-2).
and projected water demand.236 Functionally,
however, the connection between these two
resources has never been made. Several years
ago, an article in the Los Angeles Times noted,
“it may seem inconceivable to some, but this
state—where three-fourths of the population
lives in desert or near-desert climes—has always
gotten by without a law linking growth to water.
For more than a half a century, Californians have
operated on the premise that if you build a city
the water will come.”237
Planning for these two integrally related nat-
ural resources occurs in virtual isolation. Each
process is pursued without explicit considera-
tion of its impact upon the other. Water
resources planning is undertaken with the goal
of providing a reliable adequate and quality sup-
ply for all anticipated uses.238 Simultan-eously,
land uses are sanctioned under the premise that
planned water supplies are adequate and will be
available to meet future uses.239 Maintaining the
exclusivity of the two planning processes is
reinforced by the fact that, with a few notable
exceptions, water demands have almost always
been satisfied.240
Over the past several years, there have
been efforts to begin forging a link between
water resources and land use planning. These
regulatory efforts have focused primarily on
information-sharing between planning agen-
cies. Under current law, land use planning
agencies have the option of referring proposed
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236. See, e.g., NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, supra note 48, at
368 (“[H]ow lands are used will in large measure determine where
and how much water will be demanded and for what purposes.”);
Frank E. Maloney & Richard Hamann, Integrating Land and Water
Management, Publication No. 54, 3-4 (Florida Water Resources
Research Center, March 1981); JACQUELINE LEAVITT, OPTIONS LOST:
OPPORTUNITIES REMAINING, A PRELIMINARY STUDY OF WATER-AND-LAND
PLANNING IN THE LOS ANGELES REGION (U.C.L.A. 1973) (documenting
how water resources planning dictated land use decisions and
patterns of development in the City of Los Angeles); MULDER ET
AL., supra note 11, at 1 (“When the water resources planner tries to
be effective, he finds that many hydrologic, economic, ecologic,
and social linkages clearly cause water resources development
and management programs to have major effects on land use.
Conversely, land use has a major effect on water resources, and
both types of planning affect the use of other resources.”).
237. Mark Arax, Effort to Link Growth, Water Sparks Battle, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 14, 1995, at A1.
238. See supra notes 130-33.  Even the most recent and envi-
ronmentally sensitive effort at water resources planning still ana-
lyzes the water resources problem within the framework of how to
provide enough water for all the uses. The only difference from
several decades ago is that the number and types of uses have
changed. Now there needs to be enough water available to satisfy
environmental as well as traditional demands. See Revised CALFED
Bay-Delta Program Phase II Report, supra note 130, 11-14 (stating that
water reliability supply objective is to make enough water avail-
able for environmental, urban, and agricultural uses, water quality
objective is to provide “good water for all beneficial uses,” and
ecosystem restoration objective is focused on managing the water
supplies for the protection of wildlife). Left out of this vast plan-
ning process is how to reduce water demand, other than through
water conservation and water recycling, rather than increase or
better manage existing supplies. The absence of a broader view to
include the forces that continue to increase water demand in
California is puzzling, especially given CALFED’s self-proclaimed
goal of “providing a long-term solution to the Bay-Delta prob-
lems.”
239. On November 24, 1998, almost 25,000 homes with no
secured or guaranteed water supplies were approved for develop-
ment in the Santa Clara Valley where groundwater is precious and
imported supplies are not readily available. In Los Angeles
County, the Board of Supervisors approved a massive 21,615 home
development by the Newhall Land & Farming Co. with both advo-
cates and opponents agreeing that there is currently not enough
water to supply the entire project. While Newhall Land officials
stated they would seek imported supplies and the Board of
Supervisors claimed it would not issue building permits without
proof that Newhall Land was not overdrafting the groundwater
basin, everyone acknowledges that county officials have little con-
trol over Newhall Land’s groundwater extractions. See T. Christian
Miller, Supervisors O.K. 21,000-Home Development, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 25,
1998, at A1. While Ventura County Supervisors complained bitter-
ly about the recklessness with which the Newhall Land project was
approved, on the very same day, they approved the 3,000-home
Ahmanson Project just across the county line. See Ventura County
Oks Ahmanson Project, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 25, 1998 at A1.
240. From 1987 to 1992, the state experienced severe
drought during which some water users had to cut consumption
anywhere from ten percent to twenty-five percent. See Sue
McClurg, Water and Growth, WESTERN WATER 4 (May/June 1995). The
state suffered a similar shortage from 1976 to 1977. While this
drought emphasized the potential for widespread water scarcity,
most areas did not experience severe or mandatory water
rationing. Most demand reduction was achieved through voluntary
conservation practices. See MWD URBAN WATER MANAGEMENT PLAN,
supra note 134, at 115-28. Despite the virtual certainty that similar
droughts will occur in the future, MWD has not backed away from
its written promise to ensure a ninety-eight percent water service
reliability level for all existing and anticipated customers. See supra
note 143. Maintaining this promise allows land use planning deci-
sions to proceed without consideration of water supply problems.
As a result, the cumulative impact of continually increasing sup-
plies and demands is never explicitly considered in either the
water resources or land use planning process. 
land use plans to affected water agencies for
comment and review.241 Water agencies are
required to respond to the referral with a
description of existing water supplies and
uses, and the quantity and timing of all pro-
posed additional water supplies.242 Addition-
ally, certain large-scale projects that necessi-
tate full environmental review under CEQA, and
either the adoption of a specific plan or an
amendment to a general or specific plan, must
be evaluated by a water agency for determina-
tion as to whether sufficient water supplies will
be available to meet the expected increased
demand.243
These efforts, however, are just a first step.
Sharing of information between water and land
use planners is important, but it most likely
will not result in water resources planning
processes that enable the full articulation and
achievement of sociological values. First, the
current efforts attempt to work within the exist-
ing planning paradigm. While the information
available to water resources and land use plan-
ners is more comprehensive, planning process-
es for the two natural resources remain struc-
turally isolated. Planning for water and land
uses is still conducted by different agencies, at
differing times, for different periods of time, by
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241. See CAL. GOVT. CODE § 65352(a) (West Supp. 1995). The
statute requires that prior to the adoption or substantial amend-
ment of a general plan, a planning agency may refer the proposed
action to any public water system that would be affected by the
proposed action. The “general plan” is the basic land use charter
that embodies fundamental decisions that govern and shape the
direction of land use within the jurisdiction of a local government
(city or county). See City of Santa Ana v. City of Garden Grove, 100
Cal. App. 3d 521, 532 (1979). The general plan is considered a local
government’s “constitution for all future developments” because
all subsequent land use actions (e.g., specific plan, zoning ordi-
nance, subdivision map, development agreement) must be con-
sistent with the objectives, principles, and standards set forth in
the general plan. Citizens of Goleta Valley v. Bd. of Supervisors, 52
Cal. 3d 553, 570 (1990); see also Lesher Communications, Inc. v. City
of Walnut Creek, 52 Cal. 3d 531, 544 (1990). The contents of a gen-
eral plan, including a mandatory land use element, are set forth in
the California Government Code, starting at section 65300.  CAL.
GOVT. CODE 65300. The land use element provides the central
framework for the entire general plan by identifying the distribu-
tion and intensity of all land use activities through objectives,
policies, programs, diagrams and maps. See JAMES LONGTIN,
LONGTIN’S CALIFORNIA LAND USE § 2.11[1] (Local Government
Publications, 2d ed. 1987).
242. See CAL. GOVT. CODE § 65352.5 (West Supp. 1995). The
following information must be provided by a water agency receiv-
ing a referral: (1) the current urban water management plan, see
supra note 125, (2) the current capital improvement plan, (3)
description of all sources of water supplies currently available
under wet, normal, and dry years, (4) description of quantity of sur-
face and groundwaters provided to customers during the previous
five years, (5) description of all proposed additional sources of
water and estimated quantities and dates when the supplies will
be available, (6) description of total customers currently served, by
category (agricultural, commercial, industrial and residential), (7)
quantification of reduction in total water demand for each cus-
tomer category that will result from implementation of urban
water management plan. See CAL. GOVT. CODE § 65352.5 (West Supp.
1995).
243. See CAL. WATER CODE §§ 10910-13 (West Supp. 1995).
The intricate and limited applicability of this measure is impor-
tant to understand because it results in primarily procedural
rather than substantive coordination of land use and water
resources planning. First, the statute only applies to large-scale
developments, classified as residential developments of more
than 500 units, commercial developments over 500,000 square
feet and employing over 1,000 persons, hotels with more than
500 rooms, and industrial projects over 650,000 square feet and
employing over 1,000 persons.  See CAL. WATER CODE § 10913.
Second, a large-scale development will only trigger the statute if:
(1) the project results in a net increase in population density or
building intensity, (2) the local government has determined an
environmental impact report is required under CEQA, and (3) the
process necessitates the adoption of a specific plan or an amend-
ment to a general or specific plan.  See CAL. WATER CODE §
10910(a)-(b). In other words, for the statute to apply a project
must be very large, not contemplated within current land use
plans, and found to have environmental impacts sufficient to trig-
ger full review under CEQA. These complex requirements limit
the statute’s applicability to only a narrow range of develop-
ments.
Once the statute is triggered, affected water agencies must
do a demand reliability assessment which indicates “whether its
total projected water supplies available during normal, single-
dry, and multiple-dry years included in the 20-year projection
contained in the urban water management plan will meet the
projected water demand associated with the proposed project, in
addition to the public water system’s existing and planned future
uses.” CAL. WATER CODE § 10910(d). If the water agency determines
there are insufficient water supplies for the proposed develop-
ment, the water agency must provide information concerning all
“measures being undertaken to acquire and develop” the neces-
sary water supplies.  See CAL. WATER CODE § 10911(a).
A finding of sufficient or insufficient water supplies to serve
the development, however, is merely procedural. It is the respon-
sibility of the land use planning agency to make a final determina-
tion, “based on the entire record,” as to whether there will be suf-
ficient water supplies for the proposed project.  See CAL. WATER
CODE § 10911(c). A water agency’s conclusion is not dispositive.
Even if there is a finding of insufficient water supplies, the land
use planning agency can determine that the insufficiency does not
constitute an adverse environmental impact under CEQA and
approve the project. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21082.2, 21083
(West 1991); see also CEQA Guidelines, supra note 204, §§ 15382,
15064. Alternatively, the agency could find the insufficiency of
water supplies constitutes an adverse environmental impact but
nonetheless approve the project because the impact can be elim-
inated or substantially lessened, or there are overriding consider-
ations. See CEQA Guidelines, supra note 204, §§ 15091, 15093.
Thus, even if these labyrinthine procedures find there is an insuf-
ficient water supply for a proposed project, the substantive impact
of this determination is potentially minimal or nonexistent.
Finally, the most limiting aspect of this statutory scheme is
that it focuses upon short-term planning. Water resources and
different methodologies, pursuing objectives
and goals adopted under differing considera-
tions by different methods, agencies and con-
stituencies. 
The critical defect in the structural separa-
tion of planning processes is the limited capac-
ity to consider interrelationships between land
use and water resources during the planning
process. The current framework requires one
resource to be planned before the other. Land
use planners consider the most up-to-date
water resources plans before acting,244 and
water planners evaluate the relevant land use
plans to determine forecasted demands.245
Devoid from this iterative process is the poten-
tial to consider both water resources and land
uses, and how they interrelate and affect each
other, before plans are made for the utilization or
preservation of either resource. The conse-
quence of our current scheme is that sociologi-
cal values such as conservation, ecology, equity
and sustainability, all of which are impacted by
the fundamental interrelationship among land,
water and people, are incapable of being fully
incorporated into planning processes and out-
comes.246
Water resources and land use planning
must be completely merged to create a process
which simultaneously considers land use
impacts on water resources, and water re-
sources impacts on land uses. It is only
through this comprehensive planning frame-
work that evolving sociological values can be
articulated and incorporated into planning
outcomes.247 First, a combined natural re-
sources planning structure would allow envi-
ronmental and social objectives the opportu-
nity to be considered outside the quantitative
analytic processes which currently dominate
water resources planning. Land use planning
does not rely on quantitative analysis but
rather has developed in the opposite direc-
tion, emphasizing discussion, deliberation
and community involvement. The importance
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land uses are coordinated only if there is an actual proposed development
project. Coordination is reactive rather than proactive. The statute
does not seek to develop a more proactive and long-term inte-
grated planning process whereby sociological values could play a
role in determining whether the combined land use and water
resource demands are socially desirable. The interrelationship
between the two resources is considered only in a project-specif-
ic context.
244. See supra notes 240-42.
245. See supra notes 224-25 and accompanying text.
246. See Appendix (summarizing these sociological values
and explaining how they are derived from the interrelationship
between natural resources and human activity).
247. See generally MULDER ET AL., supra note 11.  In the
authors’ study on the possibilities for integration of land use and
water resources planning, they suggest three principles to support
this concept:
(1) Ecological Balance. Separate and uncoordinated
resource planning activities are likely to lead to an
imbalance in resource use because the availability of
one resource in a natural ecology is closely related to
the use of another. This interdependence among
resources may be less clearly delineated or understood
if planning activities are undertaken for single
resources and individual localities. Integrated
resources planning is necessary to achieve and main-
tain ecological balance and to optimize resource use
and insure the carrying capacity of a region is not over-
taxed.
(2) Equity. The concept of equity assumes there is
some fair or just distribution of resources to individu-
als, groups, organizations and society. The nature of
the distribution is politically defined and constrained
by various traditions. Planning activities strongly affect
resource distribution so that the equity issue is a mat-
ter of some importance in the planning process.
Questions of equity are becoming more difficult to
resolve as resources become scarce. Fragmented and
uncoordinated planning in an interdependent resource
system frequently results in spill-over effects that
change the distribution of resources.
(3) Effectiveness. Effectiveness should be a measure
of the accomplishment of desired functions and goals.
As planning for scarce resources becomes more com-
plex, with increasing objectives and changing values,
integrated planning becomes critical to achieving
effectiveness by: (a) resolving conflicting functions,
goals and objectives, and (b) coordination and cooper-
ation through improved methods, procedures, and
institutional arrangements.
Id. at 45-46.
and necessity of public participation in land
use planning has long been recognized and
pursued.248
Second, a merged water resources and
land use planning structure has the potential
for breaking the stranglehold of the con-
strained optimization framework on water
planning. Economic efficiency has not been a
primary objective in land use planning.
Instead, economic, social and environmental
values are given far more equal treatment
through this planning process. Since its incep-
tion, the purpose behind land use planning
has been to promote the public health, safety
and general welfare of the community.249 While
the economic benefits of planned develop-
ment are recognized,250 they are often viewed
as secondary to the primary objectives of land
use planning.251 For example, communities
often consciously forego economic gains in
order to achieve environmental and social
objectives.252 Incorporation of environmental
and social objectives is not limited to mere
consideration of “impact,” but rather these
objectives are recognized as legitimate ends
to be satisfied through the planning process.
Third, a combined planning structure
would allow concurrent planning of water sup-
ply and demand. The existing narrow frame-
work within which water resources planning
occurs would be eliminated. Demand would
no longer be a derived function upon which all
subsequent planning is based because the
land uses that create water demand would be
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248. As early as the 1960s, the need and desirability of
public participation and representation in land use planning was
recognized and asserted. See Paul Davidoff, Advocacy and Pluralism
in Planning, 31 J. AM. INST. PLANNERS 4 (1965) (arguing that city plan-
ners should encourage pluralism by giving voice, power and rep-
resentation to the concerns of the numerous interest groups who
have a stake in the planning process); see also MULDER ET AL., supra
note 11, at 30-1 (describing the techniques used for obtaining cit-
izen involvement in land use planning). Davidoff, a professor of
city planning, cogently observed that public participation
involves an active planning process, not a passive assessment of
citizens’ preferences:
If the planning process is to encourage democratic
urban government then it must operate so as to
include rather than exclude citizens from participating
in the process. “Inclusion” means not only permitting
the citizen to be heard. It also means that he be able
to become well informed about the underlying rea-
sons for planning proposals, and be able to respond
to them in the technical language of professional
planners.
Davidoff, supra, at 5.
249. The power to control land uses was first recognized in
1926 by the United States Supreme Court in Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). The legal basis for all land use planning
is the police power, exercised to protect the public health, safety
and welfare of the community. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26
(1954). Courts have consistently construed the “police power”
broadly, recognizing the ability of government to regulate for the
purpose of preserving and promoting “community values.” Justice
Douglas speaking for the Court in Berman stated “[t]he concept of
the public welfare is broad and inclusive . . . . [and] [t]he values
it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as
monetary.” Id. at 33. Several decades later, Justice Douglas reem-
phasized this point in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9
(1974), when he stated that under the police power a community
is empowered to take land use actions which establish areas
“where family values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet
seclusion and clean air make the area a sanctuary for people.”
250. See generally RICHARD BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME:
MUNICIPAL PRACTICES AND POLICIES (Univ. of Wis. Press 1966)
(describing how property values can substantially benefit from
good land use practices).
251. For example, the General Plan serves as the land use
“constitution” for local governments in California and consists of
seven elements. None of the elements are specifically oriented to
achieve economic objectives. Instead, the general plan elements
focus primarily on promoting social and environmental objec-
tives. The specific elements include: land use, circulation (trans-
portation), housing, conservation, open-space, noise and safety.
See LONGTIN, supra note 240, at § 2.11. Additionally, the typical
planning enabling act emphasizes the promotion of social wel-
fare objectives, with economic considerations given secondary
consideration. For example, consider the Standard City Planning
Enabling Act, created in 1928 by the U.S. Department of
Commerce, which states that:
The plan shall be made with the general purposes of
guiding and accomplishing a coordinated, adjusted
and harmonious development of the municipality and
its environs which will, in accordance with present and
future needs, best promote the health, safety, morals,
order, convenience, prosperity, and general welfare, as
well as efficiency and economy in the process of devel-
opment.
U.S. Department of Commerce, A Standard City Planning
Enabling Act § 7 (Government Printing Office, rev. ed., 1928).
252. The most direct example of communities making a
trade-off between economic and social objectives, is the numer-
ous “slow growth” ordinances which have been enacted through-
out California. The measures intentionally limit the amount of
development in a community through such means as limiting
housing permits, downzoning residential areas, size restrictions
for commercial developments, urban limit lines or greenbelts,
and industrial square foot limitations. See MADELYN GLICKFIELD &
NED LEVINE, REGIONAL GROWTH . . . LOCAL REACTION: THE ENACTMENT
AND EFFECTS OF LOCAL GROWTH CONTROL AND MANAGEMENT MEASURES
IN CALIFORNIA 27-33 (Lincoln Land Institute 1992). The primary rea-
sons given by citizens for their support of slow growth measures
include: “quality of life preservation,” “preservation of open
space,” “reduction in traffic congestion,” and “preservation of
environmental areas.” These preferences indicate that citizens
were willing to limit economic objectives to achieve overriding
environmental and social objectives. See id. at 50-52.
planned simultaneously with water supply
strategies. Communities would be empowered
to consider the interrelationships between
land, water and people, and would have a
process by which those interrelationships
could be reflected in planning outcomes. Such
a broad-based planning process would provide
a forum in which sociological values such as
conservation, ecology, equity and sustainabili-
ty would be relevant, articulated and achiev-
able.253
Finally, merging water resources and land
use planning would create an opportunity for
establishing a set of ethical principles to guide
the planning process for two fundamental and
life-sustaining resources. Current water
resources planning is normatively indefensible
because it prohibits adequate consideration of
sociological values in the planning process. As
a result, planning outcomes cannot be defend-
ed with reference to a set of ethical principles
that elucidate the desired consequences of
proposed actions. Instead, water resources
planning outcomes are defensible only on the
grounds they are economically efficient, a jus-
tification based upon economic preferences
and not ethical principles.254
Public officials understand that political
decisions must be based on ethical principles
that establish the legitimacy and rationality of
their actions.255 The ideological basis for enact-
ing policies must be sufficiently clear that the
public can understand the desired conse-
quences of government action or inaction.256 In
the absence of an ideological basis, officials
generally engage in several types of behaviors
to either obfuscate, or avoid having to explain,
the ethical legitimacy or rationality of deci-
sions. First, planning processes are undertaken
with little public participation or oversight.257
Second, planning outcomes are couched in
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253. See Harvey M. Jacobs, Planning the Use of Land for the 21st
Century, 47 J. SOIL & WATER CONSERVATION 32 (1992). Jacobs, a pro-
fessor of urban and regional planning, makes the argument that
land use planning should serve as the nexus for resolving the
interplay between social, economic and environmental values.
He asserts that planners “need to ask not just ‘what is the eco-
logical carrying capacity of the land’ and ‘what is the economi-
cally efficient use of land’ but ‘what is a socially equitable way to
plan for the land’s use.’” Id. at 34. Similar to the arguments assert-
ed in this paper for water resources, Jacobs concludes that:
In general, the mission of the postmodern land use
planning professional is to acknowledge that land use
planning is not and cannot be a technocratic, scientif-
ic exercise. Land is a unique ecological resource, but
it is also a unique social resource. Land use planning
often acts as the stage for fundamental and complex
social debate about individual and social rights and
the articulation of ideals about democracy and social
justice.
Id.
254. See FELDMAN, supra note 39, at 2-3. In his book on water
resources management, Feldman argues that:
A normatively defensible water policy should seek to
conform to a higher plateau of democratic aspiration,
a plateau on which the values of justice are articulat-
ed through a participatory framework for making
decisions, which broadens the perspectives of partici-
pants and deepens their understanding of issues
encompassed by water resources decisions. A norma-
tively defensible water policy cannot be merely effi-
cient . . . it should also be equitable and ecologically
sound. 
Id. at 158.
255. See generally RICHARD E. FLATHMAN, THE PUBLIC INTEREST:
AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE NORMATIVE DISCOURSE OF POLITICS (John
Wiley & Sons, Inc. 1966) (arguing that competing demands for
resources presided over by public officials require that officials
justify their decision, or any claim of acting in the “public inter-
est,” based on a set of moral or ethical principles which can be
understood by the public at-large). Historian Robert Kelley point-
ed out the implication for water resources planners of the need
to create normatively defensible outcomes when he warned:
Water policy makers and managers, therefore, must
take the political culture seriously, and train them-
selves—as well as student engineers—to understand
and work with it, not as something illegitimate, but as
something growing out of the very core of who we are.
The political culture and human nature are much more
decisive in the public equation than the benefit-cost
analyses students in the technical fields are trained,
almost alone, to conduct. Human affairs have a com-
plexity far too great to be encompassed in such simple
calculations; water planners, in an America increas-
ingly flexing its democratic muscles and by daily exer-
cise making them ever stronger, are being challenged
to think in new ways.
Kelley, supra note 27, at 19.
256. See generally Duncan MacRae, Jr., Scientific
Communication, Ethical Argument, and Public Policy, 65 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 38 (1971) (discussing the need for clear articulation of ethi-
cal bases for public policy arguments which prevents “reliance on
a collection of vague and mutually inconsistent principles, which
can be used for ad hoc rationalizations rather than genuinely
pointing to a single clear implication in a particular case”).
257. See generally FELDMAN, supra note 39, at 1-21. Feldman
notes that benefit-cost analysis has often been used as means of
justifying planning outcomes because it is a relatively simple and
lucid way to depict advantages and disadvantages of natural
resources development.  See id. at 157.  See also discussion supra
Part IV.A. (criticizing the inadequacy of benefit-cost analysis in
water resources planning). Additionally, current environmental
regulatory compliance and public participation methods can act
as a legitimization process for water resources planning out-
comes, and thereby avoid the need to articulate ethical justifica-
tions for the results. See discussion supra Part IV.B.  The MWD IRP
Plan also provides a good example of how highly technical plan-
ning processes and outcomes can obfuscate and avoid the need
to justify the results based upon a set of ethically defensible prin-
ciples.
very technical and confusing language.258 Third,
some other framework of legitimization and
justification is adopted to avoid an ethical or
ideological explanation.259 All three types of
legitimizing behaviors are often evidenced in
water resources planning.
By merging water resources and land use
planning, a normatively defensible planning
process is created that includes, for the first
time, a forum in which broad-based sociologi-
cal values can be articulated and incorporated
into planning outcomes. Left behind is the cur-
rent water resources planning framework which
gives recognition to environmental and social
objectives, but works implicitly to minimize
their consideration. While no planning struc-
ture can guarantee normatively defensible out-
comes, by eliminating a planning framework
which subverts sociological values and by cre-
ating a planning process in which sociological
values are given the opportunity for full con-
sideration, there is a greater chance that plan-
ning outcomes will be normatively defensi-
ble.260
B. Creating an Integrated Planning Process
The analysis of an appropriate and work-
able framework for concurrent planning of
water resources and land uses is largely
beyond the scope of this article. The author has
sought to confine this work to the development
of a conceptual and philosophical understand-
ing of why the current water resources planning
process is inadequate, and how a merging with
land use planning might address some of those
inadequacies. It will require additional re-
search to test the viability of merging water
resources and land use planning.
The first step is a comprehensive and com-
parative evaluation of land use planning prac-
tices to determine which procedures and
methods are important to an efficient, effective
and normatively defensible land use planning
process. A thorough understanding of the land
use planning context and culture must be dis-
cerned and evaluated. The second step should
provide an analysis of the social, institutional
and methodological implications of merging
water resources and land use planning. An
effective analysis would help determine: (1)
whether a planning framework could be creat-
ed that makes explicit the interrelationship
between the water resources and land
resources; (2) whether the framework could
establish and optimize objectives that are
based on economic and sociological values
derived from that interrelationship; and (3)
whether an efficient and effective institutional
structure for governing the integrated planning
process could be established.261
VI. Conclusion
Writing in 1993, the authors of Searching Out
the Headwaters noted that “[n]ever before have
people better understood the social and eco-
logical consequences of water policies and
decisions.”262 The truth of this statement is evi-
denced by the heightened scrutiny given to
water resources policies and the changing val-
ues included in the policy debate. Environ-
mental and social values are increasingly
reflected in the policy objectives adopted by
water resources agencies throughout the state.
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258. See FELDMAN, supra note 39, at 1-21.
259. See id.
260. William Lord, former Director of the Water Resources
Research Center in Arizona, observed the need for a planning
process which articulates and explicitly considers values:
We sell ourselves short in our decision-making analy-
ses when we consider values to be given. Values
should be elicited, to be sure, but we should give as
much or more attention to testing and revising our
values as we give to identifying, evaluating, and select-
ing the alternative means for pursuing them. 
Lord, supra note 5, at 6.
261. There has been some research and academic writing
on the integration of land use and water resources planning, but
most of it is either dated or too general to be readily applicable.
See, e.g., MULDER ET AL., supra note 11; Maloney & Hamann, supra
note 235; LEAVITT, supra note 235; see generally Seymour Schwartz et
al., Controlling Land Use for Water Management and Urban Growth
Management: A Policy Analysis, Technical Completion Report for
Project W-487 (Water Resources Center, Univ. of Cal. August
1977); OVADIA A. SALAMA, PLANNING AND HUMAN VALUES: AN INQUIRY IN
THE PHENOMENA OF URBAN GROWTH AND THE POSSIBILITY OF ITS CONTROL
THROUGH WATER AND LAND RELATED ACTIONS (Abt Associates, Inc.
1974). It is likely that a region-specific analysis is necessary as
was undertaken in this article, especially given the special rela-
tionship between land use and water resources in Southern
California. See supra notes 232-34 and accompanying text. The
information contained in these works, however, can provide a
good framework for beginning an analysis.
262. BATES ET AL., supra note 3, at 201.
The author’s statement is also borne out in the
continuing dissatisfaction with water resources
policy outcomes. Advocates of incorporating
environmental and social values are frequently
told that such values are incompatible with
water resources decisions.
The current water resources planning
process and analytic methods minimize the
consideration of environmental and social
objectives. The planning framework fails to
embrace the forces that drive water demand
and relegates planning outcomes to choices
between various supply strategies. Economic
objectives continue to dominate the planning
process with solutions for water resources
problems evaluated on the capacity to opti-
mize economic efficiency with the constraints
of environmental and social values.
While water resources planning over the
last century has been modified to accommo-
date changing values toward the use of water,
the inclusion of environmental and social val-
ues has proven to be especially challenging.
Progress has been made, but a more formida-
ble task lies ahead. The current water resources
planning process works implicitly to shape and
influence policy outcomes. The process is diffi-
cult to contest because the advancement of
economic objectives, at the expense of envi-
ronmental and social values, is not the product
of an explicit policy decision. Moreover, water
resources planning is considered highly tech-
nical, requiring complex models and computer
software. It is commonly believed that too
much tampering with the process will result in
water resources decisions that have potential-
ly devastating consequences.
Without changes in the current planning
process, however, there will be little substan-
tive change in planning outcomes. Sweeping
reorganization is needed in water resources
planning to ensure that water resources deci-
sions reflect changing communal values. While
the perfect planning procedure for full inclu-
sion of environmental and social values may
not currently exist or be understood, this pro-
cedural incapacity must not prevent necessary
changes. If we continue to turn a blind eye to
the growing gap between water use and social
values, we will eventually undermine the legit-
imacy of water resources planning and poli-
cies. Conceptually, the inherent connection
between water resources and land use is
already understood. Many of the emerging
environmental and social values emanate from
the interrelationship of these natural
resources. Merging water resources and land
use planning holds potential for creating a nor-
matively defensible decision-making process.
It is time to take steps toward forging that fun-
damental link. 
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APPENDIX: Definition of Terms
No attempt will be made to comprehen-
sively define environmental and social values
as they relate to natural resources. Such a task
would be daunting because each set of values
described below has been the subject of many
books and articles that give the values impor-
tant in depth treatment and analysis. The fol-
lowing information only provides a brief state-
ment on several environmental and social val-
ues that have been identified in the context of
water resources policies. The purpose is to pro-
vide the reader with a sense of “environmental
and social values” as that term is used in this
article, and to provide a reference where the
reader can further explore each topic.
Sustainability. While the idea of sustain-
able resource use has been a part of water
resources planning for a long time through the
application of sustained yield management of
watersheds and groundwater basins, the con-
cept of sustainable development is much
broader and far-reaching. See Daniel P. Loucks,
Sustainability Implications for Water Resources
Planning and Management, 18 NAT. RESOURCES F.
263 (1994). “Sustainable development seeks to
maintain natural capital stocks over time for
the benefit of both present and future genera-
tions. Sustainable development is, in part, a
response to the criticism that traditional effi-
ciency standards of welfare economics presume
that consumption of resources is efficient; the
concept is also an attempt to redefine efficien-
cy to include environmental protection across
generations.” A. Dan Tarlock, Environmental Law,
But Not Environmental Protection, in NATURAL
RESOURCES POLICY AND LAW: TRENDS AND DIRECTIONS
162, 178 (Lawrence J. MacDonnell & Sarah F.
Bates eds., Island Press 1993). Sustainable
development does not imply sustainable
growth. “Growth conveys the idea of physical or
quantitative expansion of the economic sys-
tem. By contrast, development is a qualitative
concept incorporating notions of improvement
and progress and including cultural and social,
as well as economic dimensions.” Andrew
Blowers, The Time for Change, in PLANNING FOR A
SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENT 2, 5 (Town & Country
Planning Ass’n 1993). Sustainability seeks to
develop values that fundamentally reshape
lifestyles (socio-cultural norms) in accordance
with the limitations necessitated by a sustain-
able society. See generally Dennis Pirages,
Sustainability as an Evolving Process, 26 FUTURES 197
(1994).
Carrying Capacity. Many of the values in
sustainable development are also embodied in
the concept of carrying capacity, which has
been defined as “the number of people who,
sharing a given territory, can be supported at
any time on a sustainable basis, taking into
account known resources, as well as socio-cul-
tural factors.” MICHAEL CARLEY & IAN CHRISTIE,
MANAGING SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 43 (Univ. of
Minn. Press 1993). Carrying capacity forces
planners to focus on existing social values and
priorities to determine the threshold at which
further growth and development would destroy
community values or damage the ecosystem
beyond its regenerative capacity. See PETER W.
HOUSE & EDWARD R. WILLIAMS, THE CARRYING
CAPACITY OF A NATION: GROWTH AND THE QUALITY OF
LIFE 4, 42-43 (Lexington Books 1971). While
there is no clear methodology for addressing
the myriad issues raised by the carrying capac-
ity theory, the concept provides an important
analytical framework for beginning to under-
stand the notion of trade-offs overtime. It
forces the planning process to approach prob-
lems holistically, seeking to identify social, cul-
tural and economic trade-offs that must be
made today in order for a region to continue
developing into the future. See STEPHEN MILLS ET
AL., SAVING FOR THE FUTURE (Sierra Club Local
Carrying Capacity Campaign 1995).
Ecology. Similar to sustainable develop-
ment and carrying capacity, the concept of ecol-
ogy attempts to highlight the interrelationship
of human and biotic environments. It attempts
to force recognition that any environmental
impact is inherently a human impact. The ethic
of ecology “argues that people are obliged to
protect natural systems, even beyond whatever
‘payoff’ there may be for humans as a part of
nature . . . [and that] people are expected to do
something because it is right even when it con-
flicts with their immediate self-interest.” BATES
ET AL., supra note 3, at 188. An example of this
would be to forgo additional agricultural pro-
duction in order to preserve a biologic environ-
ment that supports migratory birds. The first
and most famous articulation of the ecology
ethic is found in Aldo Leopold’s A Sand County
Almanac. ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC
AND SKETCHES HERE AND THERE (Oxford Univ.
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Press 1949). From this collection of essays are
the oft-quoted lines that are held out as the
first articulation of the ecology ethic: “A thing is
right when it tends to preserve the integrity, sta-
bility, and beauty of the biotic community. It is
wrong when it tends otherwise.” Id. at 201. A
branch of the ecology ethic, known as “deep
ecology,” goes further in arguing that anthro-
pocentric values must be replaced with biocen-
tric values that recognize the intrinsic worth
and rights of all species. See Merle Jacob,
Sustainable Development and Deep Ecology: An
Analysis of Competing Traditions, 18 ENVTL. MGMT.
477, 479-82 (1994).
Equity or Fairness. Equality is often used
to refer to how income or wealth is distributed.
In relation to natural resources, equity is often
measured in terms of access or capacity to use
natural resources. The concept of equity is also
called “distributive justice.” See generally JOHN
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 3-10 (Harvard Univ.
Press 1971) (arguing that social justice is to be
regarded as providing a set of principles
“whereby the distributive aspects of the struc-
ture of society are to be assessed”). Equality
can also refer to all persons having an equal
voice or right to be heard in a decision-making
process, and a right to have their views judged
on the merits, without bias or prejudice. See
MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH:
PHILOSOPHY, LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 39-40
(Cambridge Univ. Press 1990). Five principles
for achieving equity in water resources deci-
sions have been identified: (1) reciprocity—dis-
tributive advantages and costs should be
shared by all community members, (2) value-
pluralism—rights to use water for whatever
purpose should be respected as long as the
resource is not degraded or harmed, (3) partic-
ipation—water claims consistent with stated
values should always be accommodated in
resource allocation, (4) promises—agreements
made in good faith should be obeyed, and (5)
responsibility—present uses of water should
take account of future generations. See Helen H.
Ingram et al., Replacing Confusion with Equity:
Alternatives for Water Policy in the Colorado River
Basin, in NEW COURSES FOR THE COLORADO RIVER:
MAJOR ISSUES FOR THE NEXT CENTURY 177, 186-89
(Gary D. Weatherford & F. Lee Brown eds., Univ.
of N.M. Press 1986).
Intergenerational Equity. The concept of
intergenerational equity evolves from the
notion that use of natural resources by the cur-
rent generation has impacts on the availability
and use of those resources by future genera-
tions. Three principles of intergenerational
equity have been identified. First, each genera-
tion must conserve the diversity of the natural
and cultural resources base, so that it does not
unduly restrict the options available to future
generations in solving their problems and sat-
isfying their own values. Second, each genera-
tion must maintain and pass on a natural envi-
ronment comparable in quality to that which it
inherited. Finally, each generation must pre-
serve the right of access to the legacy of past
generations and conserve this access for future
generations. See Edith Brown Weiss,
Intergenerational Fairness and Water Resources, in
SUSTAINING OUR WATER RESOURCES 3-10 (Nat’l
Academy Press 1993).
Conservation. Conservation is often asso-
ciated with the simple concept extending the
usable life of natural resources through their
effective management. This is often referred to
as the utilitarian value in conservation. See Fred
T. Wildes, Recent Themes in Conservation Philosophy
and Policy in the United States, 22 ENVTL.
CONSERVATION 143, 145 (Summer 1995). Several
authors have noted, however, that:
Today, conservation comprehends a
wider view of resources. The focus is no
longer exclusively on fulfilling immedi-
ate human wants. There is a deeper
recognition that humans are a part of a
larger system and are obliged to con-
serve natural resources for their own
good as well as the good of future gen-
erations and other species.
The principle of conservation calls
for meaningful consideration of conse-
quences of proposed water uses. It
demands that the advantages and dis-
advantages of every water use be care-
fully weighed. It asks that a proposed
use be considered in relation to the
whole community, that the use be no
more than necessary, that its harmful
effects on others be minimized or
avoided.
BATES ET AL., supra note 3, at 181.
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